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Abstract 
 
 Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection has provided perhaps the 
most significant challenge that Christian theology has faced in the last 150 years. 
Although many philosophers of religion have attempted syntheses of religion and 
Darwinism, comparably less attention have been paid to how Darwin’s theory of 
evolution invites reinterpretations of the particular grammar and specific content of 
Christian doctrine. This thesis, an exercise in systematic theology, critically examines 
Christian belief in the Person of Christ in light of Darwinism, approaching key 
questions as topics for theological, rather than philosophical, reflection. After Darwin, 
traditional anthropocentric models of Christian doctrine, focussed on God’s 
relationship with the human person in Jesus Christ, are found to be inadequate. Since 
the human being is continuous with the wider animal, vegetable, and geological 
realm, inextricably linked with the wider ecosphere, Christian theology should now 
focus on God’s relationship to the whole cosmos in Christ, viewing the whole 
universe as made in the image of God. Likewise, traditional notions of Christian 
teleology need to be revised in light of Darwinism. This thesis represent a 
constructive theological revisioning of Christian doctrine – and specifically 
Christology – seeking to understand Christian faith in Jesus Christ in light of 
scientific knowledge. Since Teilhard de Chardin provided the most sustained and 
coherent attempt to revision Christian doctrine in light of evolution, the thesis 
provides a critical reading of his work, identifying areas of critical weakness in 
Teilhard’s responses to theology’s new challenges. Crucially, Teilhard’s Lamarckian 
and Bergsonian assumptions are seen to render his theology of evolution 
questionable: the rise of neo-Darwinism has meant that his work has become outdated 
and in need of revision. Although Teilhard asked many of the right questions, his 
solutions are now inadequate. Following a close reading of neo-Darwinist sources, the 
thesis provides a constructive corrective to Teilhard’s cosmic Christology, which is 
both faithful to orthodox sensibilities and relevant to contemporary developments. 
Christ and Evolution: A Reinterpretation of Teilhard de Chardin’s Christology 
After Neo-Darwinism 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction       p.1 
 Literature Survey       p.3 
  a. Theology and Evolution     p.3 
  b. Christology and Evolution     p.9 
  c. Teilhard de Chardin     p.13 
 Method and Scope       p.15 
  a. Statement of the Problem     p.15 
  b. Theology       p.16 
  c. Philosophy       p.18 
  d. Science       p.18 
 Outline of Thesis       p.20 
 
 
Chapter 2 – Henri Bergson and the Theory of Evolution   p.25 
 Evolution as Progress       p.27 
  a. The Paradigm of Change     p.28 
  b. “Mechanism” and “Finalism”    p.29 
  c. Criticism of Darwinism     p.31 
  d. Proximity to Lamarckism     p.34 
  e. Bergson’s Theory of Evolution    p.35 
  f. Theological Interpretations of Bergson’s Theory  p.38 
 Consciousness: Panpsychism and Pantheism    p.41 
  a. Panpsychism      p.42 
  b. Panpsychism and Lamarckism    p.46 
  c. Consciousness and the Survival of Death   p.48 
 Conclusion        p.49 
 
 
Chapter 3 – Teilhard de Chardin’s Theory of Convergent Evolution p.51 
 Method: Teilhard as Scientist      p.52 
 Evolution as Progression: Some Preliminary Points   p.55 
  a. Progress       p.55 
  b. Teilhard as Creationist     p.56 
 Teilhard’s Evolutionary Theory as Complexification,  
 Consciousness, and Convergence     p.57 
 Complexification       p.58 
  a. Complexification as Progression    p.58 
  b. Orthogenesis as Bergsonian Novelty   p.60 
 Consciousness        p.61 
  a. Consciouness as Progress     p.61 
  b. Teilhard as Synthesis between Lamarck and Darwin p.63 
 Convergence        p.66 
 Critical Thresholds, Emergence, and Qualitative Progression p.70 
  a. From Biosphere to Christosphere    p.72 
 Implications of Teilhard’s Theory of Evolution   p.73 
  a. The Primacy of Humanity     p.73 
  b. The Role of Death      p.74 
  c. The Evolution of Evolution    p.75 
  d. The Role of Politics     p.77 
  e. The Role of Technology     p.78 
  f. The Role of Education     p.82 
  g. Revelation: The Christological Significance  
      of Education      p.84 
  h. The Role of the Church     p.86 
 Criticism of Teilhard       p.87 
  a. Eternity of Matter      p.88 
  b. Pantheism and The Loss of the Individual   p.89 
 Conclusion        p.94 
 
 
Chapter 4 – The Relationship between Matter and Spirit: Teilhard’s 
                        Interpretation of Nature and Grace    p.95 
 The Religious Dimension of Evolution    p.96 
 The “Within” and “Without” of Matter    p.97 
  a. The Relationship of Creation and Deification  p.98 
  b. The “Within” of Matter as The Soul   p.99 
  c. The Increasing Importance of the “Within”  p.100 
  d. Matter and Spirit as Darwinian and Lamarckian 
       Synthesis       p.101 
  e. The Primacy of Spirit     p.102 
 Teilhard’s Mysticism: To Heaven Through Earth   p.103 
  a. The Great Monad      p.104 
 Relationship of Matter and Spirit as the Relationship between 
 Nature and the Supernatural      p.105 
  a. Teilhard’s Anticipation of Late Twentieth Century 
       Catholic Theology      p.106 
  b. The Continuing Need for Grace    p.108 
 Panpsychism        p.108 
  a. A Convergent Consciousness    p.108 
  b. Teilhard and Bergson     p.110 
  c. Panpsychism and the Great Monad   p.112 
 God, Panpsychism and Vitalism     p.113 
  a. God as Attraction      p.114 
  b. Teilhard’s Understanding of God as Bergsonian 
       Élan Vital       p.115 
  c. The Vitalistic Principle as Love of God   p.116 
 Nature and Grace       p.119 
  a. “Seeing” and “Vision”     p.119 
  b. “Seeing” as Faith      p.122 
  c. Teilhard’s Jesuit Spirituality    p.122 
  d. Synergia       p.123 
  e. The Role of the Scientist     p.126 
  f. The Role of Love      p.128 
  g. The Role of Passivities     p.129 
 Original Sin and the Need for Christ     p.130 
  a. Sin as Statistical Necessity     p.130 
  b. The Role of Christ      p.134 
 
 
Chapter 5 – Teilhard de Chardin and the Cosmic Christ   p.137 
 The Starting Point of Teilhard’s Christology    p.139 
  a. Teilhard and Ignatian Spirituality    p.139 
  b. Teilhard’s Reading of Ferdinand Prat’s Theology 
       of St. Paul       p.141 
  c. Teilhard’s Acceptance of Eastern Christology  p.144 
  d. The Rejection of “Western” Juridicial Categories  p.148 
 Christ as Bond of Matter      p.150 
  a. Christ as Vinculum Substantiale    p.150 
  b. Christ as Élan Vital      p.151 
  c. Christ as Physical Centre of The Universe   p.153 
 Participation        p.154 
  a. Teilhard’s Use of Participation    p.154 
  b. Participation as Divine Milieu    p.159 
  c. Participation: The Relationship between Nature 
       and Spirit       p.163 
  d. Participation, Divine Milieu, and Kingdom  p.165 
 Cosmic Christ and Ascension: The Role of the Resurrection 
 and the Holy Spirit       p.167 
  a. Teilhard’s Theology as Christocentric   p.169 
  b. Ascension and Sacramental Theology   p.170 
 Christ’s Cosmic Function as Third Nature    p.171 
  a. Problems with Teilhard’s Theory    p.174 
  b. Teilhard’s Neglect of the Historical   p.177 
 Omega Point as Parousia      p.178 
  a. The Role of Synergia     p.181 
  b. The Rejection of Indefinite Progress   p.182 
 Conclusion        p.184 
 
 
Chapter 6 – Neo-Darwinism: Teleological Neutrality and 
                       Subjectivism       p.185 
 The Development of Neo-Darwinism    p.189 
  a. Charles Darwin and the Emphasis on Preservation p.189 
  b. Theodosius Dobzhansky: Experimental Evidence 
       of Preservation      p.195 
  c. Julian Huxley: A Further Attempt as Neo-Darwinian 
      Synthesis       p.198 
  d. Jacques Monod: The Primacy of Preservation  p.199 
  e. Richard Dawkins: Further Evidence for the Centrality 
      of Preservation      p.202 
 Contemporary Criticisms of Neo-Darwinism   p.205 
  a. Stephen Jay Gould and Simon Conway Morris: 
       Re-interpretations of The Neo-Darwinian Synthesis p.205 
  b. Epigenetics: A Retrieval of Lamarckian Values  p.207 
 The Neo-Darwinian Synthesis     p.209 
 Criticism of Teilhard       p.212 
 Philosophical and Metaphysical Considerations   p.214 
 Doctrine of Humanity (creatures)     p.215 
  a. The Non-Uniqueness of Humanity    p.215 
  b. A New, Neo-Darwinian Ontology    p.217 
 Doctrine of God       p.219 
  a. Materialism       p.220 
  b. ‘Psychological’ Materialism    p.221 
  c. The Non-Influencibility of God    p.223 
  d. Deism       p.226 
 
 
Chapter 7 – A Reinterpretation of Teilhard’s Christology   p.230 
 The Rejection of Western Juridicial Christology and the 
 Acceptance of Eastern Christology     p.231 
  a. The Eastern Christology     p.232 
  b. The ‘Rejection’ of Eastern Christology   p.234 
  c. Incarnational Deism     p.235 
 Christ as Bond of Matter: A Reinterpretation   p.237 
  a. Christ as “Form” of Creation    p.238 
  b. Incarnation as Proleptic Event    p.239 
  c. A Christological Interpretation of TzimTzum  p.240 
  d. TzimTzum as Formal Deism    p.246 
  e. Incarnation as Divine Milieu    p.249 
 A Re-exploration of ‘Classical Participation’   p.250 
  a. The “Traditional” notion of Participation   p.251 
  b. Participation and The Relationship Between 
       Nature and Grace      p.252 
  c. Participation as Christological Doctrine   p.253 
  d. Participation as Imitation     p.254 
  e. Participation: A Neo-Darwinian Interpretation  p.258 
  f. Participation and Imitation: A Subjective Approach p.261 
 Christ’s Cosmic Function as Third Nature    p.262 
 The Constitution of the God-Man     p.264 
  a. Christ’s Assumption of Creation    p.266 
  b. The Constitution of Christ as TzimTzum   p.269 
  c. Constitution of Christ as Biological Unity   p.270 
 Participation and Imitation: A Subjective Approach   p.271 
 Omega Point as Parousia: A Reinterpretation of Vision  p.274 
  a. Two Biblical Parables     p.277 
  b. The Parable of the Labourers    p.277 
  c. The Parable of the Widow’s Mite    p.278 
 Conclusion        p.279 
 
 
Chapter 8 – Further Problems and the Contextualization in Wider 
                        Roman Catholic Theology     p.282 
 Anonymous Christians      p.284 
  a. “Anonymous Christians” as Ontological Position  p.286 
  b. “Anonymous Christians” in A Neo-Darwinian 
       Context       p.287 
 The Relegation of the Particularity of Christ    p.289 
  a. The Problem of The Particulariness of Christ as 
       Historical Problem      p.289 
  b. The Problem of The Particulariness of Christ in 
       The Context of Neo-Darwinism    p.291 
 The Christocentric Nature of Theology    p.293 
  a. Neo-Darwinism as Christocentric    p.294 
 The Relationship between Nature and Grace    p.295 
   a. Nature and Grace in A Neo-Darwinian Context  p.296 
  b. The Relevance of Vatican II    p.296 
 
 
Bibliography         p.298 
 1 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 Christology – the study of beliefs in the person and work of Jesus Christ – lies 
at the heart of Christian theology; it is, after all, Christian theology. According to the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, the end of catechesis is ‘to reveal in the Person of 
Christ the whole of God’s eternal design reaching fulfillment in the Person’ (CCC, 
1997, p.107). Likewise, Karl Barth affirmed that ‘if we try to look away from the 
name of Jesus Christ even momentarily…Christian theology loses [its] substance’ 
(Barth, 1956, p.347). Therefore, in the Catechism and Barth, there are two remarkably 
influential sources both claiming precisely that Christian theology is impossible, or at 
the very least meaningless, without reference to the person of Jesus Christ. 
 Before Darwin theologians could assert that the human person was the 
pinnacle, or apex, of God’s creation. God had created the world for humanity. For 
Christian theology, therefore, it was only necessary to speak of God’s relationship to 
humanity, focused in the Person of Jesus Christ. As such, much Christological 
reflection concerned itself with what God had done for human beings in Christ. This 
meant that much of Christology was exclusive of the wider universe. After all, 
humanity was special, exclusively made in the image of God and transcended the rest 
of creation. 
 After Darwin, humanity has been displaced from its pride of place, relegated 
to the level of all other creation. Humanity is now nothing more than one result (and 
that accidental) of the laws of natural selection in the struggle for life. Humanity is 
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thus, now, continuous with all other animal life, continuous with the wider sphere of 
biological life, and essentially continuous with the wider universal environment, with 
all its chemical and physical processes. Darwin saw humanity as nothing more than 
one more manifestation of the animal kingdom. In doing this he radically redefined 
what it was to be human. Humanity, after the publication of Origin of Species and 
Descent of Man, was no longer the same. 
 Unfortunately, Christology has not kept up with the Darwinian revolution in 
anthropology (Raven, 1962, p.90). Christ is still understood as having relevance 
exclusively for humanity. The question that obviously presents itself is what happens 
to this exclusive preoccupation with humanity once the concept of humanity has been 
radically reinterpreted? Put differently, what does Christology look like when it is 
claimed that humanity is no longer valued exclusively by God? After Darwin, 
Christology cannot be undertaken in such a narrow and exclusive context. New, 
inclusive language must be used, and new, inclusive Christologies must be 
formulated. Without the ‘entangled bank’ of plantlife, birdlife, insectlife, and ‘worms 
crawling through the damp earth’, there could be no humanity, and, so Darwinism 
suggests, this ‘entangled bank’ is just as valued as humanity. 
 The most notable attempt to begin this reformulation of Christology was that 
of Teilhard de Chardin. After Teilhard, interest in ‘cosmic Christology’ (often 
drawing on early Patristic resources) has flourished. Teilhard saw that evolution 
meant that classical Christology was no longer tenable in modern theology, and 
sought to construct a broader, more inclusive cosmic picture of Christ. The problem 
however, is that Teilhard relied on an evolutionary paradigm that has since been 
shown to be incorrect. This thesis is concerned with reshaping Teilhard’s contribution 
to fit a new updated paradigm. In doing so it will address two major concerns, one of 
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which Teilhard got right and the other of which he was mistaken. These concerns are: 
the centrality of Christ for Christian theology, and the necessity of addressing those 
concerns in the paradigm of neo-Darwinism. 
 
Literature Survey 
 There has been a considerable amount of literature on theology in general and 
evolution, and a small, more limited amount of literature on the specific topic of 
Christology and evolution. 
 
a. Theology and Evolution 
 Starting with the first category, this relationship has been approached in 
various ways.1 John Haught, in his book God After Darwin (2000), notes three 
distinct categories that describe the approach to the question of the relationship of 
theology and evolution: opposition, separation, and engagement (Haught, 2000, 
pp.24-5; cf. Stenmark, 2010, p.278ff.). Essentially, Haught distinguishes between 
seeing theology and evolution as representing one epistemological position, in which 
case they must be opposed (i.e. they cannot both explain the one truth), as two 
epistemological positions, which are subsequently mutually exclusive, or as 
representing a middle-ground, i.e. two epistemological positions that are mutually 
influential. 
 
                                                        
1
 Harrison notes that the increasing popularity of attempts to answer this question is 
due to several issues, namely, ‘developments in the sciences themselves’ (which he 
explicitly distinguishes from ‘a recent upsurge in an aggressive, scientifically 
motivated atheism’), the ‘dramatic technological achievements in the biomedical 
sciences’, and persistent and growing ‘influential anti-evolutionary movements’ 
(Harrison, 2010, pp.1-3). 
 4 
 The first category, opposition, describes the ongoing battle between the New 
Atheist Movement and fundamentalist Creationists. Both sides agree that the book of 
Genesis must be interpreted as giving a literal, historical account of creation, yet one 
argues that it must be false and the other true. One side accepts that science disproves 
religion and the other that religion disproves science. Richard Dawkins (2006) and 
Daniel Dennett (1995), among others, represent one side of this argument, and writers 
such as John Whitcomb & Henry Morris (1961) and Ken Ham (1987), who is also the 
founder of the organization ‘Answers in Genesis’ and the ‘Creation Museum’, 
represent the other.2 
 
 Separatism argues instead that religion and science deal with completely 
different subject matter and as such use completely different methodologies. They 
therefore view religion and science as mutually exclusive; the conclusions of one do 
not impinge upon the conclusions of the other. In doing so they, inevitably, place 
limits upon what can and cannot be claimed by each method respectively. Thus, 
science cannot comment on religious matters and religion cannot comment on 
scientific issues. 
 There is a large spectrum of advocates of this position who, it can be said, 
have their own agenda for doing so. Fernando Canale (2009), for example, argues that 
this outlook means that science cannot disprove the basic outline of the Genesis 
narrative, and therefore uses it to affirm his ‘creationist’ position. In other words, he 
concentrates on the limitations of science. On the other hand, Stephen Jay Gould 
                                                        
2
 It is interesting that Harrison notes that ‘“the conflict myth”, was largely the 
invention of two nineteenth-century controversialists, John Draper and Andrew 
Dickson White’ (Harrison, 2010, p.4). Whilst there ore obvious instances of very real 
conflict – the Galileo affair for example – these are few and far between and do not 
represent the vast majority of attempts to describe this relationship. 
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(1999), who coined the term ‘non-overlapping magisteria’, argues that religion has 
nothing scientific to say and this leaves science as the only authority to comment on 
evolution. He concentrates on the limitations of religion. 
 Other advocates of this position include Haught himself who, in his later 
Making Sense of Evolution (2010), argues that religion and science represent different 
levels of explaining the same phenomenon (Haught, 2010, p.24). Science can only 
answer the how question and religion the why. Ian Barbour (1971), Charles Coulson 
(1958), and Holmes Rolston III (2006), all offer different variations of this same 
argument, as does the Thomist position of secondary causality (cf. Ryan, 2009, pp.49-
50). 
 
 The problem with the first category is obvious: the Genesis narrative should 
not be taken as a literal, historical account and must be disregarded. This means that 
both sides of the conflict are working from an inadequate theology. The problem with 
the second category is less obvious. The problem here is that whilst it may be correct 
to point out that the subject matter and methodology of science and religion is 
distinct, any claim that God directs evolution (or that evolution does the work of God) 
does impinge upon the conclusions of science.  Theologians who accept this outlook 
simply claim that there is a divine influence over science (and particularly evolution) 
but science cannot detect it (cf. Edwards, 1999, pp.46-7). Richard Dawkins astutely 
affirms this criticism writing that: 
 
imagine, by some remarkable set of circumstances, that forensic archeologists 
unearthed DNA evidence to show that Jesus really did lack a biological father. 
Can you imagine religious apologists shrugging their shoulders and saying 
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anything remotely like the following? “Who cares? Scientific evidence is 
completely irrelevant to theological questions. Wrong magisterium!”…You can 
bet your boots that the scientific evidence, if any were to turn up, would be 
seized upon and trumpeted to the skies (Dawkins, 2006a, p.83) 
 
In other words, this approach is only subscribed to as long as it contradicts religion; if 
science were to somehow support religion, so Dawkins claims, this approach would 
be conveniently forgotten. 
 Regarding evolution specifically, even though theologians claim ‘let science 
be science and let theology be theology’ (Haught, 2010, p.22), they still make 
assumptions about the evolutionary process that a strict neo-Darwinian interpretation 
does not allow, as this thesis will show. By claiming that evolution is set up or 
controlled by God, whether science can detect such an influence or not, places 
restrictions on what can and cannot be concluded by science. In other words, it 
contradicts the claim that the two spheres are mutually exclusive. 
 Often, the problem with this approach to theology and evolution is 
dissatisfaction with the sole sufficiency of natural selection to account for the diversity 
and apparent design in the universe. In other words, far from allowing science to be 
science, they argue that science does not give the whole picture. In their own way St. 
George Mivart (1871), Charles Coulson (1958), Karl Rahner (1966), Ian Barbour 
(1971), John Polkinghorne (1988), Philip Hefner (1993), Michael Behe (1998), Denis 
Edwards (1999), John Haught (2000), Arthur Peacocke (2001), Ted Peters & 
Martinez Hewlett (2003), Alistair McGrath (2005), Keith Ward (2006), Francis 
Collins (2006), Holmes Rolston III (2006), Celia Deane-Drummond (2009), 
Alejandro Garcia-Riveria (2009), Fernando Canale (2009), Charles Foster (2009), Ilia 
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Delio (2013), Synthia Crysdale & Neil Ormerod (2013), all claim that a blind natural 
selection of accidental genetic replicating errors3 is not enough. In one way or another 
they argue that some factors of the evolutionary process must be influenced by God, 
and attracted or guided towards some principle, almost always life and/or 
consciousness (cf. Monod, 1972, p.33). 
 Moreover, as this thesis will show, simple adherence to natural selection and 
genetic replication does not guarantee correct evolutionary theory. This thesis, 
following the neo-Darwinian synthesis, argues instead that evolution is ‘concerned’ 
with stability and preservation rather than change and progress, and, as such, the 
emphasis is on the blind and accidental nature of evolution. Evolution is neither 
designed nor is it a teleological process. This does not imply that evolution is not 
creative in the sense of being the way by which change occurs, but it cannot be 
creative in the sense that theologians claim it to be (i.e. the deliberate creation of 
something specific). In short, any attempt to see evolution as a process by which God 
causes new and better life is brought into being fundamentally misunderstands the 
Darwinian evolutionary theory. Any attempt to argue that God controls evolution, in 
any capacity, must be understood as more properly an expression of intelligent design 
and thus creationism. In other words, the acceptance that species are not static and 
have evolved over billions of years does not automatically safeguard against 
creationism (cf. Peters & Hewlett, 2003, p.103; Collins, 2007, p.183; Dupré, 2009, 
p.169; Numbers, 2010, p.137). 
 
                                                        
3
 It must be noted, as will be clarified in later chapters, that the language of ‘mistake’, 
‘accident’, ‘failure’, and ‘error’ should not be understood as pejoratives in the strictest 
sense. 
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 John Hedley Brooke delineates the relationship between theology and 
evolution along similar lines yet he offers another important reason why these 
categories must be rejected. In his book Science and Religion: Some Historical 
Perspectives (1991) he notes that the definitions of science and religion have never 
been agreed upon and mean different things to different people (Brooke, 1991, p.6ff.) 
If a precise definition cannot be agreed upon, then it cannot properly be maintained 
that they deal with separate issues or are at odds with one another. Whilst he also 
criticizes treating science and religion as harmonious (Brooke, 1991, p.42ff.), it is 
clear that Haught’s third category, engagement, must be the one that is explored. If 
theology and evolution are neither conflicted, nor separated, then they must be treated 
as being able to influence the conclusions of each other. The limitations of both 
science and religion are still admitted – there are still areas of theology that science 
cannot comment on and vice versa – yet ultimately the two must be seen as 
complementing each other; ‘their work inevitably overlaps’ (Torrance, 2001, p.6; 
Dobson, 1984, p.211). As Baelz simply puts it, ‘if both [scientific and religious] 
languages are about one and the same world, what is said in the one cannot be 
irrelevant to what is said in the other…to distinguish is not the same thing as divorce’ 
(Baelz, 1972, p.19). Theology must take seriously what neo-Darwinism, as the 
dominant theory, has to say. 
 That being said, many of the theologians already mentioned might disagree 
with their categorization here. They might claim that they do fall into the 
categorization of engagement, rather than separation as argued. However, as it has 
already been claimed, by not taking the neo-Darwinian synthesis as it is (i.e. they 
disagree with the sole sufficiency of blind natural selection), they cannot truly be said 
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to represent the category of engagement. There is thus a need to develop a theology 
that takes seriously the conclusions of the neo-Darwinian synthesis. 
 
b. Christology and Evolution 
 The topic of Christology and evolution is less well treated yet, in light of the 
importance of Christ for Christian theology, it is by far the more important question. 
In many cases the theory of evolution simply replaces the Genesis narrative without 
any wider implications (cf. Klauder, 1971, p.77). In this way, the claim that the 
acceptance of evolution does not guard against creationism is supported. Haught, for 
example, claims to be providing a specifically Christian response to the question of 
evolution (Haught, 2010, p.xiv) yet he makes sparse reference to the role of the 
Christ. Another theologian, Keith Ward (2006), makes absolutely no mention of the 
incarnation whatsoever. Failure to take into account the incarnation fails to 
understand the importance of Christology for understanding all Christian doctrine 
(and betrays an understanding of Christology that separates Christ from the act of 
creation). In this way theologians, regardless of their own claims, do not offer 
Christian interpretations of evolution.  
 One possible reason for the exclusion of Christ from the issue of evolution and 
theology is that it is treated as a philosophy of religion question rather than a strictly 
theological, or indeed Christological, one. Whilst philosophical and metaphysical 
questions are of course important, this thesis will maintain that a specifically Christian 
response to evolution cannot be given without giving Christ a central location in that 
response. 
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 There are, essentially, two distinct paradigms for understanding the 
relationship between Christology and evolution, which correspond to two ways of 
understanding the Fall of humanity. There are those who see creation as complete yet 
‘fallen’, or at the very least in need of redemption (consistent with ‘Western’ 
theologians such as Augustine (cf. O’Grady, 1985, p.119), Anselm (cf. Robinson, 
1926, p.200), and Luther (cf. Meyendorff & Tobias, 1992, p.21)), and those who see 
creation as incomplete, claiming that the fulfillment of creation is a future event 
(consistent with ‘Eastern’ theologians such as Ireneaus, Gregory Nazianzen, and 
Gregory Palamas (cf. Mattox & Roeber, 2012, p.109)). 
 
 As examples of the first paradigm, such writers as Jürgen Moltmann (1990), 
Christopher Southgate (2008), Alejandro Garcia-Rivera (2009), and Jack Mahoney 
(2011), emphasize the death and suffering intrinsic to evolution and the problem to 
theology that it presents. They see the process of evolution through natural selection 
as flawed. The world in evolution is therefore not representative of a world that God 
would have created (cf. Barrera, 2009, p.157; Peters & Hewlett, 2003, p.24, p.78) and 
is in need of redemption. Salvation is salvation from either the paradigm of evolution 
or a world in evolution. 
 Creation and redemption are thus understood as two separate concerns with 
the role of Christ, if not exclusively concerned with redemption, certainly facing that 
direction. To put the point differently, Christ is restricted to the limits of his role as 
saviour. However this narrow designation of saviour is a problem for Christological 
interpretations of evolution. The fact of evolution, regardless of what mechanism is 
used to explain it (e.g. Lamarckism, Darwinism etc.), demands one conclusion that is 
universally agreed upon among those who accept evolution: the Genesis narrative 
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cannot be taken literally. It follows that the fall of humanity was not an historical 
event, as Smith writes ‘the plain fact is that the evolutionist Weltanschauung does not 
admit a primordial state of perfection’ (Smith, 1988, p.138; cf. Peacocke, 2001, p.28; 
Mahoney, 2011, p.14), and therefore it is difficult to explain the reason for the need 
for salvation. Put simply, if there is no fall then there is no reason for Christ, and thus 
no Christology. Canale, too, argues that: 
 
if creation week does not reveal how things actually happened, then there is not 
much reason to believe what it says about salvation or eschatology. If creation 
week did not take place then there was neither a first couple perfectly created 
nor an origin of evil by disobedience to the historical order created by God. 
Then how are we to understand sin and redemption? (Canale, 2009, p.135) 
 
 Regardless of how evolution is understood to proceed it cannot possibly 
accommodate a literal fall of humanity through the actions of a monogenetic couple 
(cf. Collins, 2007, p.126). Therefore Christ’s relationship to the universe cannot be 
seen as solely in the context of sin and salvation, as a ‘restitutio in integrum’ 
(Moltmann, 1979, p.115ff.). As such the classic question ‘if man had not sinned, 
would God have become incarnate?’ needs to be re-examined. Both Augustine and 
Aquinas gave negative answers to this question (cf. Thomas Aquinas, 1948, pp.2022-
3). Post-evolution, however, a different answer must be given arguing for a more 
inclusive incarnation, having a wider scope and a broader relevance beyond the 
narrow focus of both humanity and sin. 
 Evolution, therefore, demands that the narrow ‘substitutionary’ Christ is 
replaced by a broader ‘cosmic’ Christ. Even though, therefore, the theologians 
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mentioned above do not limit that salvific paradigm to the misdeeds of a monogenetic 
couple, they still fall short of what an evolutionary Christology should looks like by 
continuing to see Christ within this narrow category. 
 
 The second Christological paradigm focuses on the role of Christ as creator, 
rather than saviour, and sees the process of evolution as being the way that Christ 
brings creation to fulfillment, with a doctrine of deification usually being emphasized 
instead of salvation (Kärkkäinen, 2004, p.4). Exponents of this paradigm understand 
evolution not as something counter to the plans of God but as being directed towards 
a particular end, as the fulfillment of God’s creating power. Peacocke, for example, 
(although not explicitly relating such an action to work of Christ) writes that: 
 
all the evidence points to a creature slowly emerging into awareness, with an 
increasing capacity for consciousness and sensitivity and the possibility of 
moral responsibility and, I would affirm, of response to God. So there is no 
sense in which we can talk of a fall from a past perfection. There was no golden 
age, no perfect past, no individuals – Adam or Eve – from whom all human 
beings have descended and declined and who were perfect in their relationships 
and behaviour. We appear to be rising beasts rather than fallen angels – rising 
from an amoral (and in that sense) innocent state to the capability of moral and 
immoral action (Peacocke, 2001, p.78; cf. TeSelle, 1970, p.319). 
 
Christ, according to this paradigm continues this work of creation, bringing to 
completion what was started at the beginning of time, with the initial act of creation. 
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 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin not only falls into this category (cf. de Lubac, 
1967, p.120) but he is by far its greatest exponent, the most prominent and influential 
theologian to have tackled the problem of the relationship of evolution and 
Christology (cf. Southgate, 2008, p.25; Corte, 1960, p.91). Teilhard writes that ‘the 
universe has ceased to be the formal garden from which we are temporarily banished 
by a whim of the creator. It has become the great work in process of completion 
which we have to save by saving ourselves’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.91), clearly 
criticizing the first paradigm and arguing in favour of the second. 
 
 Whilst this thesis, following Teilhard, will essentially occupy this second 
paradigm, seeing the role of Christ as central and more inclusive as creator rather than 
saviour, ultimately both paradigms fall short of dealing with the conclusions of the 
neo-Darwinian paradigm. Both see evolution as a temporary phenomenon that must 
ultimately be transcended and that it is Christ that brings about that transcendence. 
Whether evolution is something that humanity needs salvation from or whether it is a 
divine process that needs completion, by claiming that it is only a temporary 
condition of creation fundamentally contradicts the neo-Darwinian synthesis. 
 Nevertheless, since Teilhard came closest to developing a Christological 
interpretation of evolution it will be his work that is concentrating on in developing a 
neo-Darwinian Christology. 
 
c. Teilhard de Chardin 
 Much has been written about Teilhard’s life and theological approach. These 
can be categorized as simple biographies, detailed commentaries on specific aspects 
of his theology, general studies, and studies of his Christology. 
 14 
 There have been a number of biographies written about Teilhard’s life, 
ranging from those who present a novelization of his life (Aczel, 2007) to those who 
present an exhaustive, scholarly study of his life and work (Cuénot, 1958). Other, 
more general accounts are also available (Barbour, 1961; Lukas & Lukas, 1977; King, 
1996). 
 Publications that focus on Teilhard’s thought and work have been written from 
various perspectives. Predictably, much of this work, especially earlier publications, 
was written by Jesuits (Raven, 1962; Mooney, 1966; de Lubac, 1967; Faricy, 1981). 
Other more recent works of equal merit have been written from outside the Jesuit 
order (Kenny, 1970; King, 1997; Grumett, 2005). Whilst many theologians, even by 
their own admission, seek to present introductions to Teilhard’s thought, there are 
some who concentrate on certain aspects of Teilhard’s thought, for example Biblical 
themes (Kropf, 1980), morality (Grau, 1976), or philosophy (O’Connell, 1982). 
 Many of the recent publications regarding Teilhard’s work, which are mostly 
collections of essays, tend to focus on ecological questions (Fabel & St.John (Eds.), 
2003; Meynard (Ed.), 2006; Deane-Drummond (Ed.), 2006). 
 Some theologians have contributed to Teilhardian scholarship, not by 
presenting an explicit commentary or treatise, but by using his theology to support 
their own interests (Fox, 1988; McFague, 1993; Garcia-Riveria, 2009). There is also a 
number of publications on Teilhard that deal with the comparison of his thought with 
Hindu theology, particularly that of Sri Aurobindo, but these lie beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
 A number of theologians have also attempted to explore Teilhard’s 
Christology without reference to his evolutionary theory (Maloney, 1968; Allegra, 
1971; Hale, 1973; Lyons, 1982), as much as such an endeavour is possible. 
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 In terms of the relationship of Teilhard to Darwin, the literature can essentially 
be divided into three groups, namely, those that argue Teilhard and Darwin are 
compatible (generally arguing that Teilhard is a Darwinian (Simpson, 1973; Dodson, 
1984; Meynard, 2006; Aczel, 2007; Haught, 2010)), those who argue they are 
opposed (Medawar, 1961; Birx, 1972, 1991; Grumett, 2005), and those who find in 
Teilhard an improvement on Darwinism (Forsthoefel, 1961; Berry, 2003). However, 
no one has attempted to re-evaluate Teilhard’s Christology in a neo-Darwinian 
context. Those that accept that Teilhard’s evolutionary theory is incorrect simply 
discard his Christology along with his evolutionary theory without attempting to 
salvage it, and thus without recognizing his important contribution to the wider 
question of theological engagement with evolution. After all, as Garcia-Rivera writes: 
 
any contemporary attempt to propose a theological cosmology must begin with 
the work of Teilhard de Chardin…his revival of the cosmic Christ tradition may 
be the only way the church will be able to make sense of her identity in an 
increasingly global and religiously interconnected world’ (Garcia-Rivera, 2009, 
pp.50-1) 
  
 
Method and Scope 
a. Statement of The Problem 
 The question of presenting a Christian response to the challenges of evolution 
essentially requires two distinct foci: the need to take seriously the neo-Darwinian 
synthesis and the centrality of Christ for Christian theology. The majority of those 
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who have tackled this question ignore both. None of the theologians considered take 
neo-Darwinism as it is without criticizing some aspect of it, and of those that take the 
centrality of Christ seriously it is arguable whether any come anywhere near Teilhard 
de Chardin in terms of presenting a thoroughly thought out Christology. Teilhard 
stands out among these theologians as presenting an agreeable Christology, yet within 
an incorrect context. It is the task of this thesis to ask what Teilhard de Chardin’s 
cosmic Christology, which is demanded from an evolutionary Christology, would 
look like when it is placed within the context of neo-Darwinism. 
 
b. Theology 
 This thesis, being predominantly concerned with Christology, will necessarily 
engage in constructive systematic theology. More specifically, this thesis is concerned 
with the question of how the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution effects and changes 
Christological doctrine and the role of Christ in the wider sphere of Christian 
theology. As a Christological thesis it will take Teilhard’s position of evolution 
demanding a cosmic Christology as axiomatic, along with the Chalcedonian definition 
of Christ’s person. However, different understandings of the ‘mechanism’ of 
evolution lead to different interpretations of that cosmic Christ. It will therefore be 
concerned with replacing the Lamarckian context of Teilhard’s Christology with a 
neo-Darwinian one. Thus, ‘we must often be prepared to give [Teilhard] credit for 
what he tried to do even when we criticize the way that he did it’ (Hansen, 1970, 
p.vii). Teilhard asked the correct questions, however he failed to provide satisfactory 
answers, because of his reliance on Bergson. This thesis will therefore argue that 
Teilhard’s doctrine of a cosmic Christ can be a fruitful way of dealing with a specific 
Christian response to the question of the role of evolution in theology. 
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 This means that it will employ a method of meaningful doctrinal interpretation 
in a scientific context. As a work of systematic theology this thesis is concerned with 
the re-interpretation of Teilhard’s ideas, not with an interpretation of Teilhard in the 
context of the history of ideas. 
 This also means that textual interpretation and exegesis are not methods that 
will be employed in attempting this question of Christology in a Darwinian 
perspective. This thesis is not concerned with presenting a critique of Teilhard’s 
corpus. It is not a textual study of his work nor an attempt to argue over contentious 
points of his work. Instead, Teilhard is used as an example, a case study, of a 
particular way of dealing with the question of theology and evolution, namely, the 
centrality of Christology for presenting a specifically Christian conversation with 
scientific accounts of evolution. As already claimed, Teilhard has an advantage over 
other attempts precisely because he recognized the centrality of Christ for presenting 
a Christian response. However, the science he engaged with has since been shown to 
be fundamentally flawed. 
 As a result, there are elements of Teilhard’s corpus that lie beyond the scope 
of this study, and this means that not all of his work will be considered. Huchet 
Bishop argues that his work falls into three broad categories, his strictly technical 
contributions as a paleontologist, his scientific synthesis, and his Christology (Huchet 
Bishop, 1961, p.35). Only the latter two categories will be considered in this thesis. 
His some two hundred articles from paleontological journals (cf. Lane, 1996, p.12) 
are not relevant, many of them written after he was censored by his superiors and 
forbidden from writing on theological and philosophical issues. Likewise, his 
personal letters and correspondence will not be considered, as they are largely 
irrelevant to this project in systematic theology. 
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c. Philosophy 
 This is also not a philosophy of religion thesis. A philosophical method will 
therefore not be employed. Inevitably philosophical and metaphysical questions will 
be addressed and dealt with, most notably the question of Darwinian ontology. 
However, as it has already been claimed, one of the major problems with previous 
attempts to answer the question of the relationship between Christian theology and 
evolution is an over-reliance on philosophical, rather than Christological, categories. 
Any philosophical question that is addressed will be done so solely because it makes 
important contributions to the overall project of Christology in a neo-Darwinian 
context. Darwinian anthropology and a discussion of divine activity and influence are 
the only philosophical categories that will be considered as making a valuable 
contribution to this question. 
 
d. Science 
 Stephen Jay Gould writes that Darwin’s intention in writing On the Origin of 
Species was twofold: to present the fact of evolution and to suggest natural selection 
as its mechanism.4 However: 
 
Darwin feared that people might confuse fact with mechanism, and cite the 
unresolved debate about natural selection as denigration for his greatest 
                                                        
4
 It is important to note that the use of the word ‘mechanism’ here, and throughout 
this introduction, is in referring to the ‘how’ of evolution; how is that evolution 
happens. This term ‘mechanism’, however, should not be confused with the term 
‘mechanism’ as a technical term used by Bergson (see next chapter) as an answer to 
this question of ‘how’ evolution happens. This chapter uses the term ‘mechanism’ in 
the sense of the ‘method’ or ‘means’ by which evolution happens, rather then in the 
sense of a ‘machine’, as does Bergson. 
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achievement in establishing the fact of evolution (Gould, 1982, p.xvii; cf. Birx, 
1991, p.60, p.154) 
 
His fear was entirely justified. Even in the twenty-first century, after 150 years of 
continued research and re-interpretation, the theory of evolution is still considered (by 
some) to be synonymous with Darwinism and is sometimes judged entirely on that 
basis. Thus (it is claimed by creationists) if natural selection is insufficient to account 
for the diversity and design in the world, evolution must be incorrect (or at least not 
the full picture (cf. Aczel, 2007, p.250; Smith, 1988, p.xiii, p.1; Lane, 1996, p.xi, 
p.60, p.88)). However, there is another problem that is created in this confusion: 
anyone who accepts evolution is thought to conform, by default, to the neo-Darwinian 
synthesis that is increasingly gaining support in the scientific world. This means, as 
eluded to above, that a number of theologians claim to be adhering to modern 
scientific data – and letting ‘science be science’ – simply by accepting the fact of 
evolution, yet in actual fact their description of evolution (and the model of 
evolutionary mechanism that they work with) is entirely incorrect. 
  This thesis will take seriously the neo-Darwinian synthesis. The biological 
reasons why this mechanism is better than any other will be glossed over, accepting 
the primacy of the neo-Darwinian synthesis as an axiom (cf. Weinert, 2009, p.96, 
p.173; O’Leary, 2007, p.132; Bynum, 2009, p.xlix; Peacocke, 2001, p.66; McCarty, 
1976, p.131; Elliot, 2012, p.10; Dodson, 1984, p.150; Huxley, 1942, p.457ff.). Indeed, 
even Teilhard accepts that ‘neo-Darwinism at present holds the ascendency in the 
eyes of biologists’ (Teilhard de Chardin, p.196). 
 This thesis, therefore, is not scientific in nature. It will use Dawkins’ definition 
of the difference between Darwinism and Lamarckism, that: 
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we give the name Darwinism to the theory that undirected variation in an 
insulated germ-line is acted upon by selection of its phenotypic consequences. 
We give the name Lamarckism to the theory that the germ-line is not insulated, 
and that environmentally imprinted improvements may directly mould it 
(Dawkins, 1999, p.167) 
 
It is the former, Darwinism, that has won the day. However, it will not be concerned 
with arguing why that is the case, only with presenting an interpretation of that theory 
that highlights why it cannot be used as others have. It is then concerned with using 
this understanding to re-interpret Teilhard’s Christology, replacing the Lamarckian 
influence that he inherited through Bergson. 
 Ultimately, of course, it may come to pass that the neo-Darwinian synthesis 
that is enjoying such support will itself become insufficient and a new evolutionary 
paradigm is needed (cf. O’Connell, 1982, p.168). At such time a new evolutionary 
Christology will be needed. However, this does not impinge upon the need to present 
a neo-Darwinian Christology now, nor that such an endeavour is not a worthwhile 
task (cf. Mooney, 1966, p.201). All it does mean is that scientific knowledge is 
provisional. Yet this scientific knowledge shapes theological discourse (assuming that 
Haught’s third category, engagement, is adhered to), and therefore presenting a neo-
Darwinian Christology is useful in its own right. 
 
Outline of Thesis 
 The first chapter will present a brief overview of Henri Bergson’s evolutionary 
theory as this provides the basis for Teilhard’s own evolutionary theory. It will be 
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shown that Bergson’s theory opposed Darwinism. Bergson is important because he 
provides the context in which Teilhard developed his own evolutionary theory and 
Christology. 
 Chapters two and three will discuss Teilhard de Chardin’s evolutionary theory, 
exploring the similarities that he shares with Bergson, as well as the major themes that 
dominated his large corpus. Of these themes the role of matter and spirit is of special 
importance, and includes the idea of panpsychism. The role of what Teilhard calls 
“critical thresholds” – a manifestation of evolutionary direction – and the role of 
vision – the tension between nature and the supernatural – will also be explored. It 
will be shown that Teilhard de Chardin attempted to combine a Darwinian and 
Lamarckian theory of evolution that argued that evolution was the complexification of 
creation. With the complexification of matter comes a complimentary 
complexification of spirit and consciousness, directed towards God. In fact, it will be 
shown that, for Teilhard, evolution was primarily concerned with the ascent of spirit 
towards God, and the complexification of matter was nothing more than the outward 
manifestation of such an ascent. For Teilhard, this rise in consciousness means that 
humanity ultimately has a part to play in the continual evolutionary ascent to God – 
the more conscious life becomes, the more directed evolution becomes – and this is 
what Teilhard calls ‘vision’, humanity’s realization that evolution is deification, and 
its active attempt to quicken its coming. 
 In chapter four it will be shown that for Teilhard this coming deification 
coincides with the second coming of Christ. This means, therefore, that the 
evolutionary ascent is the building of the body of Christ. Evolution, which is both 
creation and deification, is God creating a body for Christ. This means that, for 
Teilhard, Christ is unmistakably at the centre of his evolutionary theory. It will be 
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shown that the incarnation – the historical body of Christ – is for Teilhard the catalyst 
of evolution, the guiding force behind evolution, and the affirmation that the end of 
evolution is approaching. One of the more important Christological doctrines that 
Teilhard developed in this context is the postulation of a third Christological nature – 
the cosmic Christ – which Teilhard argued for in order to distinguish the historical 
incarnation from the sacramental or mystical body of Christ, assumed at the Parousia, 
when God will be all in all. 
 Following the discussion of Teilhard, this thesis will move onto a discussion 
of the neo-Darwinian synthesis together with its characteristic denial of teleology and 
direction within evolution. It will show that evolution is neither directed nor even a 
process, but simply the result of imperfect replication and copying. With reference to 
a number of important biologists and geneticists it will be shown that evolution is 
more concerned with preservation than with change, and that change only occurs 
when preservation is imperfect; change is an accidental byproduct of this imperfect 
replication. The very same deleterious effects on genes caused under laboratory 
conditions that cause imperfect replication are precisely the same effects noticed in 
nature, leading to the conclusion that evolution is only the accumulation of blindly 
selected errors of replication. This means that evolution is not change into something 
but change from something, it is always a backwards looking phenomenon rather than 
a forward-looking one. This leads to Jacques Monod’s important conclusion, 
supported by Dawkins and Dennett, that the appearance of design is always a 
retrospective application of value from hindsight. This chapter will also consider the 
contributions of Stephen Jay Gould and Simon Conway Morris as representatives of 
arguments over the relative frequency of evolutionary change and the number of 
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possible mutations that are open to evolution, and the recent discipline of epigenetics, 
which some claim argues in favour of Lamarckism. 
 Such an understanding of evolution leads to a number of important 
philosophical and metaphysical conclusions that need to be affirmed before a 
reinterpretation of Christology is attempted. These issues will be a reinterpretation of 
anthropology and a doctrine of humanity, and a reinterpretation of theology5 and a 
doctrine of God. The primary focus of these considerations is the rejection of 
teleology from evolutionary theory, and the affirmation that God does not treat 
humanity any differently to the rest of creation. If evolution is not an advance (and 
humanity are not in need of salvation) then there is nothing to separate humanity from 
the rest of creation; if humanity is ‘saved’ through Christ then all of creation is. Such 
a position is also affirmed, it will be argued, by ‘scientific’ deism. In other words neo-
Darwinism makes important suggestions for anthropology and theology, and these 
help provide a unified creation in which God is relevant to all creatures equally. 
 The penultimate chapter of the thesis will then consider what a reinterpreted 
doctrine of the cosmic Christ must look like when the old Lamarckian evolutionary 
theory is replaced with a neo-Darwinian one, built around the framework of the 
philosophical considerations discussed in the preceding chapters. It will be shown 
how these themes can be reinterpreted to make Teilhard’s doctrine of the cosmic 
Christ very much relevant to modern theology. Some of the more important issues 
that will be tackled revolve around the constitution of the God-Man, and how a 
reinterpretation of the hypostatic union grounds this Christology. Likewise, and as a 
result of this reappraisal of the hypostatic union, the Teilhardian theme of vision will 
                                                        
5
 ‘Theology’ is used here to refer to doctrines of God as opposed to Christology 
(doctrines of Christ) and pneumatology (doctrines of Spirit) or ‘theology’ as a wider 
subject area. 
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be reinterpreted to affirm the subjective and relative dimensions; dimensions that are 
supported by the neo-Darwinian synthesis. 
 Lastly, it will be shown that the conclusions reached in the discussion of neo-
Darwinian Christology are not alien to contemporary Roman Catholic theology. 
Using Karl Rahner as a conversation partner, it will be shown that the themes are 
issues relevant to this discussion, and the problems encountered are precisely the 
same themes and problems that have been at the centre of Roman Catholic discourse 
in the late twentieth century. This helps to contextualize this discussion and show how 
a neo-Darwinian Christology, so expounded, can make meaningful contributions to 
the wider debate in Roman Catholic theology. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Henri Bergson and the Theory of Evolution 
 
 
 As Teilhard de Chardin is so important for understanding the role of evolution 
in modern theology it is important to contextualize his ideas. Such a context can be 
found in the writing of French philosopher Henri Bergson. Birx confirms: ‘[Bergson’s 
Creative Evolution] had a profound influence on Teilhard’s thought’ (Birx, 1972, 
p.5), and that ‘Bergson’s far-reaching influence is especially noticeable in the 
evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’ (Birx, 1991, p.175; cf. Birx, 
1972, p.34; Grim & Tucker, 2006, pp.64-5; Tharakan & Maroky, 1981, p.130).6 
Teilhard himself points to his indebtedness to Bergson, referring to himself as both a 
Lamarckian and a Bergsonian (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965a, p.130; cf. Corbishley, 
1971, p.25). He also suggested that Bergson should be used as an evangelistic tool in 
making Christianity appealing to the Far East, further supporting the central role that 
Bergson played for Teilhard (Cuénot, 1958, pp.214-5). 
 Grumett notes that Bergson’s influence on Teilhard was far reaching, and 
probably extends to well before Teilhard began his intellectual career as a Jesuit. 
According to Grumett, ‘it is likely that the [Teilhard] family, via [Emmanuel, 
                                                        
6 Other influences such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Grumett, 2005, p.109ff; de 
Lubac, 1967, p.86), Maurice Blondel (Raven, 1962, p.101; de Lubac, 1967, p.178; 
Marnette, 1981, p.134f.), Edmund Husserl (Grim & Tucker, 2006, p.64; Cuénot, 
1958, p.376; de Lubac, 1967, p.169), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Grim & Tucker, 2006, 
p.64), Pierre Duhem (O’Connell, 1982, p.14, 59), John Henry Cardinal Newman 
(Cowell, 2006, p.193ff.), Pierre Rousselot (O’Connell, 1982, p.41; Lukas & Lukas, 
1977, p.120), Ferdinand Prat (Lyons, 1982, pp.148-59) and Joseph Huby (Hale, 1973, 
p.36) are also suggested. However, Bergson, who directly influenced Teilhard’s 
evolutionary position, can be seen as more important to the question at hand. 
 26 
Teilhard’s father (cf. Cuénot, 1958, p.3)], would have been exposed to early 
Bergsonian ideas’ (Grumett, 2005, p.79-80). Teilhard’s development from a curious 
child to a respected academic, even though he spent some of it in exile in the South of 
England, would have happened in an environment that was very receptive to 
Bergson’s ideas. It is easy to forget that Bergson was a Nobel Prize winner of 
international repute, who resided near Teilhard’s family (cf. Grumett, 2005, p.79). 
Indeed Hanson is probably right to observe, ‘Teilhard could not help being influenced 
by him’ (Hanson, 1970, p.169). Teilhard may have been swayed by Bergson’s book 
Creative Evolution (1911), however the geological interests of his father, which 
probably first exposed Teilhard to Bergson’s ideas as a child, could have provided a 
fertile base for Teilhard’s final acceptance of evolution. 
 Whilst Bergson wrote a number of important works, this chapter will 
concentrate only on Creative Evolution, with the exception of a brief mention of The 
Two Sources of Morality and Religion. In this second text Bergson explicitly claims 
to be going beyond the theory he espoused in Creative Evolution, adding a religious 
dimension (Bergson, 1935, p.219). This thesis will set to one side Bergson’s treatment 
of other metaphysical subjects such as time, duration, and memory, and criticism of 
Einstein’s theory of relativity (cf. Birx, 1991, p.174), as such topics lie beyond the 
scope of the study. 
 
 This chapter will therefore expound the major themes of Bergson’s 
evolutionary theory, providing a context in which Teilhard’s own evolutionary 
theology can be explored. It will provide a brief summary of the main points of 
Bergson’s evolutionary theory without offering much in the way of critical analysis. 
The important thing here is not to assess the thought of Bergson himself, but to 
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provide a context for the discussion of Teilhard, where Teilhard came from and in 
what system of thought he based his ideas. 
 
Evolution as Progress 
 There are two important themes when discussing Bergson’s evolutionary 
theory: progression, and the unity of nature. For Bergson evolution is progress, an 
irreversible process necessarily providing the offspring of life with a better ‘set of 
characteristics’. To be more evolved is to be better than one’s predecessor. According 
to Bergson: 
 
the history of the evolution of life, incomplete as it yet is…shows us…a more 
and more precise, more and more complex and supple adaptation of the 
consciousness of living being to the conditions of existence that are made for 
them (Bergson, 1911, p.ix) 
 
‘Experience, then’, he continues, ‘shows that the most complex has been able to issue 
from the most simple by way of evolution’ (Bergson, 1911, p.25; cf. Bergson, 1911, 
p.59), thus ‘the essential thing is the continued progress indefinitely pursued’ 
(Bergson, 1911, p.28). Evolutionary change is not just change but progressive change, 
it has a specific direction, and that direction is always towards the more complex. 
 This evolutionary change also provides a biological argument for the assertion 
that there is an essential and fundamental unity to nature; a unity that causes Bergson 
ultimately to claim that any teleology present in the universe must be objective (cf. 
Bergson, 1911, pp.43-6). 
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 Bergson continues that ‘by following the new conception [i.e. of modern 
science] to the end, we should come to see in time a progressive growth of the 
absolute, and in the evolution of things a continual invention of forms ever new’ 
(Bergson, 1911, p.364). Novelty, creative novelty (in other words speciation or 
evolutionary change), Bergson claims, ‘arises from an internal impetus which is 
progress or succession, which confers on succession a peculiar virtue or which owes 
to succession the whole of its virtue’ (Bergson, 1911, p.360). It is difficult to find a 
more succinct expression of Bergson’s evolutionary theory. 
 Although he did not postulate a teleological end to evolution, and, indeed, 
criticised “finality” as a means of understanding the function of evolution, Bergson 
nevertheless understood the process of evolution to be progressing in a certain 
direction. The role that he ascribed to humanity only furthers this interpretation. He 
wrote that ‘everywhere but in man, consciousness has had to come to a stand; in man 
alone it has kept on its way. Man, then, continues the vital movement indefinitely, 
although he does not draw along with him all that life carries in itself’ (Bergson, 
1911, p.280). 
 
a. The Paradigm of Change 
 Essentially the overall ontological paradigm in which this whole theory is 
contained is one of change. The opening chapter of his Creative Evolution, which in 
many respects can be understood as a summation of his previous philosophical works 
on time and memory,7 is mainly concerned with placing the phenomenon of evolution 
within the context of a universe undergoing change. Change, or durée (i.e. duration), 
is the primary mode of existence. He wrote that 
                                                        
7
 See, Time and Free Will (1910), Matter and Memory (1911). See also Pilkington 
(1976) and Birx (1991, p.167ff.) for a concise review of their main themes. 
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duration is the continuous progress of the past, which gnaws into the future and 
which swells as it advances…we are seeking only the precise meaning that our 
consciousness gives to this word “exist” and we find that, for a conscious being, 
to exist is to change, to change is to mature, and to mature is to go on creating 
oneself endlessly (Bergson, 1911, pp.5-8) 
 
A little later, he continued that ‘the more we study the nature of time, the more we 
shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual 
elaboration of the absolutely new’ (Bergson, 1911, p.11). It is this preoccupation with 
‘the absolutely new’, ‘invention’, and ‘novelty’ that came to dominate his 
evolutionary theory. It is precisely because of these features that he argued against 
both Darwinism and Lamarckism, neither of which, he perceived, could explain this 
‘novelty’. Thus it was his notion of change, change as the ever creating of something 
new, which provided the philosophical groundwork for his evolutionary theory. There 
was only one objective mode of existence, and that was to change. All existence 
participated in the one duration. 
 
b. “Mechanism” and “Finalism” 
 Bergson distinguished his theory of evolution on the one hand from what he 
labelled Darwinian “mechanism”,8 and, on the other, from Lamarckian “finalism”. 
Thus Bernard notes ‘Bergson articulates a fascinating understanding of evolution, one 
that offers an intriguing “third-way” between intelligent design theorists and neo-
                                                        
8
 Again, Bergson’s use of ‘mechanism’ should not be confused with the use of 
‘mechanism’ by Gould and used in the introduction. ‘Mechanism’ is used by Bergson 
to suggest the image of a ‘machine’ that dispassionately goes through a process, not, 
as it was used in the introduction, simply to refer to the ‘how’ of evolution. 
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Darwinians’ (Bernard, 2011, p.270). However, Bergson recognizes that he has to 
incline towards “finalism” in categorising his theory, writing that ‘the theory put 
forward in this book will therefore necessarily partake of finalism to a certain 
extent…if there is any finalism in the world of life, it includes the whole of life in a 
single indivisible embrace’ (Bergson, 1911, pp.42-6). In other words, Bergson saw 
himself to be closer to Lamarck than Darwin. He argued that any teleology must 
necessarily be objective (cf. Lacey, 1989, p.177). 
 For Bergson, one of the primary reasons for criticising “mechanism” and 
“finalism” was because neither “mechanism” nor “finalism” allowed for any real 
creation or novelty because the ‘whole is given’ (Bergson, 1911, p.40-1). In other 
words, the whole evolutionary process relies on the interaction between previously 
given postulates. For Bergson the fact that “mechanism” worked with previously 
given ‘stuff’, through which it changed into something else, meant that there could 
never be any real invention or the ‘absolutely new’. The same criticism applied for 
“finalism”. Thus there was no real change, only different configurations of the same 
‘stuff’. As such the concept of duration could not apply. For Bergson only something 
that changed could exist, and if neither Darwinism nor Lamarckism could allow for 
real change then they couldn’t explain existence. 
 According to Bergson, “mechanism” simply repeats what is already 
postulated. As such, it is a ‘merely negative influence’, a ‘passive adaptation’, and 
‘mere repetition’ (Bergson, 1911, p.58, p.62). It is only the following of a specific 
blueprint, so to speak. The same, he claimed, can be said of “finalism”, which is 
simply ‘mechanism in reverse’ (cf. Birx, 1991, p.54). In the case of “finalism”, since 
the universe is proceeding towards a final goal it is never allowed the freedom for 
invention or the absolutely new because it is following a ‘prearranged plan’. For 
 31 
“mechanism” the whole is given at the beginning whereas for “finalism” it is at the 
end (and, in that sense, present throughout). This means that for Bergson both 
Lamarckism and Darwinism represented the same problem, of not allowing for real 
creativity, novelty, or invention. 
 Whilst Bergson understood his own evolutionary theory to be opposed to these 
two understandings of evolution, this chapter will show that despite his arguments to 
the contrary it is more appropriate to see Bergson as significantly closer to 
Lamarckism (Bergson, 1911, p.42). In fact, it could even be claimed, whilst 
acknowledging that there are some nuances, that Bergson is a Lamarckian (Chettany, 
1981, p.119), especially since he acknowledged an ‘internal push’ to explain 
evolution (Bergson, 1911, p.107; cf. Elliot, 2012, p.7), and an objective teleology 
(Bergson, 1911, p.180). This leaves Bergson with no option but to resort to vitalism 
(cf. Haught, 2000, p.61; Monod, 1972, p.34), despite his explicit criticism of it (cf. 
Pilkington, 1976, p.19). 
 
c. Criticism of Darwinism 
 Perhaps somewhat strangely, therefore (since Bergson was critical that for 
Darwinism ‘the whole is given’, i.e. that everything is already determined), one of his 
most important criticisms of Darwinism was the accidental nature with which it 
‘progresses’. In precisely the same way that many creationists and anti-Darwinians 
argue, so Bergson argued that it is unreasonable to suggest that the same evolutionary 
solution can be achieved by two divergent species, separately, solely by accident. 
Using the classic example of the evolution of the eye, he asks how is it possible that: 
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by two entirely different series of accidents being added together, two entirely 
different evolutions will arrive at similar results?...[Darwinism] has great 
difficulty in accounting for the progressive and, so to say, rectilinear 
development of complex apparatus such as [the eye]. How much greater will 
this difficulty be in the case of the similar structure of two extremely complex 
organs on two entirely different lines of evolution!…how could [both the 
vertebrate eye and the mollusc eye] have been preserved through natural 
selection and accumulated in both cases, the same in the same order, when each 
of them, taken separately was of no use…we wish merely to point out that if the 
variations invoked are accidental, they do not, whether small or great, account 
for a similarity of structure such as we have cited…how can accidental causes, 
occurring in an accidental order, be supposed to have repeatedly come to the 
same result (Bergson, 1911, pp.57-9, p.68, p.67, p.60) 
 
In other words, without an evolutionary effort to cause life to develop an eye (i.e. 
vitalism), without evolution being directed by an underlying cause pushing it in a 
certain direction, there is no possible way for such organs to appear in multiple 
species by accident. He wrote that: 
 
such convergence [of effects which combine to form a functioning eye] does not 
appear possible in the Darwinian, and especially the neo-Darwinian, theory of 
insensible accidental variations…[thus] where we fail to follow these [neo-
Darwinian] biologists, is in regarding the difference in the germ as purely 
accidental and individual (Bergson, 1911, pp.80-90). 
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 There is a distinct suggestion of ‘intelligent design’ behind these words (cf. 
Bernard, 2011, p.270). Bergson did not, importantly, argue in favour of irreducible 
complexity, he accepted that, for example, the eye was able to evolve over a certain 
period of time. However, he took issue with the Darwinian doctrine that such an 
evolution can happen solely by accident. Bergson acknowledged that Darwinists were 
‘probably right in holding that evolution takes place from gene to gene rather than 
individual to individual…[but] are probably wrong when they make evolution of 
instinct an accidental evolution’ (Bergson, 1911, pp.179-80). Bergson simply could 
not accept that any change whatsoever, let alone change that produced such complex 
structures and life forms that is seen today, could be the result of purely accidental 
processes. Change is not just change but directed change, and always a change 
towards a greater complexity. He wrote that 
 
it is one thing to recognise that outer circumstances [i.e. natural selection] are 
forces evolution must reckon with, another to claim that they are the directing 
causes of evolution. This latter theory is that of mechanism. It excludes 
absolutely the hypothesis of an original impetus, I mean an internal push that 
has carried life, by more and more complex forms, to higher and higher 
destinies (Bergson, 1911, p.107) 
 
For Bergson, the impetus to evolve comes from within – pointing, in his terms, to the 
objective durée, or consciousness, of which all life is an offshoot. By contrast, strict 
Darwinism argued that all change is the result of outside influences (in the sense that 
natural selection is a passive force that shapes evolution), with the individual 
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contributing, for all intents and purposes, nothing whatsoever to the process (in terms 
of provoking evolutionary change). 
 
d. Proximity to Lamarckism 
 Such a disagreement with Darwin clearly puts Bergson closer to Lamarck, 
however Bergson still nevertheless criticized Lamarckian “finalism”. Bergson’s 
disagreement with Lamarck is essentially the same as his criticism of Darwinism. 
Lacey writes that, according to Bergson, “finalism” ‘commits the same sin [as 
mechanism], for it “implies that things and beings merely realize a programme 
previously arranged”; it excludes invention, creation, and the unforeseen…it is 
“inverted mechanism”’ (Lacey, 1989, p.178). If there is something in the future to 
which evolution is heading then this teleological goal already constricts the universe 
into the forms that it is able to manifest itself in. Indeed, even more so than 
“mechanism”, there is no room for novelty and real change because the universe is 
following a pre-set, or directed, plan (rather than the pre-set rule of Darwinism). 
 Bergson continued that Lamarckians were probably wrong ‘when they regard 
the effort from which instinct proceeds as an individual effort’ (Bergson, 1911, 
p.180). By this he implied that effort played a part in the evolutionary process only 
when it is taken as an objective, rather than a subjective, function. In other words, his 
problem with the Lamarckian appropriation of evolution was that it was too 
subjective; it had too much emphasis on the individual. The duration, or durée, was, 
for Bergson, an objective consciousness, it was an objective element, and therefore 
the change that was responsible for evolution could not be an individual effort. For 
Bergson, if the consciousness that guided the selecting and passing on of acquired 
characteristics was objective, such that all individuals were merely offshoots of one 
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stream of duration, then this passing on of acquired characteristics could not be due to 
an individual effort. In other words, the giraffe did not evolve a long neck because 
individual giraffes strained to reach the tall trees, but because there was something 
objective that was causing all giraffes to do so. Thus, Bergson’s problem with 
Lamarck was that he was too subjective. In one sense, therefore, Bergson’s theory 
was an objective Lamarckism rather than a subjective one. 
 On the other hand, Lamarck’s own concept of “erethism” (that an objective 
principle, filtered through an individual, is responsible for evolution (Lamarck, 2012, 
p.113, p.28)) bears comparison with Bergson. For Lamarck, the movement that 
produced the use of characteristics acquired and passed on was due to an outside 
influence, namely the vital impulse, or what Lamarck calls the caloric fluid (cf. 
Grumett, 2005, pp.199-200). This not only suggests that Bergson’s criticism of 
Lamarck was incorrect, but also, in doing so, it places Bergson’s own theory much 
closely to Lamarck’s than Bergson was happy to admit. 
 
e. Bergson’s Theory of Evolution 
 The clearest exposition of Bergson’s own theory of evolution was in his 
metaphor of a canister holding a jet of steam. He wrote: 
 
let us imagine a vessel full of steam at a high pressure, and here and there in 
[the canister’s] sides a crack through which the steam escapes in a 
jet…evolution of living species within the world represents what subsists of the 
primitive direction of the original jet (Bergson, 1911, pp.260-1) 
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Bergson argued that evolution is the result of a distinct vitalism within the world, 
which caused the continuing creation of the world. There was a vital impetus and 
principle present in the world (the jet of steam), which was duration and 
consciousness, and it was this impetus that both caused and guided evolution, that 
propelled life forward. The cracks in the canister represented speciation; the higher up 
the canister, the more complex. It was this vital impetus that was ultimately 
responsible for the universe as it is. Bergson called this ‘élan vital’, or ‘vital 
momentum’, the driving force behind evolution; ‘the élan vital, for Bergson, is the 
ceaselessly creative cosmic consciousness…which propels the universe forward’ 
(Bernard, 2011, p.235). Every different phylum of evolutionary development 
represented an ‘offshoot’ of this original vital force, responsible for the ‘effort’ of life 
to evolve. Each individual of evolution was a ‘vessel’ through which this ‘steam’ was 
filtered. Bergson’s vision of the ‘objective effort’ behind evolution meant that he 
could explain it without reference to mechanism or finalism. Instead, to exist was to 
change, therefore evolution was a natural result of this duration, this conscious push 
forward. According to Bergson: 
 
at a certain moment, in certain points of space, a visible current has taken rise; 
this current of life, traversing the bodies it has organised one after the other, 
passing from generation to generation, has become divided amongst individuals 
without losing anything of its force, rather intensifying in proportion to its 
advance (Bergson, 1911, p.27) 
 
This provides more evidence of his vitalistic tendencies. 
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 According to Bernard, ‘Bergson claims that the “consciousness or supra-
consciousness” is the creative cosmic vitality that continuously creates new worlds 
from a dynamic centre of being’ (Bernard, 2011, p.235). The important thing here was 
the emphasis on unity. There was a single ‘dynamic centre of being’ which created 
change because it was duration, and duration was change – all life was an ‘off-shoot’ 
of this ‘dynamic centre’. Chaudhary likewise confirms that ‘Bergson regards vital 
impulse as the real cause of cosmic evolution…life is nothing but the very élan vital, 
it is pure consciousness’ (Chaudhary, 1985, p.42). The unity of life was paramount; 
all life is just different manifestations of the same conscious, changing, objective 
force. 
 Birx also makes it clear that such a vitalism was not only the correct 
interpretation of Bergson’s evolutionary theory, but also placed him within a 
Lamarckian context (cf. Lamarck, 2012, p.31). He wrote that: 
 
vitalism has been advocated by authors of biologically oriented systems of 
evolution, but is best represented in the world of Lamarck and Bergson…[and 
Lamarck] assumed that a pervasive power in evolving nature has been 
propelling life toward increasing complexity and greater perfection, resulting in 
a branching hierarchy of zoological forms ranging from a simple protozoan up 
to the human species…[labelling Lamarck a] quasi-vitalist (Birx, 1991, p.32, 
p.54) 
 
Thus, whilst Bergson notes that his theory of evolution tended towards finalism, his 
criticism of Lamarck’s evolutionary theory was unfounded, since he inadvertently 
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ended up arguing for a Lamarckian theory himself; a nuanced Lamarckian theory of 
course, but Lamarckian nonetheless. 
 Pilkington, too, criticized Bergson for failing to take heed of his own 
criticisms.9 He wrote that ‘it is difficult to avoid the conclusions that such a use of 
“life” [i.e. consciousness and élan vital] as a cosmic principle is open to the fatal 
criticism levelled by Bergson himself at the attempts of philosophers to reduce 
everything to one animating principle’ (Pilkington, 1976, p.19), and thus in precisely 
the same way that Bergson criticised Darwinism and Lamarckism for reducing the 
evolutionary principle to the ‘whole being given’, everything in Bergson’s 
evolutionary theory is reducible to the élan vital. The same criticisms that he levelled 
at mechanism and finalism, at Darwinism and Lamarckism (namely that of the need 
for real change and novelty and the rejection of vitalistic teleology), become precisely 
the same criticisms applicable to Bergson’s own theory. 
 
f. Theological Interpretations of Bergson’s Theory 
 However, what was more important than this ascription of evolutionary 
change to a life force that penetrates all of life, was the idea that this life force, this 
élan vital, was God. Bergson, ‘in a rare use of theological language, explicitly labels 
[this élan vital] “God”’ (Bernard, 2011, p.235) – i.e. ‘God is unceasing life, action, 
freedom’ (Bergson, 1911, p.262) – which it has already been established was change, 
duration, and novelty. Pilkington also commented on this aspect of Bergson’s work, 
writing that ‘the term God in Creative Evolution comes effectively to denote no more 
                                                        
9
 It is interesting that Elliot notes that Lamarck, himself, ‘repudiated altogether a 
“vital principle”’ (Elliot, 2012, p.18), in other words he recognized, as did Bergson, 
that appealing to a vitalistic principle was incorrect, yet, again like Bergson, could not 
develop a theory without one. 
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than the world itself in its dynamic aspect’ (Pilkington, 1976, p.25). All change, all 
duration, all consciousness was now identified as God, or as the action of God. 
 In his later work The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson returned 
to the question of how God fit into his theory of creative evolution, explicitly stating 
that he added to, or went beyond, the theory he outlined in his previous work 
(Bergson, 1935, p.219). He wrote that love, specifically the love of the Christian 
mystic (which is ‘a creative energy which is love’ (Bergson, 1935, p.220)), coincided 
‘with God’s love for his handiwork, a love which has been the source of everything’ 
(Bergson, 1935, p.200). Moreover, ‘its direction is exactly that of the vital impetus 
[i.e. élan vital]; it is this impetus itself, communicated in its entirety to exceptional 
men [i.e. mystics] who in their turn would fain impart it to all humanity’ (Bergson, 
1935, p.201). This love was God himself. He was not separate from his love 
(Bergson, 1935, p.216), thus God himself caused evolution to happen, he was the 
driving force behind it, he was the effort that was needed that caused life to evolve 
into greater and greater complexity and more concentrated consciousness. God was 
the élan vital; this meant, therefore, that Bergson implicitly, and in a rather 
elementary form, expounded a doctrine that would later come to be known as theistic 
evolution: that it is God who causes evolution to happen, and directs its cause through 
varying degrees of influence (cf. Bernard, 2011, p.270). Evolution is how God 
creates. 
 Bergson also understood that this life force represented the consciousness of 
the individual. Along with pantheism (that the objective consciousness or élan vital 
was God), he also argued for panpsychism (that one objective consciousness that 
propels evolution and was ‘filtered’ throughout the universe, becoming the 
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individual’s own effort to change and evolve (cf. Birx, 1972, p.37; Grim & Tucker, 
2006, pp.64-5)). Bernard writes that Bergson: 
 
posit[s] the active, creative presence of a cosmic consciousness within each one 
of us. It is very clear, for him, that our personal consciousness is a direct 
manifestation of the élan vital. It is equally clear that the élan vital, for Bergson, 
is that which seemingly effortlessly coordinates and directs and impels the 
countless, astonishingly intricate physiological activities that come to make up 
all living organisms, including our own (Bernard, 2011, p.235) 
 
Every single individual of nature was an extension of the one guiding consciousness 
of the universe, a consciousness that determines the history of the universe, and this 
consciousness was identified with God. Bernard continued that ‘in Creative 
Evolution, Bergson equates consciousness with the élan vital, making our own 
consciousness into simply one rather limited instantiation of a vaster, quasi-divine, 
cosmic evolutionary impetus’ (Bernard, 2011, p.217), hence the objective nature of 
duration. 
 All life, all change, the whole course of evolution, was directed by God, who 
was the vitalistic impulse itself. The ‘jet of steam’, which escaped from cracks in the 
canister, was God (or at the very least the love of God), and all life was an off-shoot 
of this main stream, all matter was animated by this jet of stream and this jet of stream 
was God. It was a manifestation of that objective, single, stream of consciousness. 
Bergson wrote that ‘it is consciousness, or rather supra-consciousness, that is at the 
origin of life…[consciousness] is the name for that which subsists of the rocket itself, 
passing through the fragments and lighting them up into organisms’ (Bergson, 1911, 
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p.275). Consciousness was life itself, it was the guiding principle of evolution and it 
was life; consciousness and life were synonyms, where life as consciousness presides, 
and one was alive to the degree that consciousness (or for Bergson the élan vital) was 
present in them. This objective durée, the objective duration, was the consciousness 
of all life. In this way, the impetus to evolution, the process of evolution itself, was 
caused by life, it was the effort of life and nature itself to evolve, the opposite to 
Darwin’s theory of accidental genetic change, thus supporting the interpretation that 
actually Bergson’s evolutionary theory was more inclined towards Lamarckism (cf. 
Lamarck, 2012, p.95). 
 Thus, despite Bergson’s protestations to the contrary, his philosophy cannot 
shake the label of pantheism. Pilkington acknowledged that Bergson understands that 
this ‘“creative energy”…is God himself’ (Pilkington, 1976, p.22). He could not both 
argue a) that God was synonymous with the life impetus, that the cause of all life and 
evolution was God directly, and b) that this God was also separate and autonomous 
from his creation. It is important to note that Bergson did not explicitly identify 
himself as a pantheist. The inclusion of God into Bergson’s theory was more of an 
afterthought. However, the identification of a postulated objective stream of 
consciousness means that Bergson could not escape the charge of pantheism. 
 
Consciousness: Panpsychism and Pantheism 
 Bergson’s idea of an objective stream of consciousness, that was responsible 
for guiding and directing the evolutionary movement, was equated not just with a 
divine influence, but also with God himself. Consciousness for Bergson, therefore, 
leant towards panpsychism. However, Bergson did not stop there. Consciousness 
came to occupy a much larger role in the way he described and understood the 
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mechanics of evolution, and, perhaps more importantly, how this objective durée 
came to be manifested in the individual. 
 
a. Panpsychism 
 For Bergson, consciousness was separate from the brain. Or more precisely, 
consciousness did not originate in the brain, which was only a ‘vessel’ through which 
consciousness was filtered. He wrote that 
 
consciousness does not spring from the brain; but the brain and consciousness 
correspond because equally they measure, the one by the complexity of its 
structure and the other by the complexity of its awareness, the quantity of 
choice that the living being has at its disposal (Bergson, 1911, p.277) 
 
Bernard clarified that ‘while our subconscious levels of awareness may be filtered in 
and through the brain (thus creating wide-ranging cerebral effects), these 
subconscious levels of awareness are not produced by the brain’ (Bernard, 2011, 
p.219). 
 For Bergson, although consciousness did not originate in the brain, the degree 
to which consciousness was exhibited in the individual directly correlated to the size 
of the brain: 
 
the increasing complexity of the organism is therefore due theoretically (in spite 
of innumerable exceptions due to accidents of evolution) to the necessity of 
complexity in the nervous system (Bergson, 1911, p.256) 
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In this way, there was a primitive manifestation of what Teilhard would later call the 
law of complexity-consciousness; the more complex the brain, the more 
consciousness it can appropriate. 
 Although the cause of consciousness was external to the nervous system, the 
degree to which the individual was conscious and aware was dependent on the 
nervous system. Bergson was explicit in this regard, writing that ‘in animals with a 
nervous system, [consciousness] is proportional to the complexity of the switchboard 
on which the paths called sensory and the paths called motor intersect – that is, of the 
brain’ (Bergson, 2011, p.275). 
 In noting the causal and correlative relationship between matter and 
consciousness, between the ‘complexity of its structure’ in one and the ‘complexity of 
its awareness’ of the other, it is also important to remember that consciousness was 
the primary of the two. Bergson continued that ‘the whole history of life until man has 
been that of the effort of consciousness to raise matter’ (Bergson, 1911, p.278). It was 
consciousness that gave matter the impetus to raise itself. Consciousness was the 
cause of evolution, as was noted above. Evolution was the effort, not of the 
individual, but of the ‘collective consciousness’ to force evolution ‘upwards’ to force 
it to change, and it was this that had a causal effect on matter and evolution. Such was 
the content of Bergson’s criticism of Lamarck. 
 Elsewhere Bergson wrote that 
 
neither this mobility, nor this choice [of the élan vital], nor consequently this 
consciousness involves as a necessary condition the presence of a nervous 
system; the latter has only canalised in definite directions, and brought to a 
higher degree of intensity (Bergson, 1911, p.116) 
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To be conscious does not require the process of cephalisation and the formation of 
complex nervous system such as have occurred in humanity. However, the presence 
of such a system intensified and concentrated consciousness to a greater degree. An 
example of this could be the relationship that the sun has with a magnifying glass; the 
sun does not need the glass to shine its light on the world, but through the filter of the 
glass its rays are intensified. 
 Again, Bergson wrote that, ‘the truth is that the nervous system arises, like 
other systems, from a division of labour, it does not create the function, it only brings 
it to a higher degree of intensity and precision’ (Bergson, 1911, p.116). Thus, again, 
there is this sense of a progressive evolution, and such a progression was manifested 
in the intensity of consciousness, in the concentration of consciousness. There is a 
distinct emphasis on the benefit to the individual of a more complex nervous system. 
Yet, whilst noting that the presence of such a system is not the sole requirement for 
the possession of consciousness, all matter, all extension (cf. Bergson, 1911, p.199), 
has consciousness to some degree. There was a definite direction to Bergson’s 
postulation of panpsychism. Thus, the direction in evolution, the complexification in 
evolution, was judged entirely on the basis of the manifestation of consciousness. It 
was consciousness that permeated through matter, that extended itself in the universe, 
and in certain evolutionary directions, concentrated itself. Indeed ‘life [is] 
consciousness launched into matter’ (Bergson, 1911, p.191), and therefore ‘life is of 
the psychological order’ (Bergson, 1911, p.271). 
 
 One of the important elements of Bergson’s panpsychism, necessitated by the 
fact that consciousness was seen as separate from the nervous system, was that 
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consciousness, in manifesting itself as life in proportion to the nervous system, was 
also manifested in proportion to movement; in other words, not only is there a causal 
relationship between the concentration of consciousness in the degree that certain 
evolutionary off-shoots have developed brains, but there was also a causal 
relationship between the development of a central nervous system and the potential 
for movement that such a direction has developed. According to Bergson, ‘in 
organisms unprovided with a nervous system, [consciousness] varies according to 
power of locomotion’ (Bergson, 1911, p.275). Bergson continued: 
 
the humblest organism is conscious in proportion to its power to move 
freely…[and that] from this standpoint, and in this measure, we should define 
the animal by sensibility and awakened consciousness, the vegetable by 
consciousness asleep and by insensibility…[and that consciousness] probably 
awakens in the vegetable that has regained the liberty of movement, and awaken 
in just the degree to which the vegetable has regained this liberty (Bergson, 
1911, p.117-8) 
 
The vegetable, therefore, is not ‘actively’ conscious. It is probably not aware of its 
environment (due to the lack of sense organs and nervous system), and it is almost 
certainly not self-aware. It is certainly not conscious in the same way that animal life 
is. However, that does not negate the possibility that it has a rudimentary potential for 
this form of consciousness. In this direction it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that 
were plants to eventually develop a need and a means to move, such a movement 
would be a precursor to the development of a nervous system. It may even be possible 
to suggest, in this direction, that as some plants ‘follow’ the path of the sun, so they 
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have a correlative consciousness – just as there is a direct correlation between 
complexity and consciousness, so there is a direct correlation between movement and 
consciousness. 
 
b. Panpsychism and Lamarckism 
 Once again, behind Bergson’s theory of consciousness was a latent 
Lamarckism. The idea that a nervous system would always develop in any life that 
has developed the capacity for movement is a clear example of the internal and 
conscious effort of the élan vital, and certainly a primitive doctrine of acquired 
characteristics. Bergson would claim that since Lamarck attributed the evolutionary 
effort to the individual there is no such problem, for he himself attributed 
evolutionary effort to the vitalistic principle (Bergson, 1911, p.107) – it is not the 
individual that is striving but the élan vital. 
 However Lamarck observed that: 
 
I soon perceived that the intelligent acts of animals are, like their other acts, 
phenomena of animal organisation, and that they take their origin from the 
relations existing between certain moving fluids and the organs which produce 
these wonderful acts (Lamarck, 2012, p.137) 
 
Therefore, the likeness between Lamarck and Bergson, the common ground they 
share, can be seen. Lamarck, like Bergson, attributed evolution to a vitalistic 
principle, a vitalistic principle that may tentatively be understood as God (cf. 
Lamarck, 2012, p.39, p.49). If there is a difference between Lamarck and Bergson, it 
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is a difference of emphasis. Bergson was more explicit in expressing the objective 
element of both systems. 
 Bergson wrote: 
 
it is impossible to consider some of the special instincts of the animal and of the 
plant, evidently arisen in extraordinary circumstances, without relating them to 
these recollections, seemingly forgotten, which spring up suddenly under the 
pressure of some urgent need…we shall suppose that it is by an effort, more or 
less conscious, that the living being develops a higher instinct (Bergson, 1911, 
p.176, p.179) 
 
According to Bergson, Lamarckians are probably right in ‘saying that at the origin of 
instinct there is an effort’ (Bergson, 1911, p.179). Once more, there is a clear 
description of a vitalistic principle, a single objective consciousness, which caused the 
evolutionary movement through change and duration, and thus also caused a higher 
concentration of intelligence and consciousness. 
 
 Panpsychism is at the bottom of this theory of evolution. In fact, not only does 
Bergson’s evolutionary theory not work without panpsychism, but also, in its final 
manifestation (i.e. in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.), it cannot work 
without pantheism either. The love of God moves matter, and in moving it, gives it 
extension and locomotion, gives it duration. In doing so this love of God, this élan 
vital, this consciousness, becomes more concentrated and intensified, leading 
eventually, but not finally, to humanity, in whom alone consciousness has emerged in 
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an individual mode. ‘Man then continues the vital movement indefinitely’ (Bergson, 
1911, p.280). 
 
c. Consciousness and the Survival of Death 
 Bernard also notes that precisely because there is a distinction between the 
nervous system and consciousness there is the possibility to suggest that 
consciousness can survive biological death. He writes that 
 
if this is true and consciousness actually is not dependent upon the brain for its 
existence, but instead has its own independent, flowing, continuous existence, 
then it seems to me that after the death of our physical body we should perhaps 
expect a radical change in the form of our consciousness, but not its utter 
disappearance (Bernard, 2011, p.261) 
 
Indeed, if consciousness is not dependent on the brain for its formation but only its 
manifestation, then it may be possible to suggest that such consciousness can survive 
death. However, if consciousness is simply the manifestation of an objective stream 
of consciousness then that survival cannot be an individual survival. Whilst Bernard 
touches upon an important point the question remains as to whether there is a survival 
of personal identity. In other words if consciousness is objective, such that Bergson 
cannot escape the criticism of pantheism, then he cannot escape the criticism of the 
loss of the individual either. Ultimately, the individual is lost to the objective 
consciousness. 
 The loss of the individual, the exclusion of the individual from any survival of 
death, was always going to be a problem when panpsychism was appealed to, 
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especially when such a panpsychism was linked to the evolutionary process and a 
doctrine of intelligent design of theistic evolution. 
 
Conclusion 
 Bergson must be considered a ‘pantheistic evolutionist’, who was sympathetic 
to intelligent design and theistic evolution. He was a panpsychist, separating 
consciousness from the nervous system and believing it to permeate all matter. For 
him, life is nothing but the manifestation of consciousness. Indeed, consciousness/life 
is the élan vital, the life force or impetus. The more concentrated this impetus 
became, the more complex life or matter became, thus betraying a vitalistic 
evolutionary theory. 
 In this way, Bergson must be considered a Lamarckian, despite his own 
criticism of Lamarck and neo-Lamarckism. Although he attributed the élan vital to a 
collective consciousness rather than the individual consciousness (Bergson, 1911, 
p.250), it was still the effort of creation or life itself that propels and moves evolution, 
especially when he explicitly notes that evolution is directed by particular needs of 
life. 
 The life impetus that causes evolution, however, was as much God as it was 
life itself, and thus he must be labelled a pantheist as well. This “evolution/God” also 
served to push life forward, to the more complex forms of life, and humanity 
represented the crowning achievement of evolution so far – ‘everywhere but in man, 
consciousness has had to come to a stand; in man alone it has kept on its way. Man, 
then continues the vital movement indefinitely, although he does not draw along with 
him all that life carries in itself’ (Bergson, 1911, p.280). 
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 Bergson thus represents a progressive evolution centred upon the rise and 
evolution of a correlative progress of consciousness and complexity, caused by the 
effort of a pantheistic conception of nature, life and God. It is not too much to claim 
that “all” Teilhard did was expound an overtly Christian interpretation of this very 
idea. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Teilhard de Chardin’s Theory of Convergent Evolution 
 
 
 Teilhard de Chardin, born in 1881 in the Auvergne region of France, grew up 
in an intellectual environment in which Bergson was a leading and world-renowned 
academic. It was inevitable that Teilhard would come to be influenced by his 
evolutionary theory, rather than the Englishman Darwin (cf. Grim & Evelyn Tucker, 
2003, p.18; Cuénot, 1958, pp.214-5).10 What set Teilhard apart from Bergson, 
however, was that Teilhard held a very definite and explicit religious conviction that 
informed his evolutionary theory. Although Bergson did, eventually, interpret his élan 
vital along religious lines, his God was the impersonal God of the philosopher, not the 
personal God of Christianity. For Teilhard de Chardin, on the other hand, the role of 
God was primary, and he therefore interpreted the distinctly French progressive 
evolutionary theory of Bergson (Galleni & Scalfari, 2006, p.161) and Lamarck 
(Midgley, 2002, p.7) from a Christian, specifically Roman Catholic, perspective 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.57). Teilhard de Chardin, therefore, represents what 
Bergson would have looked like had he been Roman Catholic. 
 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the role of evolution in Teilhard’s theology is much 
as it is in Bergson’s philosophy. Evolution dominated Teilhard’s theological outlook, 
and everything revolved around this locus of dynamic change. For Bergson, evolution 
dictated the changing nature of the universe, and this led him to formulate his anti-
                                                        
10
 It may also be important that Teilhard was, professionally, a paleontologist, and 
Huxley notes that paleontologists are more likely to come to a Lamarckian theory of 
evolution as orthogenesis because of the nature of the fossil record (cf. Huxley, 1942, 
p.31 & p.38). 
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platonic notion of reality as change (cf. Bergson, 1911, p.8). Teilhard accepted this 
principle with only one slight nuance; he replaced the idea of ‘change’ with ‘union’ 
(de Lubac, 1967, p.198). For Teilhard, therefore, ‘fuller being is closer union’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.31). Change, for Teilhard, is not just something new or 
different, it is uniting; change is change into something more united. ‘The whole of 
evolution’, wrote Teilhard, is ‘reduced to a process of union (communion) with God’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, p.144). 
 This chapter will present Teilhard’s evolutionary theory, showing the 
similarities and differences with Bergson and, at times, with Lamarck (Forsthoefel, 
1961, p.106). This discussion will be divided into a number of sections, outlining the 
important elements of Teilhard’s theory. The most important of these elements are the 
understanding of evolution as a progression and complexification, and seeing 
evolution as convergence rather than divergence. Understanding evolution as a 
convergence leads to Teilhard’s doctrine of ‘critical thresholds’, which will also be 
explored. This discussion will provide the foundation for the next two chapters in 
which the relationship between matter and spirit and the role of Christ will be 
explored respectively. 
 
Method: Teilhard as Scientist 
 Before Teilhard’s evolutionary theory is discussed, a few comments need to 
be made regarding what Teilhard thought he was doing and on his methodology. In 
the opening paragraph of Teilhard’s most famous work, and the only work in which 
he offers a sustained, book-length, systematic treatment of his evolutionary theory, he 
wrote that: 
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if this book is to be properly understood, it must be read not as a work on 
metaphysics, still less as a sort of theological essay, but purely and simply as a 
scientific treatise (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.29) 
 
This does not mean that Teilhard always understood what he was doing as science, 
but it does mean that he saw the evolutionary theory that will be presented in this 
chapter as ‘purely’ scientific.11 
 Perhaps one of the reasons behind such an assertion is the fact that ‘in 
September, 1947…[Teilhard] was told to write no more philosophy’ (Cuénot, 1958, 
p.266). Teilhard, always respectful of authority, would have been very keen to show 
his superiors that he was obeying their commands and that he was not attempting to 
converse on topics of theology or philosophy, but was adhering to their mandate of 
writing only on science. 
 However, many commentators have questioned the scientific ‘badge’ that has 
been placed on this work. It is interesting that when Harper and Collins conducted a 
survey of the most important spiritual books published in the twentieth century, 
‘Teilhard’s The Phenomenon of Man was found to be number one’ (Salmon, 2011, 
p.2). McCarty also evidences the non-scientific nature of Teilhard’s work, writing that 
because Teilhard’s projections are based upon non-laboratory work, ‘this has caused 
many orthodox biologists to reject Teilhard as non-scientific and his program as 
fantasy’ (McCarty, 1976, p.131). 
 What Teilhard did, rather, was to take what he knew about the past 
‘scientifically’ and use it to postulate a future ‘theologically’ (cf. Lane, 1996, p.19; 
Smith, 1970, p.47; Blair, 1970, p.95; Cuénot, 1958, p.146, p.212; McCarty, 1976, 
                                                        
11
 For a discussion of Teilhard’s science see McCarty, 1976, p.36ff, pp.130-3; Kropf, 
2006, p.144; Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.47n1. 
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p.83; Maroky, 1981, p.20; O’Connell, 1982, p.135). ‘The past’, Teilhard claimed, ‘has 
revealed to me how the future is built’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.97). Already there is 
comparison with Bergson, who once claimed that ‘the extent of our future is very 
much dependent on how far back we go into the past’ (Fox, 1988, p.107). If the 
process of evolution reveals certain elements about the world now, then it is 
reasonable to postulate a future in which such evolutionary processes continue. Most 
of Teilhard’s theological conclusions, with specific reference to his eschatology, 
were, he believed, the result of purely scientific arguments. Teilhard did not separate 
science and religion into separate spheres, he clearly saw them as informing one 
another; science informed theology. 
 
 There has, therefore, been some scholarly debate as to how to properly 
categorize Teilhard. Most scientists criticize Teilhard for failing to espouse a pure 
science, yet theologians and philosophers also likewise reject him. Francoeur 
observes that Teilhard’s theology ‘is not what we should ordinarily call “science” and 
yet it does not fall into the category of metaphysics or theology’ (Francoeur, 1961, 
p.11). Lane, noting this criticism, therefore prefers to understand Teilhard primarily as 
a mystic (Lane, 1996, p.30). 
 However, Teilhard himself acknowledged that ‘I am neither a philosopher nor 
a theologian, but a student of the “phenomena” in the old Greek sense’ (Reilly, 1961, 
p.51). O’Connell agrees that Teilhard should be considered a scientist in the same 
way that Aristotle was (O’Connell, 1982, p.170). In this way, especially noting that 
Teilhard thought that ‘as we draw nearer to the whole, physics, metaphysics, and 
religion strangely converge’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.119), it is difficult to 
understand exactly what Teilhard considered himself to be. Nevertheless, this thesis 
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will understand Teilhard as a theologian, as someone who attempted to incorporate 
evolution and theology, acknowledging that, whilst there may be other elements to his 
work, it is the theological elements that are of concern. Taking this into account, this 
chapter will focus only on his theological conclusions and the contribution he made to 
the conversation of religion and science. 
 
Evolution as Progression: Some Preliminary Points 
 With an understanding of what Teilhard thought he was doing, i.e. present a 
theory that draws on both science and theology with a strong mystical bent, it is 
necessary to present some preliminary points regarding this theory itself before it is 
considered in some detail. 
 
a. Progress 
 The most important comment that can be made regarding Teilhard’s 
evolutionary theory is that it is concerned, almost exclusively, with progress. 
‘Progress…[is] perhaps the essential element in [Teilhard’s] philosophy’ (Turk, 1970, 
p.11). Indeed, ‘Teilhard was absolutely dedicated to the idea of progress…[and] all of 
this was, to his mind, identified with and supported by the emergent evolutionary 
process’ (Berry, 2003, p.58). Evolution is not a neutral process; it is not something 
that simply happens to the universe. Evolution drives creation into something that is 
inherently better and more complete. Evolution is the process by which creation is 
brought to its completion. Evolution is not just a creative process; it is the process of 
creation. 
 Bergson wrote that ‘no doubt there is progress, if progress means a continual 
advance in the general direction determined by the first impulsion’ (Bergson, 1911, 
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p.109). Teilhard takes over this outlook. He wrote that ‘those who look reality in the 
face cannot fail to perceive this progressive genesis of the universe, and with a clarity 
which leaves no room for doubt’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.3). For Teilhard, this 
observation of progress in the world was unmistakable, it was obvious; no one could 
look at the world around them and fail to see this progress. 
 
b. Teilhard as Creationist 
 Teilhard also took over Bergson’s assertion that God controls this 
evolutionary process (McCarty, 1976, p.55). If evolution is the act of creation, and it 
is God who creates, then it is God who guides evolution (cf. Faricy, 1981, p.56; Brix, 
1991, pp.26-7). ‘A creation of an evolutionary type’, wrote Teilhard, ‘has for long 
seemed to some very great minds to be the most beautiful form imaginable in which 
God could act in the universe’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1966, p.154). 
 This means that Teilhard’s evolutionary theory falls into the category of 
theistic evolution or intelligent design (as did Bergson’s). Evolution is a tool by which 
God creates, as Teilhard writes ‘[we] can see only one way in which it is possible for 
God to create – and that is evolutively, by process of unification’ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1975, p.198). Peters and Hewitt confirm such a categorization of Teilhard’s 
thought. Both in terms of accounting for divine action in the world and in terms of 
positing a causal explanation for the world they place Teilhard nearer to the category 
of intelligent design then any other category of explanation for creation. They write 
that ‘Teilhardianism is somewhat more gradual than ID; yet both find divine design 
embedded in nature’ (Peters and Hewitt, 2003, p.32; cf. Rescher, 2009, p.106). 
Although there are differences in rhetoric, the basic underlying principles are the 
same. Teilhard never understood himself as an advocate of intelligent design in the 
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modern sense of the term (cf. Weinert, 2009, p.139ff.), nor did he argue for the 
presence of irreducible complexities, however, because he saw the process of 
evolution as being controlled by God to bring about his creation, the principle behind 
the two views is the same. 
 Evolution is how God creates. Evolution is thus completely guided by God 
(Mortier, 1973, p.52). As such, he must be categorized as an exponent of intelligent 
design; the world has been designed by an intelligent mind, and that mind uses the 
process of evolution to bring about such design. 
 This categorization of Teilhard as an exponent of intelligent design also means 
that, referring to the discussion in the introduction (cf. Peters & Hewlett, 2003, p.103; 
Collins, 2007, p.183; Dupré, 2009, p.169; Numbers, 2010, p.137), Teilhard is an 
exponent of creationism. Any doctrine of intelligent design or theistic evolution is, in 
principle, a form of creationism (Hale, 1973, p.81). By claiming that God creates – 
that evolution is simply a means to the end of creation – Teilhard is essentially a 
creationist; certainly he is not a ‘young-Earth’ creationist, nor a denier of evolution, 
but a creationist nonetheless. 
 
Teilhard’s Evolutionary Theory as Complexification, Consciousness, and 
Convergence 
 There are essentially three main facets that characterize Teilhard’s theory of 
progressive evolution. These are a) complexification, b) the role of consciousness, 
and c) convergence. These will be treated in turn before the role of what Teilhard 
called ‘critical thresholds’ is explored. This last element of Teilhard’s theory is 
properly a part of the discussion on convergence, but can be seen as incorporating all 
three of these main themes. 
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Complexification 
a. Complexification as Progression 
 The progressive evolution of the universe, for Teilhard, took the form of the 
increasing complexification of the universe; from simple beginnings evolution 
produces all the intelligent life in the world. Teilhard wrote that ‘matter has obeyed 
from the beginning that great law of biology to which we have to recur time and 
again, the law of “complexification”’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.48). 
 For Teilhard, complexification is not just a phenomenon of nature; it is a 
fundamental law of nature that cannot be disobeyed. For Teilhard, evolution is not 
just about the changing form of the universe, it is not just about producing different 
manifestations of life. Evolution is not a directionless process. Rather, evolution has a 
definite direction. Evolution is a process that produces more complex manifestations 
of life. Teilhard argued that life does not just multiply, but this multiplication is also 
an ‘ascent’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.109). This was the way that Bergson 
understood evolution. For Bergson, evolution was not just change for change’s sake, 
it was change in a definite direction. 
 Teilhard also termed this complexification in a definite direction ‘additivity’. 
In the Phenomenon of Man he wrote that matter ‘add[s], one to the other, and their 
sum increases in a pre-determined direction’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.108). 
Teilhard also claimed that this ‘complexity increases in geometrical procession’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.60). This means that evolution is a process of adding 
‘bits’ to one another, forming more complex ‘bits’. The more evolved is more 
complex because it is made of more ‘bits’ of matter. This becomes important in the 
 59 
following chapter when the role of spirit is considered, but for now it is important to 
note this aspect of evolution for Teilhard. 
 However, the most common term that Teilhard employed when discussing 
complexification was ‘orthogenesis’. Teilhard described ‘orthogenesis’ as ‘the 
manifest property of living matter to form a system in which “terms succeed each 
other experimentally, following constantly increasing degrees of centro-complexity” 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.108n1), confirming that he saw it as a synonym for 
complexification in a certain direction. However, in his lexicon of Teilhard’s work, 
Cowell provides a more helpful definition of what Teilhard meant by the term 
‘orthogenesis’. He writes that: 
 
in a biological sense, [it is a] cumulative series of small anatomical (and 
psychic) mutations oriented in the same direction, thereby constituting a 
phenomenon of continuous growth in the same direction…in a 
phenomenological sense, [it is a] a fundamental shift according to which the 
stuff of the universe seems to shift towards corpuscular states of increasing 
complex material arrangement – states that, psychically, are increasingly 
interiorized (Cowell, 2001, p.137) 
 
This process of ‘orthogenesis’, therefore, characterizes evolution for Teilhard. 
Evolution is a ‘cumulative’ process of growth in the same direction that leads to an 
ascent of matter. 
 ‘Orthogenesis’ also has a purpose behind it. As it has already been claimed, 
evolution is not a directionless process but has a definite direction and purpose to it. 
McCarty notes this element of ‘orthogenesis’ writing that ‘orthogenesis says that 
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change is not completely random but there is purpose working in every change of 
species and phyla’ (McCarty, 1976, p.70). This gets to the heart of the matter for 
Teilhard. Evolution is neither a random, nor an accidental, process; it is being driven 
in a certain direction, and that direction is an ascent to God. In short, ‘orthogenesis’ 
affirms direction rather than randomness, and purpose rather than accident. 
 In this direction Mooney notes the importance of the word ‘genesis’ itself for 
Teilhard’s evolutionary theory. He writes that ‘we are not simply face to face with 
“change” in the world but with the “genesis”, which is something quite different’ 
(Mooney, 1996, p.51). The word ‘genesis’, or, more specifically, the French word 
‘genèse’, ‘applies to any form of production involving successive stages oriented 
towards some goal’ (Mooney, 1966, p.51). In other words evolution is not simply 
change, or even directed change, it is teleological change; evolution is progression 
towards a specific goal. This means that evolution is only a means to an end. 
Evolution is not a continuous ascent or an infinite progression; it has an end, a goal to 
which it is heading. Creation will be complete at a future point in time. Teilhard 
called this point the ‘Omega Point’. 
 
b. Orthogenesis as Bergsonian Novelty 
 Essentially, the concept of orthogenesis is a reinterpretation of the Bergsonian 
idea of novelty (cf. O’Connell, 1982, pp.156-7; Simpson, 1973, p.93), although 
Bergson did not postulate an end to the evolutionary process as Teilhard did. In 
Phenomenon of Man Teilhard wrote that ‘without orthogenesis life would only have 
spread; with it there is an ascent of life that is invincible’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, 
p.109). Without ‘orthogenesis’ life would have only multiplied, it would not have 
changed, it would not have progressed and complexified. However, with 
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‘orthogenesis’ real novelty is possible; evolution produces something new. Evolution, 
as for Bergson, does not simply produce different aggregations of the same matter; 
evolution produces something that is really new. In much the same way that Bergson 
criticizes mechanism and finalism for failing to account for novelty and newness, so 
Teilhard argues that without ‘orthogenesis’ the same problems are present, there can 
be nothing new. 
 Forsthoefel also notes this element of Teilhard’s evolutionary theory. Pointing 
to Mendelian genetics (which will be considered in the chapter on Darwin below) he 
writes that 
 
Teilhard asserts that orthogenesis is the dynamic and only complete form of 
heredity, and that heredity conceived as involving only the recombination and 
shifting of characters according to Mendel’s laws brings about nothing really 
new (Forsthoefel, 1961, p.108) 
 
According to Teilhard, following Bergson, Darwinism cannot produce anything new. 
Darwinism can only account for change, not for progression. ‘Orthogenesis’ 
represents this idea of dynamism for Teilhard, and thus forms an integral part of this 
evolutionary theory. Indeed, ‘orthogenesis’ is the reason there is evolution in the first 
place. ‘Orthogenesis’ is the real change that life goes through. That change, for 
Teilhard, was one of complexification and geometric addition. 
 
Consciousness 
a. Consciousness as Progress 
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 The second principle of Teilhard’s evolutionary theory, again following 
Bergson, is that the complexification of the universe is correlative to an increasing 
concentration and deepening of consciousness. ‘Life’, for Teilhard, ‘is the rise of 
consciousness’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.153), and that ‘evolution is an ascent 
towards consciousness’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.258). This means that, if there 
is a correlation between complexification and consciousness then, as Teilhard argued, 
it is consciousness that is first and foremost the ‘marker’ of complexity; the more 
conscious the individual then the more complex and the more evolved. 
 Maroky, in his book Convergence, asks whether there is ‘an objective standard 
of complexity that can be applied to all organisms?’ acknowledging that ‘Teilhard 
believes that there is…[namely] the development of the brain-centred nervous 
system’ (Maroky, 1981, p.13). In Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard asked by what reason 
‘can we say that a mammal, or even a man, is more advanced, more perfect than a bee 
or a rose?’ following that ‘I believe I can see a direction and a line of progress for 
life’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, pp.141-2). Cerebralization, Teilhard wrote, ‘provides 
a direction; and therefore it proves that evolution has a direction’ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1959, p.146). For Teilhard, the emergence of increasingly greater centres of 
consciousness proved that there was a direction to evolution, just as it did for Bergson 
before him. It is consciousness that provides the ‘test’ of how complex evolution has 
become, and, therefore, that evolution is progressing in a definite direction (Teilhard 
de Chardin, 2004, p.56). 
 Teilhard likewise wrote that ‘we shall then see that a vast evolutionary process 
is in ceaseless operation around us, but that it is situated within the sphere of 
consciousness’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.6), and that ‘it is better, no matter what 
the cost, to be more conscious than less conscious…this principle, I believe, is the 
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absolute condition of the world’s existence’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.108). Not 
only is evolution characterized by an increase in consciousness, but this increase is 
also explicitly seen as progress. There is a significant judgment value placed on the 
increasing consciousness of life. Evolution is always progress into something better. 
 There is clearly a link here with Bergson, who himself argued that the 
increasing progression of evolution was manifested in the increasingly complex 
nervous systems of individuals (Bergson, 1911, p.277). For Bergson, the 
consciousness of the individual was due to the élan vital being filtered through the 
brain. This meant that the more complex the brain, the more conscious the individual. 
For both Bergson and Teilhard, this led to a doctrine of panpsychism, which will be 
dealt with in the next chapter. For the purposes of this chapter it is important to note 
the relationship between consciousness and complexity, and the comparison between 
Teilhard and Bergson. 
 
b. Teilhard as Synthesis between Lamarck and Darwin 
 As well as the ideas of complexification and ‘orthogenesis’, Teilhard also used 
the concept of ‘groping’ to explain this process of directed evolution. ‘Groping’, 
wrote Teilhard, ‘is directed chance’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.110). The more 
conscious life is the more focused and directed evolution is. In the early stages of 
evolution, before self-conscious beings emerged, chance dominated the evolutionary 
process. However, this chance was not random chance, as it is for Darwinism, but 
chance informed by instinct or habit. This chance was not ‘mere’ chance, it was not 
‘blind luck’, but chance directed towards a specific goal. Thus, Teilhard 
‘[differentiated] his own theory from the classical Darwinist conception by telling us 
that it would be a mistake to interpret “groping” as mere chance’ (Smith, 1988, p.11). 
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 At the ‘lower’ stages of life “mechanism”, i.e. Darwinian chance, is the 
dominant influence on evolution; evolution ‘gropes’ forward rather than thrusts 
forward with conviction. As evolution continues, as life becomes more complex and 
conscious, this ‘groping’ becomes less and less open to chance, and more and more 
definite in its direction. At some point in the evolutionary process, that point at which 
humanity emerged, evolution became ‘conscious of itself’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 
1959, p.221), and consciousness became so dominant that there was no longer any 
luck involved in the evolutionary process, or at least a negligible amount of chance. 
Teilhard wrote that 
 
in pre-human life…, [consciousness] appears but still has only a slight influence 
on the growth of [material arrangement], which is still mainly automatic. 
Starting with man…[consciousness], now reflective, takes over to a large extent 
the function of developing the progress of [material arrangement] (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1965, p.207; cf. 1966, p.235; 1959, p.308; 966a, p.108) 
 
The more conscious the universe becomes the more directed evolution becomes. 
Thus, O’Connell can write that ‘human inventiveness points to some measure of 
groping “ingenuity” at work in the prehuman phase of evolution’ (O’Connell, 1982, 
p.88). 
 As well as becoming more and more directed, evolution also speeds up as it 
becomes more complex. The more convergent and united evolution becomes the more 
it accelerates, thus Klauder can write that ‘the great technological advancements of 
today point to the acceleration of evolutionary time…evolutionary time is changing 
with the speed of evolution, which is constantly and more rapidly accelerating’ 
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(Klauder, 1971, pp.120-2; cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 1975, p.148; Alioto, 1973, p.57). 
Once evolution sets itself on a particular path it accelerates; the closer it gets to the 
‘Omega Point’, the faster it becomes. 
 Cuénot, in his comprehensive biography of Teilhard, furthers that 
 
Teilhard, although a vitalist – or, more exactly, a supporter of orthogenesis – did 
allow mechanisms their part (their great part, particularly in early forms of life), 
but he credited them with only a minor role in complex life – man above all – 
and maintained that life is, at bottom, psychic in character’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.35 
(cf. Fullman & D’Aoust, 1961, p.146, p.150; Bruns, 1961, p.175; Grumett, 
2005, p.198)). 
 
 This means that the process of evolution is composed of two separate elements 
of chance and direction in indirect correlation to each other, yet, importantly, never 
completely separate from the other. No matter how directed evolution is there is still 
an element of chance or ‘groping’, and no matter how open to chance evolution is it is 
still directed. This led Teilhard to understand himself as a synthesis, or ‘symbiosis’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.149n1), between Lamarckism and Darwinism.12 ‘In 
general’, writes Kenney, ‘Teilhard tries to steer a course between the Darwinian or 
chance explanation and the Lamarckian or inner-directedness explanation. In part he 
does this by his concept of “groping”’ (Kenney, 1970, p.86). 
 In The Appearance of Man, Teilhard wrote ‘however Lamarckian or 
Bergsonian we may be, we must admit that even hominized life only advances 
tentatively, by the effect of great numbers and the play of chance’ (Teilhard de 
                                                        
12
 For a discussion of ‘groping’ and the relationship between Lamarck and Darwin see 
Dodson, 1984, pp.132-3, p.147ff; Sproxton, 1971, p.80ff. 
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Chardin, 1965a, p.130). More explicitly, in Phenomenon of Man, he wrote that ‘I shall 
be accused of showing too Lamarckian bent…[but] an essential part is left to the 
Darwinian play of external forces and chance’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.149n1). 
Regardless of how directed evolution is, no matter how evident the ‘plan’ of evolution 
is, there is always a role for chance and for uncertainty. 
 Whereas Bergson consciously distances himself from both Lamarck and 
Darwin, Teilhard understands his own theory as a synthesis between them. Bergson 
dismissed both Lamarckism and Darwinism as being incorrect, neither being able to 
account for real novelty, whereas Teilhard understands them, not as being incorrect, 
but as incomplete. On their own they miss something, their focus is too narrow, but 
together they complement each other. What is manifested as chance on the outside is 
the result of a direction inside, one Darwinian and the other Lamarckian (King T, 
2006, p.21). 
 
Convergence 
 The third aspect of Teilhard’s evolutionary theory, however, is arguably the 
most important, and certainly the most controversial (in that it is the least 
scientifically verifiable assertion of his theory). This idea is that evolution, as it 
complexifies and becomes more conscious, also converges upon itself and becomes 
more united (cf. Rolston, 2006, p.246). ‘The ultimate explanation of life’s movement 
is that the universe is converging upon God’ (Mooney, 1966, p.56; cf. Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1959, p.259). God waits at the end of evolution pulling everything towards 
him; the ‘Omega Point’ at the end of evolution is an ‘attractive’ state, drawing all 
matter towards it through evolution. It is God who directs the process of evolution, 
and this he does by drawing everything towards him, unifying it, through the process 
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of evolution (cf. Cuénot, 1958, p.288; Kenney, 1970, p.34). For Teilhard, ‘to create is 
for God to unite’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1978a, pp.262-3; cf. Grumett, 2005, p.44-5). 
Creation and unification are synonyms; God creates by uniting. Yet this process of 
unification happens through evolution. God does not unite by physically drawing 
existing matter together; God creates through evolution, by creating more unified 
matter. This means that the process of complexification, the process of geometric 
addition, which is judged by its corresponding consciousness, is achieved through a 
process of unification and convergence. 
 In ‘Social Heredity and Progress’, Teilhard writes that 
 
in the passage of time a state of collective human consciousness has been 
progressively evolved…to which each generation adds something…sustained 
certainly by the individual person but at the same time embracing and shaping 
the successive multitude of individuals, a sort of generalized human personality 
is visibly in process of formation upon the earth…[therefore] human endeavour, 
viewed in its ‘natural’ aspect, is tending towards some sort of collective 
personality, through which the individual will acquire in some degree the 
consciousness of mankind as a whole (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.23) 
 
 If consciousness is that by which complexity is judged, and complexity is now 
understood as a convergence of geometric addition, then it is also through 
consciousness that such a convergence is judged. In other words, evolution produces 
more and more unified centres of consciousness. 
 This inevitably means that, at some point in the future, a time will be reached 
when all of matter will have converged upon itself completely (hence Teilhard’s use 
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of the image of a cone (cf. Maloney, 1968, p.195; Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.87)). 
This point of full convergence represents the end of evolution and is what Teilhard 
termed the ‘Omega Point’, which can be seen as synonymous with the Pauline 
‘Pleroma’ (Kropf, 1980, p.61). The ‘Omega’ of evolution is the end of evolution. This 
is the moment when evolution has reached its conclusion, when the complex and the 
conscious have completely converged upon each other (Grumett, 2005, p.220). At this 
point, at the tip of the cone of convergent evolution, consciousness is truly collective. 
This consciousness is not a unity of many consciousness’, but simply one 
consciousness. Likewise, at this point the world is not just a collection of persons, but 
is simply person – and that person is Christ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968, p.145). 
 Evolution, therefore, is the ‘gradual discovery…not only of something but of 
someone, at the summit produced by the convergence upon itself of the evolving 
universe’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.181). Dodson explains this by writing that ‘personality is 
convergent, the personal centres organize in relation to each other and mutually 
converge; and omega is that centre toward which all other centres converge’ (Dodson, 
1984, p.196). The universe is creating one body, one consciousness, and one person: 
Christ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.79). 
 If the end of evolution is explicitly identified with Christ, then evolution is as 
much a process of deification as it is of creation. Creation and deification become 
synonymous; they are simply two ways of looking at the same process (Audy, 1973, 
p.259; Grumett, 2005, p.9; King T, 2003, p.38). If ‘to create is to unite’, then 
complete union lies at the end of creation, and such a union is deification. As Smith 
remarks of Teilhard’s evolutionary theory, ‘heaven is neither “above” nor “within”, 
but ahead of us in time’ (Smith, 1988, p.34). This will be explored in greater detail in 
the following chapter. 
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 In ‘Life and the Planets’, Teilhard called this convergent consciousness an 
‘organicosocial supercomplex’. He wrote that: 
 
we are now at the beginning of a third phase, the formation of an organicosocial 
supercomplex…mankind, born on this planet and spread out over its entire 
surface, coming gradually to form around its earthly matrix a single, major 
organic unity, enclosed upon itself; a single, hypercomplex, hypercentred, 
hyperconscious arch-molecule, coextensive with the heavenly body on which it 
was born [i.e. Earth] (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.108) 
 
However, it is again in Phenomenon of Man where this idea is given its fullest and 
most explicit expression. He wrote that: 
 
We are faced with a harmonized collectivity of consciousness equivalent to a 
sort of super-consciousness. This idea is that of the earth not only becoming 
covered by myriads of grains of thought, but of becoming enclosed in a single 
thinking envelope so as to form, functionally, no more than a single vast grain 
of thought on the sidereal scale, the plurality of individual reflections grouping 
themselves together and reinforcing one another in the act of a single 
unanimous reflection (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.251) 
 
For Teilhard, the evolution of a collective consciousness was not simply the harmony 
of ‘myriad grains of thought’ but really and truly the evolution of a single 
consciousness. 
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 Henri de Lubac, when treating this aspect of Teilhard’s thought, reaches the 
same conclusion. He writes that ‘the time came when the human mass formed one 
single bloc. This was when the fluid mass “set”; from this resulted this “great 
monad”’ (de Lubac, 1967, pp.48-9). The use of the term ‘monad’ is particularly 
important as it confirms that for Teilhard this convergence forms, not a collection of 
individuals, but one single being (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.52), one 
‘supercomplex’, one person, which is outcome of evolution; ‘the whole world [is] one 
being’ (Savary, 2010, p.97). 
 For Teilhard, as matter pulls itself together, converging upon itself, through 
evolution, consciousness is allowed to grow and expand, to plummet to greater depths 
of awareness, until such a union becomes so centred and concentrated upon itself that 
the Earth becomes itself person and evolution can go no further; ‘one single thing is 
being made in creation: the body of Christ’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.74). 
 
Critical Thresholds, Emergence, and Qualitative Progression 
 For Teilhard, the process of convergence through evolution is not one single 
process of convergence; evolution goes through a number of stages each of which 
represent a qualitative leap towards the Omega. Each stage in evolution represents 
that point at which something entirely new emerges from what was previous.13 In 
Teilhard’s view, according to Raven, ‘for mankind emergence effects not a mere 
difference of degree as between the anthropoid and human, but a real novelty’ 
(Raven, 1962, p.156). Teilhard called these stages ‘critical thresholds’. 
 Mooney confirms that ‘“critical points” are of great importance in Teilhard’s 
thinking, for they always mark a profound change in nature by which something 
                                                        
13
 For a discussion of ‘Teilhard and Emergent Evolution’ see (Raven, 1962, p.142ff.). 
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totally new is produced’ (Mooney, 1966, p.39). As creation converges upon itself, 
creating ever increasing complex forms, certain moments are reached where the 
tension and pressure of convergence becomes so great that completely new, 
qualitatively different, manifestations of evolution are produced – from matter, to life, 
to consciousness (cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.108). Such key moments of change 
represent an irreversible ascent towards God (McCarty, 1976, p.112), which, as has 
already been noted, ends in deification. 
 These ‘critical thresholds’ may also represent moments of special creation by 
God. Forsthoefel notes that, whilst it is not an explicit aspect of Teilhard’s theory, he 
‘could not, however, object if a philosopher operating on a supraphenomenological 
level of explanation feels obliged to invoke the intervention of an extrinsic cause 
(God) to bridge the gap between inert and living matter’ (Forsthoefel, 1961, p.102). In 
other words, to add further to the idea that God uses evolution to create, at certain 
moments in evolutionary history special acts of creation need to be invoked to 
account for these ‘critical thresholds’, when something radical new emerges in 
evolution. This lends support to the argument that Teilhard’s theistic evolution is a re-
formulated doctrine of creationism. 
 
 In The Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard writes that ‘[animals] are separated from 
[humanity] by a chasm – or a threshold – which it cannot cross. Because we are 
reflective we are not only different but quite other. It is not merely a matter of change 
of degree but of nature’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.166). The difference between 
human and non-human life is not one of degree but kind; there is a qualitative 
difference between the two. Not only is there a difference in kind, but this difference 
is explicitly noted in terms of consciousness. 
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 Raven, too, writes that ‘man represents a species which has jumped forward 
biologically: self-consciousness has emerged in him’ (Raven, 1962, p.156). Francoeur 
also notes that ‘somewhere among this mass of primates an instantaneous mutation 
took place and evolution jumped to a new and higher form of life’ (Francoeur, 1961, 
p.19). Evolution reaches points at which it makes qualitative leaps, it jumps forward, 
and something entirely new emerges from it. 
 There is then, once again, a possible comparison with Bergson, who argued 
that ‘evolution appears as a series of sudden leaps…it may well be that the 
appearance of the human species was due to several leaps in the same direction 
(Bergson, 1977, p.116). Both Teilhard and Bergson argued that there is such a 
difference between humanity and the rest of creation that there is a real qualitative 
difference. The one cannot come straight from the other. There are too many 
differences between humanity and non-human life that a real leap must have been 
made; something truly new has emerged. 
 
a. From Biosphere to Christosphere 
 Teilhard deployed a variety of technical terms to explicate his understanding 
of critical thresholds, however there are essentially three ‘major’ moments of real 
qualitative novelty. These moments Teilhard termed ‘biogenesis’, ‘noogenesis’, and 
‘Christogenesis’. In fact, ‘Christogenesis’ may very well be understood as the overall 
process, synonymous with evolution in which ‘biogenesis’ and ‘noogenesis’ 
contribute (Lyons, 1982, pp.38-9). Teilhard understood these moments of ‘genesis’ to 
produce corresponding ‘spheres’ that build up the earth: the ‘geosphere’, the 
‘biosphere’ (King, 2006, pp.81-2), the ‘noosphere’ (King, 2006, pp.82-3; Skehan, 
2006, p.22), and the ‘Christosphere’, which is the ‘Omega Point (cf. McCarty, 1976, 
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pp.51-2; Weigel, 1961, 158-9; Lukas & Lukas, 1977, p.159ff). These spheres refer, 
respectively, to the physical Earth, the life that inhabits it, the self-reflection of 
humanity (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, pp.165-6), and finally incorporation and 
deification in Christ. The end of evolution, ‘Omega Point’, deification, is the last 
‘critical threshold’. 
 Each ‘threshold’ adds another layer to the Earth so that now, in the 
‘noosphere’, the Earth is covered by an envelope of thought, gradually converging 
upon itself. As it has already been claimed, this envelope of thought will continue to 
converge until a point is reached where the pressure and tension of this convergence 
is so much that a single consciousness is formed. Since this will be a moment of 
complete union, no more union is possible, and thus evolution will be finished. 
 
Implications of Teilhard’s Theory of Evolution 
 Teilhard’s theory of convergent and progressive evolution led him to affirm 
certain conclusions that shaped his theology. These implications of his evolutionary 
theory will now be considered before some of the more important criticisms of his 
theory will also be considered. 
 
a. The Primacy of Humanity 
 This understanding of evolution, as one of qualitative progression, leads 
Teilhard to claim that ‘man is unquestionably situated at the topmost point’ (Teilhard 
de Chardin, 2004, p.58). ‘To consider man as anything else but the principal aim of 
cosmic development’, writes Mooney, ‘is unthinkable’ (Mooney, 1966, p.41). If 
evolution is a progression, then humanity is at the top. In his study of Teilhard, de 
Lubac claimed that in ‘The Phenomenon of Man [Teilhard] takes over the idea of 
 74 
universal evolution and restates it completely in such a way as to restore to man his 
dignity’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.84). Such a ‘restatement’ leads Birx to argue that ‘from 
this new perspective the writings of Teilhard represent a regression in modern 
thought’ (Birx, 1972, p.55). In this way, Teilhard’s thought goes directly against 
Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
 Whilst Teilhard still accepts that humanity evolved from simple beginnings, as 
does Darwin, he keeps with the traditional supposition that man is fundamentally and 
essentially different from the rest of creation. More importantly, the claim that 
humanity occupies such a privileged position is an indication for Teilhard that 
evolution is close to its end. In humanity the ‘Omega Point’ is within sight. 
 
b. The Role of Death 
 For Teilhard, however, the emergent self-reflection that represents humanity is 
not the only qualitative difference that results from the crossing of ‘critical 
thresholds’. The primacy of man is not the only outcome of ‘noogenesis’. Another 
important qualitative change to life is the role of death; death no longer plays such an 
important part, it no longer has a sway over creation. Instead, writes Mooney, the 
function of death is to ‘act as a metamorphosis between stages of personality’ 
(Mooney, 1966, p.112). 
 In The Phenomenon of Man Teilhard writes that in death the animal returns to 
the earth whereas the human is liberated from the earth and ascends higher to God; 
death for humanity is profoundly different than death for non-human life, and it is 
because humanity have crossed an evolutionary threshold (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, 
p.272). The place that death occupies in this process is still important; on a number of 
occasions Teilhard speaks of the importance of going through death (Teilhard de 
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Chardin, 1968, p.80ff). However what is of greater significance is the fact that human 
death is of a profoundly different order than that undergone by the rest of the animal 
kingdom. It is not that death no longer happens, but that its effect on the individual 
has been radically changed. Death is now an ‘agent of transformation’ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1968, p.88; cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.116). 
 
c. The Evolution of Evolution 
 Another important qualitative change that happens as a result of evolution is 
that evolution itself, the actual ‘mechanism’ of evolution, changes as well, thus 
Teilhard could write that ‘biological evolution itself begins to change its general 
mechanism’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1966, p.207). ‘Science has suggested that human 
evolution in the future will be different than that of other species’, notes Galleni, 
‘thinking creatures have developed cultures, new aspects of evolution, that allow for 
the rapid transmission of acquired characteristics’ (Galleni, 2011, p.71). As the 
manifestation of life goes through qualitative changes, so evolution has a profoundly 
different effect on life. Now that the ‘noosphere’ has been reached evolution becomes 
more concerned with the evolution of consciousness rather than with biological 
evolution; ‘the future of evolution is not to be looked for in the realm of biological 
transformations in or of man’ (Kenney, 1970, p.140).14 
 Klauder writes that ‘after the development of the massive brain and intricate 
nervous system in the primates, this species ceases striving for exterior development 
and allowed the “within” itself to develop’ (Klauder, 1971, p.21). This ‘within’ will 
be treated in more detail in the next chapter, but for now it is enough to note that this 
                                                        
14
 Another interesting aspect of this, although not essential for this argument, is the 
role of sex and chastity. Teilhard seems to argue that as evolution, as a process, 
changes so sex will be replaced with chastity. See Madelin, 2006, p.33 & Grau, 1976, 
p.145. 
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essentially means that consciousness becomes more dominant. Weigel makes the 
same point, writing that ‘Teilhard supposes on grounds of observation that each new 
sphere was a once-for-all event. Once matter had achieved a higher stage of 
complication it did not bother to continue the process on the lower levels’ (Weigel, 
1961, p.159). 
 In other words, once evolution had discovered a higher level of being, it 
‘ignores’ the previous levels and concentrates on converging and complexifying on a 
higher level. ‘Properly speaking’, writes Mooney, ‘from now on the evolutionary 
process continues its development not so much in the sphere of life, the “biosphere”, 
as in the sphere of mind and spirit, the “noosphere”’ (Mooney, 1966, p.67). Now that 
life has made a qualitative jump forward, so the mechanism of evolution has taken a 
qualitative leap as well. If life is now fundamentally different, then what evolution 
does must likewise be fundamentally different. According to Galleni and Scalfari, this 
fundamentally different effect of evolution in the ‘noosphere’ is more cultural; it is a 
cultural evolution. They write that ‘cultural evolution is for the noosphere what 
speciation is for the biosphere’ (Galleni & Scalfari, 2006, p.167). Evolution, 
originally concerned with speciation, with biological progression, once it goes 
through ‘noogenesis’ and life becomes fundamentally and qualitatively transformed, 
is now concerned with cultural progression, with the progression of consciousness. 
 In this direction, O’Connell observes that 
 
the law of “growth” detectable through the observation of human societies, their 
stops and starts, their sideways leaps, their long periods of apparent stability 
before another leap takes place, are the same laws, fundamentally, as those 
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which operate in the “mutations” of plant and animal populations (O’Connell, 
1982, p.83) 
 
Evolution is still concerned with doing the same ‘thing’, it is still the ascent of life 
towards the ‘Omega Point’, but what is affected through it has changed. Evolution is 
still evolution but qualitatively transformed. 
 Not only does this support the interpretation of a supposed convergence of 
Darwin and Lamarck – i.e. after the emergence of the ‘noosphere’ the chance 
mutations of Darwinism do not contribute to evolutionary change and instead 
Lamarckian ‘acquisition of characters’ takes over15 – but it also means that a social 
Teilhardism comes to the forefront of the continuing process of evolution. 
 
d. The Role of Politics 
 With the affirmation of a cultural and social aspect of evolution, and that such 
an aspect of evolution becomes dominant with humanity, a discussion of politics 
becomes inevitable (cf. Grau, 1976, p.216ff; Ferber, 1973, p.195ff; Young, 1973, 
p.210ff). Some commentators see support for the idea that society is a part of the 
biological evolution of the world in the fact that the world is becoming more and 
more interdependent. If evolution is first and foremost a process of convergence then, 
                                                        
15
 In his Zoological Philosophy Lamarck writes that ‘it might then be perceived how 
needs, at first absent and afterwards gradually increasing in number, have brought 
about an inclination towards the actions appropriate to their satisfaction’ (Lamarck, 
2012, p.31), in other words the more ‘needs’ that life has the greater the effort to 
evolve. This is remarkably similar to Teilhard’s argument that as consciousness 
increases so does its ability to direct evolution, especially since Lamarck continues 
that nature ‘was able by a further elaboration of the animal organisation to convey 
that power right into the interior of these being, and that finally she reached the point 
of placing that same power at the disposal of the individual’ (Lamarck, 2012, p.29). 
As complexity increases, therefore, nature has more control and influence over the 
vitalistic principle. 
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when evolution becomes more concerned about ‘culture’ and consciousness in the 
‘noosphere’, then it is logical to expect a cultural convergence. This is exactly what 
Teilhard thought he saw. 
 Grau writes that ‘the globe itself, not merely one part of it, is becoming 
crowded with people who are increasingly bound with ever-more-complex ties of 
economic and political dependence’ (Grau, 1976, p.34). McCarty, too, notes that 
‘industrialization also produces dependence of nation upon nation. This inner network 
of interdependence will help to bring a universality of thought and life to every part of 
the world’ (McCarty, 1978a, p.36). This increasing interdependence of the globe, it is 
postulated, has a direct influence on ‘thought’ and ‘consciousness’. Thus, once again 
it is consciousness that is seen as the ‘marker’ of progress, it is the production of a 
more universal consciousness that results from this cultural convergence (cf. Mooney, 
1966, p.44; Turk, 1970, pp.24-5). This universal consciousness is continuing to 
converge, forming, eventually, just one, single, universal consciousness. 
 The social and political convergence of humanity now becomes the dominant 
phase of evolution, humanity are gradually coming closer and closer. Teilhard saw 
evidence of this in institutions and organizations such as United Nations and 
UNESCO (Klauder, 1971, p.21). However there is also support for this aspect of 
Teilhard’s evolutionary theory in the increasingly faster travel and communications 
(such as the internet) available to humanity (Teilhard de Chardin, 1978a, p.36). 
 
e. The Role of Technology 
 With evolution shifting focus to cultural convergence, the role of technology 
also becomes paramount for Teilhard. With ‘noogenesis’, Teilhard claims that 
‘biological evolution has reached it’s ceiling: in reflecting upon itself life has become 
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stationary’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.305). Biological evolution, in other words 
evolution in the biosphere, has finished – life has reached its upper limit – now the 
noosphere takes over and thought continues the evolution progression towards God, 
converging upon itself. Therefore, ‘most probably, the external human type will not 
change again’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1966, p.74), ‘the osteological differentiation of 
man may well have reached its limits’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1966, p.252); hence the 
‘evolution of evolution’. However, ‘there is fortunately another dimension in which 
variation is still possible, and in which we continue to evolve’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 
2004, pp.6-7), namely, technologically. 
 O’Connell, writing about the ‘biological ceiling’ that humanity has reached, 
writes that  
 
the human group did not need to evolve physically (literally) to become the 
variety of interrelated and interdependent specialists – burrowers, climbers, 
fliers, and all the rest – into which every previously successful “branch” of the 
tree of life found it necessary to “diverge” and “radiate”. Every human being 
has the power now to “be” a climber, underwater swimmer, or flier, without 
undergoing the physical transformation which would enslave him to this or that 
unique and limited specialization (O’Connell, 1982, p.98) 
 
 Humanity has not evolved a ‘specialty’, or what Teilhard called ‘blind alleys’ 
and ‘organic imprisonments’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.158). Humanity has not 
evolved into a specific ‘tool’, but has evolved to a point whereby they can incorporate 
every specialty and tool. O’Connell continues to ask ‘is there no “deeper linkage” 
whatever between the evolutionary transformation of reptile into flyer, and the human 
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group’s invention of the airplane?’ (O’Connell, 1982, p.98). There is no difference 
between a bird evolving biological wings and a pilot evolving technological ones; 
‘Teilhard connects the vertebrate growing extra limbs, covering itself with feathers 
and the aviator providing himself with wings’ (Kenney, 1970, p.98; cf. Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1969, p.116). In other words, technology is actively continuing the 
biological convergence. Evolution has fundamentally changed, and now, technology, 
the result of human achievement and progression, is continuing the process of 
evolution. ‘For humankind’, furthers O’Connell, ‘the artificial has become the 
natural’ (O’Connell, 1982, p.98). 
 Teilhard wrote that there are 
 
profound connections between the ship, the submarine, the airplane and the 
animal reconstructions which produce the wing and the fin…[and that] air 
routes, postal channels, wires, cables, pulsations…[are not] merely 
communications for business or pleasure…[but] the creation of a true nervous 
system for humanity (Teilhard de Chardin, 1966, pp.57-9) 
 
It is technology that is now forming a convergent, universal consciousness. ‘What 
[Teilhard] means, quite plainly’, notes Smith, ‘is that a radio transmitter is not just 
analogous (in certain respects) to a nervous system, but that it is a nervous system (or 
more precisely, a part of one)’ (Smith, 1988, p.177). The technological advancements 
that are truly converging the globe are not to be taken metaphorically, as Smith notes 
‘while for the most part, certainly, he speaks in metaphor, he does also on occasion 
employ the term [convergence] unmistakably in its primary spatial sense’ (Smith, 
1988, p.81). Technological advancements are truly, literally, adding to and continuing 
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the same evolutionary process from which humanity emerged in the first place. In 
other words, culture (i.e. art (North, 1968, p.32) and war (Sproxton, 1971, pp.42-4)) 
and technological advancements mean that humanity furthers its evolutionary 
progress, not on the previous biological level, but a fundamentally transformed one, a 
level on which thought and personality play the major role. ‘It was the “organic-
machine” that first released thought in the human body’, continued Teilhard, ‘why 
should it not be the industrial machine that will release it a second time in humanity’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1969, p.81).16 
 Predictably, such an understanding of the role of technology, and its 
relationship to non-human evolution, is influenced by Bergson. Bergson asked 
whether ‘an unintelligent animal possess tools or machines?’ answering that it does, 
‘but here the instrument forms a part of the body that uses it’ (Bergson, 1911, p.146). 
For Bergson, this represented a difference between instinct and intelligence. ‘Instinct 
perfected is a faculty of using and even of constructing organized instruments’, wrote 
Bergson, whereas ‘intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using 
unorganized instruments’ (Bergson, 1911, p.147). Instinct develops in correlation to 
biological instruments, whereas intelligence to technological instruments. 
 Bergson continued that 
 
instinct is therefore necessarily specialized, being nothing but the utilization of a 
specific object. The instrument constructed intelligently, on the contrary, is an 
imperfect instrument…[and that] above all, [the tool] reacts on the nature of the 
                                                        
16
 It is interesting to question what Teilhard would have made of climate change and 
the idea that technological advance and industrialization are continuingly damaging 
the planet to such an extent that its eventual inhabitable environment is somewhat 
inevitable. For Teilhard, such industrialization is the proof of his theory of 
evolutionary progress; for climate change scientists, it is responsible for the 
destruction of much of the planet. 
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being that constructs it; for in calling on him to exercise a new function, it 
confers on him, so to speak, a richer organization, being an artificial organ by 
which the natural organism is extended (Bergson, 1911, p.148) 
 
It is clear that Teilhard’s own theory of technological tools as being ‘artificial organs’ 
builds upon this idea. Of course, Teilhard did not understand this ‘artificialness’ of 
technology to be in any way a criticism. Just because an organ was artificial did not 
mean that it was lesser than something natural, in fact quite the opposite. If an organ 
was natural it belonged to the ‘biosphere’, if an organ was artificial it belonged to the 
‘noosphere’ which built upon and improved the ‘biosphere’ and pushed evolution 
towards the ‘Omega Point’. 
 Whilst Teilhard did not take over Bergson’s use of instinct, the role of 
consciousness in Teilhard’s evolutionary theory means that he did acknowledge a role 
of intelligence. As a result of this there was an important role for education. 
 
f. The Role of Education 
 There is no doubt that the most important element of Teilhard’s theory of 
‘critical thresholds’ is the fact that there is a connection between ‘biological’ 
evolution and ‘cultural’, ‘social’, or ‘technological’ evolution. The latter is truly a 
continuation of the former. This meant that evolution itself, as a process, underwent a 
qualitative change; the actual mechanism of evolution becomes radically transformed. 
It is here that education becomes important as with education ‘heredity become[s] 
socialized in a special way’ (Grau, 1976, p.252; cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.16ff, 
pp.157-8). 
 Grau continues that Teilhard’s fundamental theme about education is that 
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its primary function is to operate as a special form of biological development 
through addition to serve as an essential organic process of transmission of vital 
development in evolution of human collective consciousness…[and] he 
concludes that education is not artificial, accidental, or accessory, but an 
essential, natural form of biological additity (Grau, 1976, pp.252-3)  
 
In other words, education is for the ‘noosphere’ what genes became (after Mendel) for 
the ‘biosphere’. Technology, along with culture, answers the question of ‘what’ 
evolution is in the ‘noosphere’, but education answers the question of ‘how’ of 
evolution. 
 Such an affirmation of the role of education is perhaps the most obvious 
reference to the Lamarckian influence on Teilhard’s theory. It is through education 
that ‘acquired characteristics’, which for Teilhard are culture and technology, are 
passed on to the next generation. There is clearly nothing random or accidental about 
this process of heredity. The groping chance of ‘genetics’ (although Teilhard would 
have been unfamiliar with the field of genetics as it is today) has been replaced, or, 
better, transformed into a more directed notion of heredity; evolution is guided by 
human consciousness. 
 
 However, what is more important than this affirmation of Lamarckian 
influence is exactly what Teilhard deems this education to be. For Teilhard, whilst 
there is obviously room for what could be termed ‘academic education’ (i.e. science, 
history, etc), it is primarily the Church that Teilhard is referring to when he discusses 
education. Haught confirms that: 
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the most characteristic way in which the search for the centre – which has 
always been going on in the universe – continues now is that of religion. 
Religion fits into the evolutionary universe as the way in which conscious life 
carries on the search for the centre…for Teilhard, religion is the way in which 
the universe, now that it has reached the level of self-awareness, continues its 
ageless search for centre (Haught, 2011, p.17) 
 
 It is therefore in this direction that Teilhard understands the role of revelation. 
The revelation of God in Christ is primarily how Teilhard understands the educational 
role of the Church as the heredity of the ‘noosphere’. 
 
g. Revelation: The Christological Significance of Education 
 If education is the mechanism of evolution in the ‘noosphere’, and this is 
primarily seen in the Church, then Christ comes to be understood as a teacher. Kropf 
agrees that the ‘phyletic’ character of Christianity 
 
seems not to have been intended simply as an extrapolation in terms of 
Christianity as a historical phenomenon, nor simplistically as an application of 
biological laws to the ‘organic’ reality of the body of Christ, but as a direct 
extension of these same laws in the realm where evolution now must be active 
on this planet – in the collective convergence of reflective human 
consciousness, that is, the ‘noosphere’…such development [of doctrine] goes 
beyond a mere reflective elaboration on dogmas that remain fixed in their 
formulations for all time (Kropf, 1980, pp.265-6) 
 85 
 
In other words, revelation is not a fixed epistemological category but, like everything 
else, is in a process of progression. Revelation, like life, consciousness, and even the 
mechanism of evolution itself, evolves (Lane, 1996, pp.71-2). ‘If there is any room 
for a period in which revelation will stand as complete’, continues Kropf, ‘this era 
would have to begin with the final Parousia [which Teilhard identifies with the 
‘Omega Point’ (see Chapter 5)]’ (Kropf, 1980, p.283). 
 However, it is in and through the Church whereby this revelation is made 
available to humanity. If revelation acts as the education that is the heredity of the 
‘noosphere’, it is the Church that acts as a vehicle of that revelation. It is the Church 
that passes on, through education, the hereditary characteristics of evolution. It is the 
Church, therefore, that carries on the evolutionary progress. All religions achieve this, 
to a limited degree, but it is only through the Roman Catholic Church that this process 
reaches its fulfillment. For Teilhard, therefore, all other religions represent so many 
evolutionary ‘dead ends’; they represent real progress, but can only progress so far. It 
is only through the Roman Catholic Church where this evolutionary progression has 
any real future; it is only through the Roman Catholic Church that the ‘Omega Point’ 
can be reached. 
 It is for this reason that Teilhard can call the Church a ‘phylum’, understood as 
a ‘zoological group of branch’ (Mooney, 1966, p.156), and more specifically the 
‘phylum of love’. By this Teilhard means that ‘the whole orientation of evolution…is 
towards the formation of the human phylum’, however, now, ‘the Church also acts as 
a phylum, or more precisely, that it acts as a phylum of love growing within the 
human phylum and moving in the same direction’ (Mooney, 1966, pp.156-7). This, 
therefore, leads to a discussion of the evolutionary role of the Church. 
 86 
 
h. The Role of the Church 
 For Teilhard, evolution proceeds in a very particular and definite direction. 
That direction has led through all the various forms and manifestations of life, 
through ‘biogenesis’ and then ‘noogenesis’, and has arrived at humanity. However, 
the continuing process of evolution not only continues through humanity but a 
particular humanity. This future evolutionary trajectory continues through Western 
man (O’Brien, 1973, p.35), and, more specifically, the Church. 
 In a letter quoted by Cuénot, Teilhard wrote that ‘the majority of oriental 
thought-patterns are [nothing] but outmoded and obsolescent, fated to disappear along 
with the human type to which they are native’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.137). Therefore, 
Teilhard believed that ‘there are some races that act as the spearhead of evolution, and 
other that have reached a dead end’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.301). This does not mean that 
Teilhard argues there is no value in other races. Even though he claims that ‘one 
could say that in more accentuated form [lemurs and tarsiers] stand to present day 
apes as Australian Aborigines and Negrillos [sic] do the white human race’ (Teilhard 
de Chardin, 1965a, p.36), he is keen to clarify that he is not a racist (Cuénot, 1958, 
p.301). He did not argue that other races and religions were lower (or more primitive) 
than white Europeans, but that the future of evolution is only through that race, or 
more specifically, through the Roman Catholic Church. 
 In Phenomenon of Man Teilhard likewise wrote that 
 
in truth, a neo-humanity has been germinating around the Mediterranean during 
the last six thousand years, and precisely at this moment it has finished 
absorbing the last vestiges of the Neolithic mosaic…the proof of this lies in the 
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fact that from one end of the world to the other, all peoples, to remain human or 
to become more so, are inexorably led to formulate the hopes and problems of 
the modern earth in the very same terms in which the West has formulated them 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.212) 
 
 However, as it has already been claimed, it is not just Western man who 
represents the continuing progress of evolution, but specifically Western man in the 
Church. Thus Corbishley, quoting Teilhard himself, writes that 
 
if Christianity…is indeed destined to be the religion of tomorrow, there is only 
one way in which it can hope to come up to the measure of today’s great 
humanitarian trends and assimilate them; and that it is through the axis, living 
and organic, of it’s Catholicism centred on Rome (Corbishley, 1971, p.100) 
 
 The Church, therefore, is formed evolutionally, through a particular phylum 
(cf. Binns, 1968, p.119ff). This being the case, the theological dimensions of 
Teilhard’s evolutionary theory come to the fore. If ‘one single thing is being made in 
creation: the body of Christ’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.74), the Church, as the 
‘living continuation of the incarnation’ (Binns, 1968, p.125), is that one thing being 
made. Maloney, referencing Ephesians 1.20-3, evidences that ‘the Church is not 
merely a moral aggregate of members coming together to honour the historical 
person, Jesus Christ’ (Maloney, 1968, p.62), Teilhard treats convergence in spatial 
terms (Smith, 1988, p.81). 
 
Criticism of Teilhard 
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 With the affirmation of the future of evolution happening through the phylum 
of the Church a discussion of Teilhard’s evolutionary theory comes to an end. 
However there are a number of criticisms that must be highlighted at this point that 
help to further clarify some of the points that dominate his theory: the eternity of 
matter and the loss of the individual. 
 
a. Eternity of Matter 
 If Teilhard’s theory of evolution was dominated by a concern for convergence, 
which ultimately led him to postulate a future point at which no more convergence 
was possible, a point he termed the ‘Omega Point’, then this leads to the conclusion 
that, running the process of evolution backwards, there is a possibility of an infinite 
divergence of matter (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.41). Such a conclusion is 
compounded by the fact that for Teilhard creation was union (hence ‘un-creation’ is 
‘dis-union’). De Lubac, noting this problem, asked ‘should we not, then, 
conclude…that he postulated some element, as diffuse as you care to imagine, that 
pre-exists the creative act?’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.196) 
 If God’s act of creation is one of union, there must have been something 
alongside God for God to begin to unite. The only possible way to deal with such a 
comment is to postulate an eternity of matter. Lane is certain that ‘Teilhard espouses a 
veritable materialism when he speaks of “eternal matter”, denies a temporal beginning 
to creation and suggests that Divinity is somehow dependent upon matter’ (Lane, 
1996, p.46). Kenney, too, observes that for Teilhard ‘there is no absolute beginning of 
anything’ (Kenney, 1970, p.89). Put simply, the idea that ‘to create is to unite’ 
compromises the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (de Lubac, 1967, p.195). 
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 Teilhard appeared to confirm such criticisms when he wrote that ‘the universe 
is no longer endless in space alone. In all its strands, it now unfolds interminably into 
the past’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.78), and that ‘just as we cannot imagine any 
limit to stellar or interatomic space, so we cannot see any absolute beginning to 
temporal series’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.162). Such quotations seem to be 
entirely damning.  
 
 However, this does not take into account the whole picture. For Teilhard, the 
formula ‘to create is to unite’ is not simply a doctrine about creation but one of 
ontology. Teilhard does not mean that God creates only by pulling together diffuse 
matter that is pre-existent; God is not reduced solely to formal causality. Instead, for 
Teilhard, to be created is to be united. Thus, Teilhard writes that ‘to be more is to be 
more fully united with more…to be more, is more fully to unite more’ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1965, p.45), and that ‘to be – to unite oneself or to unite others (the active 
form)…[and] to be – to be united and unified by another (the passive form)’ (Teilhard 
de Chardin, 1975, p.193). 
 In other words, Teilhard is not strictly making a claim here about the work of 
God but about the ontological standing of creation. Teilhard is simply claiming that 
ontology is better understood as dynamic unity rather than as a static concept of 
being. In fact, it could be claimed that this is simply his attempt to reinterpret the 
Bergsonian notion that to be is to change. Teilhard replaced a metaphysics of being 
with an ‘ultraphysics of union’ (cf. Reilly, 1961, p.54; Grau, 1976, p.55ff). 
 
b. Pantheism and The Loss of the Individual 
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 However, perhaps the most important criticism of Teilhard is his pantheism 
and the relegation of the individual.17 Passmore writes that Teilhard is concerned with 
‘the perfecting of the universe; to this climactic event the perfecting of man is only a 
preliminary’ (Passmore, 1970, p.257). As such, perfection lies in the progress not of 
individuals but of mankind as a whole’ (Passmore, 1970, p.252). Evolution may have 
culminated in humanity, but this is not the final stage, and, as it has already been 
noted, this further convergence evolves into just one person; all but one individual are 
excluded from the ‘Omega Point’. 
 Grumett, too, notes that it is not the individual that will ultimately be united 
with God at the ‘Omega Point’, but the collective, convergent, soul that is the 
outcome of evolution. He writes that: 
 
it is the world as a whole that will present a likeness to God, rather than 
individual elements within the world…[and] in the unification of souls with 
                                                        
17
 Another criticism of Teilhard’s theory, which is an aspect of his pantheism, is the 
fact that God now becomes mutable; if the world is God, and the world is the process 
of completion, a process that will provide a body for Christ, as will be seen in the next 
chapter, then God becomes effected by this process too – ‘God also is the name given 
to the consummated being’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1969, p.67). Smith, in his highly 
critical book on Teilhard’s theology, acknowledges this problem. He writes that ‘from 
the outset Teilhard was bent upon blurring the fundamental distinctions between God 
and the world’ (Smith, 1988, p.106). He continues that, for Teilhard, ‘not just the 
world, but God, too, is changing, and becoming more perfect…the conception of a 
mutable or “evolving” God is entirely in line with Teilhard’s rejection of the 
traditional Christian doctrine concerning creation and participated being, and his 
famous theory of “creative union” which is supposed to replace these “antiquated” 
ideas’ (Smith, 1988, pp.104-5), and that ‘Teilhard wants God to be both the evolver 
and that which ultimately evolves…the biblical “I AM” turns out to be misleading: 
God should rather have been “I shall be”’ (Smith, 1988, p.117). 
 Klauder also notes that the relationship between matter and spirit also provides 
further evidence for the fact that Teilhard expounded a process theology; ‘Whitehead 
would say that there is a basic constituent of every existing thing (organism) whose 
intensity of life is of different degrees, and that evolution is an evolution of organisms 
of ever-increasing organization with more organization comes a greater participation 
in consciousness. This is exactly identical to Teilhard’s law of recurrence – the law of 
complexity-consciousness’ (Klauder, 1971, p.89; cf. Thekumkal, 1981, p.149ff). 
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each other, a common soul is being formed..[and] it is this common soul, rather 
than individual human souls, which will ultimately be unified in Deo (Grumett, 
2005, pp.190-1; cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 1966, p.46; McCarty, 1976, p.101; 
Mooney, 1966, p.202; Smith, 1988, p.179) 
 
 Teilhard’s emphasis on creation as union also suggests his exclusion of the 
individual from the ‘Omega Point’. The process of convergence is one that takes 
place through evolution not through a physical bringing together of matter; God does 
not create by pulling existing matter together physically, but by creating more united 
and centred matter evolutionally. Teilhard thus wrote that ‘creation is brought about 
by an act of uniting; and true union cannot be effected except by creating [i.e. through 
evolution]’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, pp.155-6; cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 1975, 
p.198). Put very crudely, union is not the same ‘bits’ in a new aggregation, but the 
creation of ‘new bits’ in a closer aggregation (hence his and Bergson’s criticism of 
Darwinism and Lamarckism and the emphasis on orthogenesis and novelty). Union is 
creation, and God creates ‘evolutively’, which means that God unites not by 
physically bringing together the matter of the universe but by evolving more united 
individuals, until one individual results. Thus, Teilhard can write that ‘in a real sense, 
only one man will be saved: Christ, the head and living summary’ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1968, p.143). 
 Essentially, for Teilhard, any individual who does not represent the end of 
evolution is not a part of God’s creation; the end of evolution culminates in only one 
person, Christ: ‘fundamentally – since all time and forever – but one single thing is 
being made in creation: the body of Christ’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.74). If 
evolution has not yet finished (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.81 & 106), then the 
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common soul has not yet finished either, and thus anybody who is alive today does 
not form part of this ‘Omega Point’. ‘One cannot help wonder’, notes McCarty, ‘what 
Teilhard might have felt had he recognized that he was a by-product of evolution to 
be cast off as a dead-end street in the world process’ (McCarty, 1976, p.136); Teilhard 
must have realized that this only served to exclude himself from the beatific vision of 
the ‘Omega Point’, even if it did not bother him too much: 
 
in itself, to be frank, the problem of personal survival does not worry me 
greatly. Once the fruit of my life has been gathered up into an immortality, a 
self-centred consciousness of that fact or enjoyment of it matters little to me 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.115) 
 
 It is important, therefore, to note that Teilhard was well aware of the 
pantheistic overtones of his work (cf. Faricy, 1981, p.101). In Christianity and 
Evolution, for example, he wrote that: 
 
what I am proposing to do is to narrow that gap between pantheism and 
Christianity by bringing out what one might call the Christian soul of pantheism 
or the pantheist aspect of Christianity…however individual our salvation may 
be from many points of view, it is in consequence accomplished only in 
collective fulfillment (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.56, p.67) 
 
 Teilhard allowed for such pantheism by pointing out that this pantheistic union 
was not a unity of simplicity but of complexity (Teilhard de Chardin, 1975, p.56), and 
that actually union differentiates. De Lubac expounds this idea writing that: 
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in working out this doctrine, Pere Teilhard, we find, is careful to preserve the 
distinction between “individuality and personality”…he says, individuality 
decreases, as being now useless support, in proportion with the increase of 
personality (de Lubac, 1967, p.150; cf. Smith, 1988, p.143) 
 
 This difference between individual and person can be seen anticipated in the 
doctrine of the Trinity (Kenney, 1970, p.111), and what Teilhard is ultimately 
concerned with is the salvation of the person, not of the individual. However, 
regardless of the fact that it is important to distinguish between the person and the 
individual, what is evolving is one single person, a collective consciousness and a 
single soul – the ‘Soul of the Earth’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, p.32). As such, ‘only 
Christ is saved’ (cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 1968, p.143). Regardless of semantic 
subtleties, it is still the case that the individual’s personal identity remains excluded 
from the Omega.  
 
 However, a more favourable assessment of Teilhard’s pantheism may see in 
Teilhard a doctrine of incorporation, or recapitulation, of all into the body of Christ. 
As Tremblay perceptively notes, ‘in fact Teilhard was only paraphrasing St. Paul’ 
(Tremblay, 1989, p.30). Teilhard’s pantheistic tendencies, in other words, come from 
a desire to appropriate and make sense of the Pauline phrase that God will be ‘all in 
all’ (NRSV, 1995, 1 Cor. 15.28). If Teilhard is a pantheist, Tremblay implies, so, too, 
must be St. Paul. Although Teilhard used strange language, he was essentially 
affirming a unity such as was expounded by St. Paul. 
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Conclusion 
 The Cultural and social progression of humanity continues the geological and 
biological evolution that began with the stars, planets, and the emergence of life. This 
is not a different process, but a new phase of the same process, which is punctuated 
by moments of real novelty, of real change, when something entirely new, 
qualitatively new, emerges. Biological evolution still happens, therefore, but it now 
happens on a qualitatively different level. This means that it is not quite as simple as 
suggesting that it is now only confined to creating social, economic, and political 
unity, humanity do not become mere cells in the body of the planet. Lane confirms 
that ‘the rapid social evolution witnessed over the past few hundred years will be 
paralleled in biological evolution’ (Lane, 1996, p.122). 
 Teilhard, too, wrote that ‘[humanity] tends to knit itself together materially 
and psychologically until it forms in the strict biological sense a super-organism of a 
definite nature’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1966, p.265). This ‘duality’ of matter and 
consciousness represents another important element of Teilhard’s evolutionary theory, 
so important that it warrants its own chapter. This is where this thesis will now turn. 
For Teilhard, evolution is not just a process of material convergence but, in fact 
primarily, it is a process of psychological or spiritual convergence; and it is this 
process of spiritual convergence that guides the material convergence just described. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Relationship between Matter and Spirit: Teilhard’s Interpretation of Nature 
and Grace 
 
 
 In the previous chapter Teilhard’s evolutionary theory was expounded along 
two main lines, (a) a general treatment of the idea of progression and convergence and 
(b) what Teilhard termed ‘critical thresholds’ and the fact that evolution itself goes 
through qualitative changes. This led to a number of important considerations such as 
the role of technology, the role of education, the role of the church, and the loss of the 
individual. In this chapter another facet will be added to this understanding of 
Teilhard’s evolutionary theory, namely, the role of spirit. 
 The relationship that Teilhard postulated between matter and spirit is so 
important that it holds his evolutionary theory together. It could be argued that the 
relationship between matter and spirit is the central issue of Teilhard’s evolutionary 
theory (Grau, 1976, p.27). Whilst it is difficult to understand the biological or 
scientific understanding of evolution apart from the theological (thus leading to some 
commentators rejecting that what Teilhard offers can rightly be termed science at all), 
it is the explicit introduction of spirit into Teilhard’s theory of evolution that gives 
this chapter a rather different complexion. This chapter represents a more theological 
approach to the question of evolution for Teilhard, and at times that theological 
approach is also unmistakably mystical (cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 1975, p.202). 
 However, to claim that this chapter simply represents a theological or mystical 
interpretation of the same themes that were outlined in the previous chapter is to 
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oversimplify the issue. Although it is true that Teilhard saw matter and spirit as ‘two 
sides of the same coin’, a spiritual dimension to Teilhard’s evolutionary theory adds 
not only meaning but also a ‘mechanism’ by which Teilhard’s convergent evolution 
happens; it is spirit that drives and guides evolution. This means that the introduction 
of spirit into the conversation truly contributes something important to Teilhard’s 
theory of convergent evolution. 
 One of the most important considerations of this theological evolutionary 
theory is that it displays Teilhard’s monism. For Teilhard there is only one thing in 
the universe, everything else is simply a manifestation of that one thing. This means 
that the process of evolution is concerned only with the progression of one thing, only 
with the convergence of the disparate elements of one thing. This ‘thing’, it will be 
shown, is spirit. Everything is spirit, and all diverse matter is simply differing 
manifestations of that one principle. 
 
 This chapter will be divided into a number of sections that deal with this 
element of Teilhard’s theory. Starting with what Teilhard terms the ‘within’ of matter, 
this chapter will consider panpsychism, synergia, Teilhard’s mysticism of attaining 
heaven through earth and ‘seeing’ or ‘vision’, which can be said to represent 
Teilhard’s understanding of the relationship between nature and grace. 
 
The Religious Dimension of Evolution 
 One of the many important allusions to progress that appear in Teilhard’s 
work provides a particularly helpful insight into the religious implications of his 
evolutionary theory. In ‘The Salvation of Mankind’, Teilhard writes that 
‘futurism…universalism, and personalism…are the three characteristics of the 
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progress that leads us on’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.137). Evolutionary progress 
is characterised as an irreversible march towards the future. There is ‘no barrier to any 
possible development’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.135), fulfilled in the complete 
convergence of the universe as an organic unity, and deepening in the personal 
realisation of that unity. These were manifested in Teilhard’s work as the ‘Omega 
Point’, that end of evolution in which the universe becomes complete, united in the 
body of Christ (Lyons, 1982, p.38). To this end, Teilhard makes a point of 
‘theologising’ these specific points. He continues that 
 
the guiding principles of Christ’s religion are exactly the same as those in which 
we found the essence of human effort expressed: Heaven, Catholicity, the city 
of souls; in other words, futurism, universalism, personalism (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1965, p.147). 
 
The evolutionary progress has always had a religious realisation towards which it has 
been focused; the fulfilment of the evolutionary process of futurism, universalism, 
and personalism, has a theological end. Evolution is thus at every moment a religious 
doctrine that has religious concerns, or as Teilhard puts it, ‘evolution is holy’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.59); evolution ends in salvation, or more precisely, 
deification, the fulfilment of the universe’s spiritual life. 
 
 
The “Within” and ‘Without” of Matter 
 The reason that Teilhard can claim that ‘evolution is holy’, that evolution has 
a theological end, and thus can be seen as the work of God, is the role that he ascribes 
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to spirit and its relationship to matter. For Teilhard, there is a fundamental link 
between matter and spirit. There is a direct, positive correlation between the two such 
that an increase in matter causes an increase in spirit and vice versa. The more matter 
complexifies through the process of evolution, so the more spirit complexifies as well. 
This means for Teilhard, as has already been claimed, that the spiritual perfection of 
the universe (i.e. deification, the Omega Point) is precisely the same event as the end 
of material evolution. 
 This leads de Lubac to comment that Teilhard’s Hymn to Matter ‘is equally a 
hymn to spirit’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.204). Matter and spirit, therefore, are not two ends 
of one process that leads from one to the other (cf. Maloney, 1968, p.223), but are two 
ways of viewing the same phenomenon. For Teilhard, the ascent to God, i.e. the 
Omega Point, is achieved through matter. Matter is always the vehicle of spirit, or, as 
will be seen below, matter is simply the outward appearance of spirit. 
 
a. The Relationship of Creation and Deification 
 The process of evolution, therefore, has a spiritual goal, as King notes that ‘the 
process of evolution is a process of growing spiritualisation through greater 
unification and complexity, through centering and convergence’ (King, 1997, p.44). 
The implication of this idea is that creation and deification become the same act. 
Creation is only finished when it has become deified. Evolution – the process of 
spiritual perfection – ends in deification, when the universe participates in the divine 
nature, when God and the universe become united. Remember, that this is not the 
unification of individuals, a ‘pulling together’ of disparate material elements, but the 
creation, through evolution, of a single, completely centred, complex person: Christ. 
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 Once it is accepted that there is an underlying spiritual presence in the world, 
and that evolution directs such a spirituality towards its perfection, then deification 
becomes a central doctrine – evolution is as much a doctrine of deification as it is of 
creation. 
 
b. The “Within” of Matter as The Soul 
 Teilhard evidences this closeness of matter and spirit in Phenomenon of Man, 
writing that ‘spiritual perfection (or conscious “centreity”) and material synthesis (or 
complexity) are but two aspects or connected parts of one and the same phenomenon’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.60). In the same book, he uses the terms ‘within’ and 
‘without’ to talk about the spiritual dimension and the material dimension respectively 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.53ff). ‘There is an inside of things’, writes Corte, which 
is ‘co-extensive with their outside’ (Corte, 1960, p.61). The two dimensions cannot, 
truly, be considered apart from one another, they form two parts of the same thing, 
two ways of looking at the same phenomenon. 
 Teilhard also uses the terms ‘radial’ energy and ‘tangential’ energy to describe 
the ‘within’ and the ‘without’ respectively. In fact, ‘physical (tangential) and psychic 
(radial) energy would probably be clearer, and their meanings are more obvious’ 
(Dodson, 1984, p.30). Smith writes that ‘radial’ energy is ‘the mysterious factor 
which according to Teilhard’s theory draws the organism to higher levels of 
complexity and consciousness, [and] is obviously but another term for soul’ (Smith, 
1988, p.52). In other words, Teilhard denies an anthropic dualism of body and soul. If 
matter and spirit are simply two manifestations of the same phenomenon, then the 
body is simply the material appearance of the soul, which is the ‘within’ of matter, 
and is thus the spiritual dimension of evolution. As Teilhard confirmed, ‘the soul is 
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created through the grouping and co-ordination of materiality’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 
1968a, p.97). Thus, Faricy can write that ‘complexity is a matter of organized 
multiplicity – not just complication, but complication around a centre’ (Faricy, 1968, 
p.61). (Bearing in mind that Teilhard treated ‘centre’ and ‘person’ as synonyms 
(Kenney, 1970, p.231)).18 
 Baltazar also confirms this interpretation of the soul, writing that ‘the human 
is a single reality in which the body is tangential energy and the soul is radial energy; 
these two energies are but [two aspects] of one and the same reality’ (Baltazar, 2003, 
p.175). ‘Tangential’ energy and ‘radial’ energy, therefore, can be seen as synonyms 
for the ‘without’ and the ‘within’ respectively, the material and the spiritual 
dimensions of the same phenomenon. 
 
c. The Increasing Importance of the “Within” 
 Writing about the relationship between the ‘within’ and the ‘without’ of 
things, Dodson claims that 
 
at the atomic and molecular levels, the within is not detectable, but as the 
organisation of matter becomes more complex, the within becomes relatively 
                                                        
18
 The theory of entropy plays a role in this relationship. ‘[Teilhard] believes that 
entropy only operates upon tangential energy and not radial energy…this makes it 
important for man to continue on to the next step toward which he is driven’ 
(McCarty, 1976, pp.40-1; cf. Fullmen & D’Aoust, 1961, p.148). ‘Teilhard tried to 
resolve the problem [of the tension between entropy & evolution] by postulating two 
kinds of energy, which he called tangential energy and radial energy. Tangential 
energy is characteristic of the without of matter…it is fully subject to the laws of 
thermodynamics…radial energy is the energy of the within of matter, it increases with 
the increasing complexity of matter…and is at least potentially independent of 
entropy’ (Dodson, 1984, p.3). The more evolved one is, the more ‘ordered’ one is, the 
less effect entropy (disorder) has. The closer one is to God, the greater the pull of the 
divine, and the harder it is to fall away from him. 
 For a comprehensive list of Teilhard’s references to entropy and evolution see 
(King T, 2006, p.183; O’Connell, 1982, p.84ff.). 
 101 
more prominent, and at the cellular level it becomes visible as life, with all its 
properties (Dodson, 1984, p.156) 
 
Here, Dodson reiterates what has already been stated regarding the relationship of 
matter and spirit, however there is the implication that the ‘within’ of matter becomes 
of increasing importance as it complexifies. When a ‘critical threshold’ is crossed, 
and evolution undergoes a qualitative change, so the ‘within’ of matter becomes 
manifested in qualitatively different ways. When Dodson continues that 
‘consciousness [is] the most highly evolved expression of radial energy’ (Dodson, 
1984, p.203), this is what he is referring to. As material evolution progresses, and 
pulls spirit together, so spirit becomes manifested in different ways, as life or as 
consciousness. At the human level the ‘within’ becomes more important than the 
‘without’, hence the ‘evolution of evolution’. 
 
d. Matter and Spirit as Darwinian and Lamarckian Synthesis 
 In this way the ‘within’ and the ‘without’ of things can be seen as indicative of 
the ‘synthesis’ of Lamarckian and Darwinian principles that Teilhard understood his 
theory to represent. ‘The “within” would correspond to a Lamarckian inner principle’, 
writes Mooney, ‘while the “without” of things would be Darwinian’ (Mooney, 1966, 
p.38). As it was argued in the last chapter, Teilhard thought that as matter was more 
diffuse Darwinian principles controlled the process of evolution but as matter became 
more centred so Lamarckian principles took over. That point when Lamarckian 
principles take over happens in humanity, when the ‘within’ of things becomes more 
important. 
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 This means, therefore, that just as Teilhard claimed that Darwinism was 
‘directed chance’ rather than ‘random chance’, so this is a result of the fact that he 
postulates a “within” to every “without”; there is not one ‘bit’ of matter that is not 
without a corresponding spirit to guide it. 
 
e. The Primacy of Spirit 
 This leads to one of the most important considerations regarding Teilhard’s 
evolutionary theory: it is actually spirit that is evolving, not matter (cf. Savary, 2010, 
pp.20-1); just as consciousness was the primary element in Bergson’s own theory. 
McCarty writes that 
 
previously it had been thought that things were held together from below by the 
external which we call matter. However Teilhard saw this as an inversion of 
reality, because things are really held together from above, by spirit (McCarty, 
1976, p.30). 
 
 It is spirit that is converging and complexifying, and matter that is pulled 
together as a result. The complex manifestations of matter that make up the 
observable world are passive constructions, the result of a more primary pulling 
together of spirit. ‘The true evolution of the world’, writes Teilhard, ‘takes place in 
souls and in their union’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.48). Evolution is the evolution 
of spirit, of which matter is the external expression (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.50). 
It is spirit that is being complexified, it is the perfection of spirit, i.e. deification, that 
is the primary goal of evolution, and matter only becomes complexified because it is 
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the ‘external manifestation of spirit’ (McCarty, 1976, p.37). In other words, it is not 
spirit that is the ‘within’ of matter, matter is the ‘without’ of spirit. 
 
Teilhard’s Mysticism: To Heaven Through Earth 
 However, regardless of the fact that Teilhard argued for the primacy of spirit, 
the fact that Teilhard affirmed such a relationship between matter and spirit means 
that he could not conceive of a spiritual dimension that is without a material 
manifestation. The ascent to God is not one in which matter is left behind or escaped 
from, but matter is simply the outward manifestation of the spiritual ascent. The more 
unified souls become, the more unified their material manifestation, which is their 
outward appearance. There is thus a ‘communion with God through Earth’ (Teilhard 
de Chardin, 1968a, p.14). 
 In The Heart of The Matter  Teilhard continued that the fundamental aim ‘is to 
attain heaven by bringing Earth to fulfilment’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, p.47). The 
mystical effort is not one of trying to escape from the Earth, to deny one’s materiality, 
but to immerse oneself in the material, to see the fulfilment of the Earth as the 
fulfilment of one’s spiritual life. The two are not separate concerns; ‘heaven cannot 
dispense with the Earth’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, p.47).  
 This means that, since there can be no spiritual dimension without a 
corresponding material manifestation, the complete spiritual union that is 
representative of the Omega Point (i.e. deification) has a corresponding complete 
material union, both attained through evolution. As spirit is pulled together, through 
evolution, towards God so matter is pulled together with it, and if there is a point to be 
reached at which spirit is completely unified, then there must be a point at which 
matter is likewise completely unified. 
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a. The Great Monad 
 If evolution produces just one monad, ‘the great monad’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 
1968, p.145; cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, p.182ff.),19 then this must be manifested 
as one materially convergent phenomenon (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965a, pp.238-9). If 
matter is the ‘without’ of spirit then the convergence of spirit into a collective soul (or 
consciousness) also means a convergence of a matter into a collective materiality. As 
such, Teilhard observed that 
 
it is becoming more and more impossible for any step in material organisation 
to be taken on this earth which does not there and then call for an equivalent 
step in the psychic and spiritual domain, to balance, humanize, and complete it 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1975, p.144). 
 
 Again, it is important to remember that the union of matter is not caused by a 
merging of disparate matter, nor a fusion of existing material, but by the production of 
more unified and spiritual matter evolutionally. This must be the case because 
evolution is how God creates (Teilhard de Chardin, 1975, p.198); this is how God 
pulls creation towards himself. It is impossible, therefore, to understand the 
convergence of matter that culminates in the ‘organicosocial supercomplex’ (Teilhard 
de Chardin, 2004, p.108) as a metaphor; if evolution produces one monad, one 
spiritual centre, then this must be manifested outwardly as one ‘bit’ of matter, which 
will come to be labelled as the body of Christ. 
                                                        
19
 ‘One similarity between Le Roy and Teilhard is the employment of “monad” in the 
general sense of a unit of being, without commitment to the Leibnizian notion of a 
totally enclosed entity’ (Lyons, 1982, pp.176-7). 
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Relationship of Matter and Spirit as the Relationship between Nature and the 
Supernatural 
 If the relationship between matter and spirit is such as Teilhard argues then 
this corresponds to the relationship that is posited between nature and the supernatural 
in modern Catholic theology. If Teilhard saw the term of evolution to be deification, 
complete union with God, and that such an end to evolution was also necessitated 
because he saw the material evolution of the universe to be only an outward 
manifestation of spiritual fulfilment, then understanding nature to have a supernatural 
end is inevitable. 
 Passmore recognises such a conclusion when he writes that while the mystical 
union with God may be ‘supernatural in character, [it] is at the same time the natural 
outcome of evolution’ (Passmore, 1970, p.252). The ‘biological realities’ of evolution 
are the ‘supernatural realities’ of ascent to God (de Lubac, 1967, p.189). The natural 
progression of the world is identical to the supernatural progression of the world. This 
leads Mooney to write that Teilhard’s overriding concern was: 
 
to create a living unity between the movement of supernatural faith in God 
which rises upwards and the movement of natural faith in man which advances 
forward…he thereby postulates a connection between the natural evolutionary 
process and the supernatural consummation of mankind (Mooney, 1966, p.32, 
p.68) 
 
Thus, Mooney continues, evolution was: 
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situated squarely within the total supernatural movement from creation in Christ 
to final pleroma…since in Teilhard’s thought the natural evolutionary process is 
clearly destined to reach a supernatural termination (Mooney, 1966, pp.206-7) 
 
Deification is completely synonymous with the historical process of the world – 
natural fulfilment and spiritual fulfilment are one and the same event (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1968a, p.50). 
 
a. Teilhard’s Anticipation of Late Twentieth Century Catholic Theology 
 Such a tension between materiality and spirituality can be seen in Henri de 
Lubac’s A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, written in the wake of the Second 
Vatican Council. De Lubac writes that: 
 
on the one hand we use a noun “nature”, and on the other an adjective 
“supernatural”…in reality we have here is not…two juxtaposed realities (two 
“natures”), or, if one prefers, two realties the second of which would be 
superimposed on the other, while both remained exterior to each other (de 
Lubac, 1980, pp.33-4) 
 
Instead: 
 
the supernatural, one might say, is that divine element which man’s effort 
cannot reach (no self-divinization!) but which unites itself to man “elevating” 
him as our classical theology used to point out and Vatican II still says, 
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penetrating him in order to divinize him, and this becoming as it were an 
attribute of the “new man” described by St. Paul (de Lubac, 1980, p.41) 
 
For de Lubac, the supernatural is not separate from nature, but is that which is ‘in’ 
man, which brings him to his fulfilment. The fulfilment of man, his divinization, is 
supernatural in character. 
 This relationship is precisely that found in Teilhard’s relationship between 
matter and spirit. In fact, in a footnote to his essay ‘Super-Humanity, Super-Christ, 
Super-Charity’, Teilhard explicitly writes that ‘the prefix “super” is used…to indicate 
not a difference of nature but a mere advanced degree of realisation and perception’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1965,p.151n1), thereby even coming close to using the same 
language that de Lubac does (or, better, de Lubac comes close to using the language 
of Teilhard). 
 It is therefore in the relationship between nature and the supernatural that 
Teilhard’s whole evolutionary theory lays (cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.212ff). 
The relationship between matter and spirit is the relationship between nature and the 
supernatural (Schäfer, 2006, p.113); the more conscious and spiritual creation 
becomes, the more supernatural its disposition. 
 In this way, ‘[Teilhard] anticipated the thought of Vatican II. We can even 
venture to assume that this influence was at work there, in the person of such periti as 
Henri de Lubac, who shared Teilhard’s cosmic view’ (Binns, 1968, p.134; cf. Vollert, 
1968, p.147ff). Lane even goes so far as to claim that ‘Gaudium Spes embodied 
Teilhard’s thought, though without explicit reference to him’ (Lane, 1996, p.89), as 
does Faricy, who claims that Teilhard’s ideas influenced the Pastoral Constitution on 
the Church in the Modern World (Faricy, 1981a, p.xv). 
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b. The Continuing Need For Grace 
 ‘Nevertheless’, clarifies de Lubac, ‘[Teilhard] is equally clear, when 
necessary, to emphasize the distinction [between nature and the supernatural], which 
only God’s gift can eliminate the two’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.122). Such a comment can 
clearly be seen as an attempt to reaffirm that Teilhard’s understanding of the 
supernatural term of evolution does not mean that grace is no longer required. The 
Pelagian heresy has not returned under a new guise. The relationship between nature 
and the supernatural still relies completely upon God’s grace, and it relies completely 
on the role of God in the evolutionary process, and the love of God. 
 
Panpsychism 
a. A Convergent Consciousness 
 It has already been expounded in some detail that for Teilhard the 
complexification of matter had a corresponding complexification of consciousness; 
the more evolved one is, the more conscious one is. However, the relationship that 
Teilhard posited between matter and spirit, such that every ‘bit’ of matter has a 
‘within’, i.e. a spiritual dimension, also leads to a doctrine of panpsychism, the belief 
that everything from humanity to elementary particles has a corresponding 
consciousness. 
 It was claimed above that the process of evolution can rightly be called a 
process of spiritualisation, that the material progression of evolution is nothing more 
than the outward manifestation of the more important process of spiritual perfection, 
i.e. deification. However, by the term spiritualisation, Teilhard also meant ‘the 
increasing predominance in the human layer of the reflective (or “thought”) over 
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automatic reactions and instinct’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1975, p.183). In other words, 
as there is a positive correlation between material complexification and 
consciousness, and there is likewise a positive correlation between material 
complexification and spiritual complexification, so there is a relationship between 
spirituality and consciousness (Smith, 1988, p.27). The more conscious one is, the 
more spiritual one is, and the closer to God one is. If the spiritual dimension is simply 
the ‘within’ of matter, then this forms the basis of a doctrine of panpsychism. 
 
 In The Future of Man Teilhard wrote that there ‘is a universal property 
common to all particles constituting the universe, but varying in proportion to the 
complexity of any particular molecule’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.123), explicitly 
underlying the correlation between material complexity and consciousness. Teilhard 
also stated in his Phenomenon of Man that: 
 
the term “consciousness” is taken in its widest sense to indicate every kind of 
psychism, from the most rudimentary forms of interior perception to the human 
phenomenon of reflective thought (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.57n1) 
 
This means that Teilhard does not mean that everything is conscious in the same way, 
but that what is manifested in humanity as reflective thought, is also present, in a 
qualitatively different degree, in everything else. Just as evolution goes through 
qualitative changes, so what is termed consciousness, the ‘within’ of matter, does too. 
Hence, this does not mean that each atom is conscious, but ‘there is something 
corresponding to consciousness even among the atoms’ (Hanson, 1979, p.170). 
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 Teilhard underlined this point in the rather obscure remark that ‘consciousness 
displays itself qualitatively as a spectrum of shifting shades whose lower terms are 
lost in the night’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.60), meaning that the ‘within’ of 
matter, i.e. consciousness, becomes so fragmented as matter becomes more simple 
that it becomes undetectable. Even the most simple and diffuse of matter is still 
conscious but this does not mean that the consciousness manifested at these lower 
levels is of the same quality as human reflective thought. At one point Teilhard even 
postulates that magnetic forces have a corresponding consciousness (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1965, p.146), which led Cuénot to suggest that ‘the universe of physical 
forces is only an exterior whose interior is psychic’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.352). 
 For Teilhard, if there is a definite process of convergence of consciousness 
into more complex forms, then there must equally be a reverse, a ‘looking back’ to a 
previous divergent consciousness. He wrote, therefore, that: 
 
why not extend and generalize this law, duly documented in the human sector, 
to all the rest of the living world?...what is true on the level of man and 
anthropogenesis must be equally true (at least initially and proportionately) at 
any earlier stage of biological evolution (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965a, p.124) 
 
 However, it is not just consciousness and spirit that are treated as in some 
sense interchangeable, life, too, is part of this relationship. What is considered spirit, 
the ‘within’ of matter, is both life and consciousness. The more that life is manifested 
in the individual, the more conscious it is, and the more spiritual and closer to God. 
 
b. Teilhard and Bergson 
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 Teilhard’s conclusion that ‘all energy is psychic’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, 
p.64) is similar to that of Bergson who asserted that ‘life is of the psychological order’ 
(Bergson, 1911, p.271), further supporting the fact that Teilhard was heavily 
influenced by Bergson. However, that being the case, it is panpsychism that 
nevertheless represents one of the most important distinctions between Teilhard and 
Bergson. 
 For Bergson consciousness was a single, objective entity that was filtered 
through the brain. This meant that, although there was a direct correlation between the 
individual’s brain and their consciousness, consciousness did not originate in the 
brain, which was only a ‘vessel’ for a separate consciousness (Bergson, 1911, p.256, 
p.277). Consciousness, therefore, was divergent; the single, objective consciousness 
diverges and is ‘distributed’ to individuals in correlation to the size of their brain. 
 For Teilhard, in contrast, consciousness is fragmented, each particle of matter 
having a corresponding consciousness (the ‘within’), which converges and unites, 
evolutionally, forming ever greater and deeper centres of consciousness, directly 
correlating to the degree of biological development. Eventually, when the Omega 
Point is reached, what was once a fragmented consciousness becomes united and 
singular, forming one objective consciousness. The thresholds that evolution crosses 
correspond to those moments when the tension of converging spirit becomes too great 
and a ‘jump’ in the consciousness of the universe occurs. For Teilhard, consciousness, 
or spirit, is pulled together into the convergent centre of the universe that is the heart 
of Christ. 
 For Bergson, consciousness ‘splits’ and branches off into matter, the degree of 
individualisation being determined by the extent of participation in the durée. In other 
words, Bergson’s panpsychism is divergent whereas Teilhard’s is convergent. 
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Bergson and Teilhard both espouse panpsychism, and both attribute consciousness in 
correlation to biological development (although Bergson is more specific that neural 
tissue is needed, he still maintains there is potential for consciousness in all matter), 
Teilhard differs in that he sees the process of evolution as being concerned with the 
convergence of a divergent consciousness, rather than the continual process of a 
diverging consciousness. Thus, Teilhard’s panpsychism is fundamentally bound up 
with his spiritualisation. Just as evolution is producing one united spirit, i.e. 
deification, so evolution is producing one united consciousness, which is Christ’s, to 
correspond with the body of Christ, which is the material ‘without’ of the Omega 
Point. 
 
c. Panpsychism and The Great Monad 
 If consciousness is the manifestation of the ‘within’, or, more accurately, 
matter is only the outward appearance of consciousness, then the convergence and 
union of one, collective, objective, consciousness – Christ’s – must manifest itself as 
one, collective, objective, body as well; a body that is ‘organically and psychically 
indivisible’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.281). One collective consciousness ‘within’ 
means one collective material ‘without’. 
 Teilhard, in his Writings in The Time of War , supports this interpretation 
writing that ‘if [Christ] is to be the soul of our souls, he must begin by being the flesh 
of our flesh’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.268). Christ achieves this ‘being the flesh 
of our flesh’ through the continuing convergent evolutionary process in the phylum of 
the Church. As Cuénot confirms 
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if we want more mind, we must have greater arrangement of matter…there is 
nothing to stop us from admitting that the conscious superstructure is based on 
the material infrastructure (Cuénot, 1967, p.64, p.87). 
 
If heaven is reached through the Earth, so that heaven cannot dispense with the Earth, 
and that the correlation between matter and spirit is upheld, there can be no other 
conclusion than this: a completely unified soul is manifested as a completely unified 
body. 
 
God, Panpsychism and Vitalism 
 In much the same way that Bergson went on to correlate the consciousness 
that drives evolution with God, Teilhard also links the spirit that drives evolution with 
God (Lane, 1996, p.145). The spirit that eventually converges upon itself to become 
the body of Christ is identified with God (cf. McCarty, 1976, pp.57-8). If 
consciousness, the objective consciousness that is being united through evolution, is 
the consciousness of God, and remembering that evolution is always, no matter how 
weakly, directed through consciousness (see Teilhard’s ‘synthesis’ between 
Darwinism and Lamarckism), then evolution is a process that is directed by God. As 
evolution progresses, and this consciousness becomes more converged and united, 
then God has more control of the evolutionary process through the actions of 
humanity (see synergia below). 
 The postulation of a ‘within’ to matter that guides the evolutionary process 
betrays a vitalistic understanding of evolution. There is a principle within nature that 
guides it along the path of evolution to its fulfilment, and that principle is the 
consciousness of ‘within’, which is God. Thus, Klauder writes that 
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evolution is the creative power and intelligence of God working from within his 
creation to the manifestation of his glory…the “thrust” in the universe is the 
created dynamic force which manifests God’s immanence and creative power in 
nature. Since radial energy is that form of energy which accounts for cosmic 
evolution towards the more complex, the more aware, the more spiritual, it 
would seem that in its basic form it is the creative power of God (Klauder, 
1971, p.15, p.23) 
 
The fact that consciousness is seen as a manifestation of spirit, and the guiding force 
of evolution, means that Teilhard is an exponent of vitalism. In this way, it becomes 
explicit that the energy of the creative process is that of God. God pulls spirit towards 
him, unifying matter. 
 In his essay ‘The Zest for Living’, Teilhard writes that ‘a zest for living, the 
zest for living – such, when we get to the bottom of the problem, would appear to be 
the fundamental driving force which impels and directs the universe along its main 
axis of complexity-consciousness’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1978a, p.235). This zest for 
living is none other than life/consciousness/spirit, which is also the guiding force of 
God in Christ. 
 
a. God as Attraction 
 At times, Teilhard also refers to this vitalistic movement of evolution as 
‘attraction’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, p.205; Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.254). It 
is God who pulls matter, through spirit, towards him. Teilhard ‘was careful to make it 
clear…that that ascent [to God, through evolution,] should be attributed not so much 
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to an impulse from below as to an attraction from above’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.121). 
The process of evolution is one of unification, but that unification is one of passive 
attraction rather than active movement. 
 This means that Teilhard can write that God pulls creation not from above but 
from ahead (Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, p.53; cf. Smith, 1988, p.34). God waits for 
evolution to finish (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.71), pulling creation towards him 
not spatially but temporally, through evolution. 
 
b. Teilhard’s Understanding of God As Bergsonian Élan Vital 
 Bergson’s élan vital is a clear influence here. Balek, in his essay ‘The Birth 
and Life of Consciousness’ writes that 
 
Teilhard conceives of a purely mechanistic description of the development of 
the universe – a continuous evolution from inorganic matter to life and even 
consciousness without the intervention of a vitalistc force. His requirement is 
that this spiritual force exists from the onset in simple, unorganized matter 
(Balek, 1961, p.92-3). 
 
In other words, the vitalistic principle is not something separate from matter, it exists 
in simple, unorganized matter; Teilhard is not a vitalist because he postulates 
something else to evolution, he is a vitalist because he sees evolution as being guided 
by an active principle. This is precisely what has already been concluded regarding 
Teilhard’s notion of the ‘within’ of matter. 
 Forsthoefel agrees that ‘there is no room in [Teilhard’s] idea for an entity 
residing in the midst of matter which is alive, essentially separate from matter’ 
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(Forsthoefel, 1961, p.104). Teilhard does not postulate a ‘something else’ as the 
vitalistic principle. The guiding principle of evolution is not separate from or outside 
of that which it guides. The consciousness of matter is responsible for its own impetus 
to evolve. The guiding principle of evolution is the attractive pull of converging 
consciousness, which is nothing other than the ‘within’ of matter. 
 There is a clear comparison here with Bergson’s élan vital. Bergson attributed 
the consciousness of the individual to the filtering of the élan vital, which was 
identified with God, through the brain. Thus, for Bergson, the consciousness of the 
individual was a participating in the objective consciousness of God. This élan vital, 
or vital principle, was also responsible for evolution, leading to the conclusion that 
God directed evolution. This is precisely how Teilhard understood the role of 
consciousness regarding evolution (cf. Teilhard’s tension between Darwin and 
Lamarck). The relationship in Teilhard between matter and spirit is similar to the 
relationship between creation and the élan vital in Bergson, with the exception, 
already outlined, that with Teilhard this objective consciousness of God is a future 
reality, the conclusion of a convergent evolutionary process. Consciousness is the 
fragmented consciousness of Christ, gradually being pulled together by consciousness 
itself, gradually being completed, and this completion coincides with the completion 
of the body of Christ, since matter and spirit are directly linked and have a positive 
correlation. 
 
c. The Vitalistic Principle as Love of God 
 McCarty, in support of the interpretation of this chapter, writes that Teilhard’s 
notion of love is comparable with Bergson, writing that ‘love as energy is the 
“withiness of things” and is closely comparable to Bergson’s élan vital’ (McCarty, 
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1976, p.56). Therefore, Teilhard’s understanding of divine love furthers this 
interpretation of his evolutionary theory (cf. Grau, 1976, p.322ff). For Teilhard, love, 
the love of God, is synonymous with the evolutionary guiding principle of creation; it 
is also, therefore, synonymous with consciousness and spirit. It is love that best 
describes the zest for life that causes creation to evolve to higher and higher degrees 
of complexity and interiority (cf. Mooney, 1966, p.55; Corbishley, 1971, p.55; Faricy, 
2006, pp.127-8; McCarty, 1976, p.33; McCarty, 1976, p.56; Grim & Evelyn Tucker, 
2003, p.8; Tremblay, 1989, p.49; Grau, 1976, p.132). Kropf writes that: 
 
a note of July 20th 1946 suggests that love is the dynamic source of 
consciousness or that consciousness is but the first vague wave of love and that 
as a consequence the noosphere will be fully activated only to the extent that its 
affective unifications is “dynamized” or transformed through “Christification” 
(Kropf, 1980, p.269-70) 
 
Faricy, too, writes that for Teilhard: 
 
what binds creatures together is love. The interior mutual attraction that runs 
through nature, that binds particles to make atoms, atoms to make molecules, 
cells to make bodily organs and whole bodies, when found at the level of human 
consciousness is what we most properly call love (Faricy, 2006, p.128) 
 
Thus, the ‘within’ of matter, the spirit of which matter is the physical manifestation, is 
the consciousness of God and the love of God. In Human Energy Teilhard is explicit 
that ‘in its most primitive forms, when life was scarcely individualized, love is hard to 
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distinguish from molecular forces’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1969, p.33) and that ‘soon, 
however, the pull of the living can be felt: in the lower forms it is almost a mechanical 
process, but in the human heart it becomes the infinitely rich and formidable power of 
love’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.48). There is a clear correlation between how 
Teilhard treated consciousness, which is postulated in all and undergoes qualitative 
changes, and how he treats love. For Teilhard, therefore, the love of God is also the 
‘within’ of matter, it is that which pulls matter together into more complex and 
convergent material. 
 In The Future of Man Teilhard wrote that: 
 
for the Christian, if he be truly Christian, [love] is life itself, life in the integrity 
of its aspirations, its struggles and its conquests, that he must embrace a spirit of 
togetherness and personalising unification with all things (Teilhard de Chardin, 
2004, p.71) 
 
De Lubac also draws attention to this theme. Love, according to de Lubac, is so 
central that it is the unifying principle of the universe (de Lubac, 1971, pp.86-7). It is 
love that unites, therefore it is love that creates, and if evolution is how God creates, 
then the love of God is the vitalistic principle. It is the love of God that is the ‘within’ 
of matter, that makes up the consciousness of the individual, thus it is the love of God 
that guides evolution, that is slowly building the body of Christ. Even the 
attractiveness between atoms at the centre of chemistry is due to the unitary force of 
love. It is through the love that God creates; it is the love of God that guides 
evolution. The love of God, then, that is the vitalistic principle. 
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Nature and Grace 
 With the close relationship between matter and spirit, comparable to the same 
relationship between nature and the supernatural in modern Catholic theology, which 
in many respects Teilhard can be claimed to anticipate, Teilhard postulates a 
particular mystical outlook. As has already been alluded to, if nature and the 
supernatural are the same phenomenon then the tension between them, if it can be 
called a tension, becomes blurred. Although there are definite thresholds that are 
crossed, whereby entirely new manifestations of matter and spirit are manifested, 
there is no real distinction between where creation ends and deification begins. In 
fact, because matter and spirit are the same, there is not a point when creation ends 
and deification begins, the two are different ways of explaining the same 
phenomenon. 
 
a. “Seeing” and “Vision” 
 It is therefore only faith, only by ‘seeing’ with eyes that can see,20 that can 
understand the supernatural end to nature, that can see the world and evolution for 
what it truly is: the love of God working in and through the world, perfecting it, 
deifying it, forming the body of Christ. ‘Seeing’, writes Hale, ‘is in fact the key 
source for [Teilhard’s] theology of the universe’ (Hale, 1973, p.60). 
 In The Divine Milieu, the book where such an understanding is most explicit, 
Teilhard argues that it is common to accept that there is a divide between time spent 
in the world and time spent engaging in ecclesial activity. He writes that: 
 
                                                        
20
 It is in this direction that O’Connell notes Rousselot’s influence on Teilhard. 
‘Rousselot in 1910 published his famous essay on how the believer’s “eyes” could see 
signs of God’s working which escaped the eyes of others’ (O’Connell, 1982, p.41). 
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a few moments of the day can be salvaged for God, yes, but the best hours are 
absorbed, or at any rate cheapened, by material care…under the sway of this 
feeling large numbers of Catholics lead a double or crippled life in practice 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1968, p.65) 
 
The reason that large numbers of Catholics feel this way is that ‘much of the so called 
“spiritual” writing in the Church has…treated those two orders [of nature and the 
supernatural] as if they were like oil and water, one superimposed on the other but 
never interpenetrating it’ (Corbishley, 1971, p.85), a sentiment that can be attributed 
to the success of Thomism (cf. Cooper, 1989, p.28). However, Teilhard claims that 
this is incorrect. There can be no separation of nature and grace, because matter 
always has a spiritual ‘within’, therefore there can be no situation in which humanity 
is not in touch with their supernatural end in God; ‘by virtue of the creation and, still 
more, of the incarnation, nothing here below is profane for those who know how to 
see’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968, p.66).21 
                                                        
21
 ‘Jesus’ often shocking parables have as their primary purpose to get people to 
behold, to get people to wake up and see, to behold what is already in their 
midst…[and] what is it we are always being told to behold in Jesus’ parables? The 
divine presence everywhere’ (Fox, 1988, p.70). (‘The reason I speak in parables is 
that “seeing they do not perceive…but blessed are your eyes for they see”’ (NRSV, 
1995, Mt 9.14, 16), ‘do you have eyes, and fail to see?’ (NRSV, 1995, Mk 8.18)). 
 Maloney writes that Maximus the Confessor understands that ‘the ordinary 
person reads Holy Scripture and sees nothing but the letter…but the person with the 
gift of contemplation sees the deeper meanings…the same applies to man in relation 
to other men…the man of interior vision can see beyond to the inner logos. He can 
pierce through the phenomenal, the physical appearance of the sensible order, as 
unimportant and enter into an interior vision, that allows him to see others in God’s 
light’ (Maloney, 1968, pp.173-4). 
  There is a similarity, therefore, between Teilhard’s understanding of the 
relationship of matter and spirit and the Palamite understanding of the Thoboric light. 
For Palamas, and subsequently Eastern Orthodox theology, the light of Christ of the 
transfiguration, and the light of deified individuals and mystics, is only perceivable to 
those who themselves are deified. The story of the transfiguration of Motovilov and 
Seraphim of Sarov (Jakim, 2009, p.255) provides a good example of this. In this story 
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 The language of ‘seeing’ or ‘vision’ is central to this understanding, and what 
humanity must ‘see’ is ‘the inner presence of the resurrected Christ bringing the world 
to consummation’ (Maloney, 1968, p.189). Teilhard continues by asking ‘which is the 
more precious of these two beatitudes, that all things are means through which 
[humanity] can touch [God], or that [God himself] is so “universal” that [humanity] 
can experience [him] and lay hold of [him] in every creature’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 
1968, p.127). These two beatitudes, however, essentially make the same point: there 
can never be a situation whereby creation is not the means whereby God is 
experienced and attained. 
 This means that when humanity come to realise the close connection between 
nature and grace there will be ‘no need to fear that the most trivial or the most 
absorbing of occupations should force us to depart from him…there will be little to 
separate life in the cloister from the life of the world’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968, 
pp.66-7). The path to God is not in separation and escape from it but through it. 
Humanity only has to recognize that nature always and at every moment has a 
supernatural end to acknowledge that their natural life becomes supernatural in 
character – the end of evolution is experienced now (Grumett, 2005, p.150). 
 
 However, perhaps more importantly, Teilhard explicitly relates this idea of 
vision to his evolutionary theology of union. He writes that ‘fuller being is closer 
union…[and] union increases only through an increase in consciousness, that is to say 
                                                                                                                                                              
Motovilov complains of not being able to look at his master because of his 
transfiguration, however Seraphim replies that this is only because he has become 
transfigured himself, it is only he that has eyes that can see who can recognize the 
supernatural end to nature. It is only because Motovilov was himself deified that he 
could perceive that deification of Seraphim of Sarov. (Likewise at the Transfiguration 
of Jesus the change is not one that happens in Christ but in the disciples (cf. Maloney, 
1968, p.246, Lossky, 1975, p.61)). 
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vision’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.31). The more evolved one is, the more 
consciousness one has, then the more united to God one is, and the more that one can 
experience the supernatural end to evolution. The more evolved creation becomes, the 
closer to deification it becomes, and the greater the ability to ‘see’ the world for what 
it truly is. As will be seen below when synergia is considered, the mystical activity of 
recognizing the supernatural end of life in the here and now actually fastens the 
‘Omega Point’. 
 
b. “Seeing” as Faith 
 It is in this direction that faith comes to hold an important role. De Lubac asks 
‘how, then, should we sum up Pere Teilhard’s optimism? No one, surely, (no believer, 
that is,) could reasonably see it as anything but a victory of faith’ (de Lubac, 1967, 
p.46). ‘Seeing’ the world for what it truly is, with such a close connection between 
nature and supernatural, is an act of faith. It is with faith that the individual can 
perform their duties, no matter how mundane, and still be sure that they are living 
with the supernatural. 
 This means that faith becomes for Teilhard an evolved category. The more 
evolution progresses, and the more spiritual it becomes, especially when it crosses the 
threshold of humanity and the spiritual becomes more prominent than the material, so 
faith becomes more central.  
 
c. Teilhard’s Jesuit Spirituality 
 It is true that Teilhard reached this conclusion regarding the role of spirit in 
matter from Bergson, but it is also a result of his Jesuit upbringing, an outlook that he 
attained as a student (Cuénot, 1958, p.5). Grumett, in his Teilhard de Chardin: 
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Theology, Humanity, and Cosmos, notes this feature of Teilhard’s intellectual 
upbringing writing that ‘the vision of the cosmos spiritually transfigured performs an 
analogous function for Teilhard to that of imagination in the Ignatian Spiritual 
Exercises’ (Grumett, 2005, p.228). 
 The Ignatian spirituality was concerned, in the first place, with finding ‘God in 
all things’. Teilhard spent his entire academic life in Jesuit institutions; he joined the 
order at eighteen, and spent his adult life giving retreats. It is therefore obvious that he 
was steeped in Jesuit spirituality. This provides the perfect complement to Bergson’s 
élan vital. Where Bergson developed an evolutionary theory based on a vitalistic 
principle in all things, evolving them, and bringing them to consciousness, Ignatius 
taught his disciples to see God in all things. It comes as no surprise therefore that 
Teilhard embraced this Bergsonian evolutionary theory and used it to develop his own 
evolutionary theology. 
 Teilhard saw God in everything, and he saw evolution as the creating action of 
God in the world, uniting everything together in the body of Christ. The more evolved 
the individual was the easier it was to see this supernatural evolution, and to ‘see’ 
God in the world. The more evolved one was, the closer deification was, and the more 
faith the individual had. 
 
d. Synergia 
 It has already been commented that Teilhard’s understanding of the 
relationship between matter and spirit led to his mysticism of attaining heaven 
through Earth, not by abandoning it. This means that, although it is the spiritual 
dimension that is primary, any attempt to hasten material progression will likewise 
hasten the Omega Point, due to the correlation between the two. This, obviously, 
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leads to a doctrine of synergia. Although many commentators note that ‘action’ plays 
an important part in Teilhard’s thought,22 very few, if any, explicitly refer to it as 
synergia. 
 In his Christianity and Evolution Teilhard wrote that humanity must: 
 
make [their] way to heaven through Earth. There is a communion (the true 
communion) with God through the world, and to surrender oneself to it is not to 
take the impossible step of trying to serve two masters (Teilhard de Chardin, 
1971, p.93). 
 
There is no longer a separation of nature and grace, no longer an activity on earth that 
is separate from (whether positively or negatively) the path to deification. Teilhard 
therefore contends that no matter how ‘monotonous, commonplace, [or] boring’ his 
worldly duties may be, he can carry them out ‘in the consciousness that I am 
effectively collaborating in the absolute evolution of Being’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 
1968a, p.43). 
                                                        
22
 It is in this area that it is argued that Blondel provided a big influence on Teilhard. 
Most notably, Blondel argued that ‘even by our own action we try to produce 
something outside us, we find that we grown in the process. So action builds up our 
personality’ (Marnette, 1981, p.137); for Blondel it is in the field of action that the 
category of becoming happens, it is only in action that humanity can come to know 
itself and the world, and more specifically, or importantly, God. Marnette continues 
that ‘if we open ourselves to wider horizons of action, we attain a destiny in which we 
become the collaborators of God and even are ready to receive the generous help of 
grace’ (Marnette, 1981, p.143), clearly showing a comparison with Teilhard’s theory. 
However, as Lyons notes, ‘it was not until August 1919 that [Teilhard] became aware, 
in conversation with Valensin, of Blondel’s “pan-Christism” and of its similarity to 
his own view on the relation between Christ and the world’ (Lyons, 1982, p.159). 
This happened after Teilhard, in his essays written during the First World War, had 
already elaborated his Christology, therefore Blondel cannot be considered to be 
responsible for this idea in Teilhard. See also Hale, 1973, p.51ff; Grumett, 2005, 
p.44ff; Raven, 1962, p.101; Mooney, 1966, p.20. 
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 In The Divine Milieu Teilhard places a big emphasis on the importance of 
human action in relation to creation’s relationship with God, and he is clear that 
human action makes a positive contribution to the progress of evolution. In other 
words, human action brings ‘fulfilment to Christ’. Teilhard continues that ‘each one 
of our works, by its more or less remote or direct effect upon the spiritual world, helps 
to make perfect Christ in his mystical reality’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968, p.62). If the 
Omega Point coincides with the completion of the body of Christ, then it is 
unmistakable that Teilhard here is claiming that human action contributes to the 
direction and progress of evolution. 
 Again, in his essay ‘A Note on Progress’, Teilhard writes that Christ ‘fulfils 
himself gradually through the ages in the sum of our individual endeavours’ (Teilhard 
de Chardin, 2004, p.13). The Lamarckian implications of Teilhard’s evolutionary 
theory have already been commented upon and therefore it is unnecessary to return to 
such a debate. It is enough to point to how this understanding of the role of human 
cultural and social progress (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.14) helping to complete 
evolution follows from Lamarck’s own theory of acquired characters, albeit through 
Bergson’s own interpretation. With the onset of the noosphere, and the contention that 
the spiritual has now superseded the material in terms of importance, so 
consciousness, manifested in human culture, has significant influence over the 
evolutionary process. 
 The affirmation of the role of synergia for Teilhard therefore becomes the 
logical conclusion of his evolutionary theory of complexity-consciousness. The more 
complex creation becomes, and the more conscious it becomes, then the greater 
influence this consciousness has on the further progress of evolution. Synergia, the 
working with God to complete evolution is directly correlated to the 
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complexity/consciousness of the individual. The more conscious and complex life is, 
the greater the responsibility they have for submitting to the will of God. Or, in 
Lamarckian terms, the more conscious one is, the greater influence they have on the 
evolutionary direction. 
 
e. The Role of the Scientist 
 Further to the role of synergia in evolution, and with reference to the role of 
technology in the last chapter, Smith notes that ‘what mainly complexifies the world, 
according to Teilhard de Chardin, is the progress of science and technology’ (Smith, 
1988, p.171). For Teilhard, whilst all human action plays an important part in 
bringing about the end of evolution, the advancement of science and technology plays 
a particularly central role. It is for this reason that Teilhard can claim that the monks 
of the future are scientists (Schmitz-Moorman, 2011, p.115). It has already been seen 
that Teilhard saw little to separate the cloister from the rest of the world, but now it 
may be claimed that the laboratory holds a special place – the lab becomes the 
cloister, where those who set themselves apart from the world dedicate their lives to 
bringing the kingdom. It is the scientist who fastens the supernatural fulfilment of the 
world, not the monk. 
 In this direction Grau remarks that what Teilhard ‘was thinking of first and 
foremost seems to have been the, to many, startling equivalence of scientific research 
itself with adoration of the divine’ (Grau, 1976, p.347). Scientific research becomes 
the new prayer of creation. Sproxton agrees that ‘research thus pointed more and 
more to a divine centre’ and that Teilhard claimed ‘that science and technology have 
essentially a spiritualizing role’ (Sproxton, 1971, p.103). This quote has added 
significance when it is remembered that for Teilhard evolution is nothing if it isn’t a 
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process of spiritualization. If science and technology have a spiritualizing role, then it 
is science and technology, specifically, that influences the progress and direction of 
evolution. When evolution reaches the threshold of humanity technology takes over 
from biological evolution, continuing the process towards the Omega Point. 
 Cuénot, too, writes that for Teilhard ‘scientists feel obscurely that to know 
more is to be more, that a growth of consciousness also promotes an ontological 
growth’ (Cuénot, 1967, p.69). There is clearly an allusion to the role of ‘vision’ at the 
heart of Teilhard’s mystical evolutionary theory. To know more is to be more, the 
more conscious one is the fuller being they have, and the more they know that the 
natural process of evolution has a supernatural end. 
 It should come as no surprise that science and technology lay at the heart of 
Teilhard’s theory. It is scientific progress that represents the summit of human action. 
It is scientific endeavour that first and foremost brings about human progress. 
Technological progress influences biological evolution and brings about the 
‘organicosocial supercomplex’. 
 
 However, what is important about this contention involving the role of 
science, a contention that few commentators pick up on, is that the role of the Church 
is significantly downplayed. 
 Of course, it must be remembered that Teilhard saw the continuing evolution 
of creation as happening within the phylum of the Church, and in that respect no 
evolution can happen outside of the influence of the Church, yet there is definitely 
room for the possibility of grace outside the Church. Perhaps Teilhard meant that 
science should be conducted within an ecclesial environment; for those who have 
‘eyes that can see’ the Church has no boundaries, the world is the Church. This would 
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surely be the interpretation of his famous sacramental essay ‘The Mass on the World’, 
in which he makes precisely these sorts of comments. However it is not clear that this 
is where he saw the role of the scientist, nevertheless Teilhard’s work at least allows 
for the discussion of the possibility of grace outside the Church to take place. 
 
f.  The Role of Love 
 Another important element of synergia for Teilhard is the role of love. If the 
love of God is the ‘within’ of matter, and is that which unites the world, pulling it 
together to form the body of Christ, then the love of humanity, imitating this love of 
God, works with the love of God, hastening the Omega Point. If love directs and 
progresses evolution, then the love of humanity compliments this love, helping to 
direct and progress evolution. Grau is explicit in this regard, writing that ‘love is to be 
exercised in accord with the framework of discernable, organic ties binding men 
together in the evolutionary task’ (Grau, 1976, p.180). The work of evolution is 
union, and when men unite themselves together, the Omega Point comes closer. 
 In the same way that consciousness, according to Teilhard, is postulated 
‘backwards’ so that there is something that equates to consciousness even in the 
atoms, so there is something that equates to love in all matter. Teilhard wrote that 
‘morality is consequently nothing less than the higher development of all mechanics 
and biology’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1969, p.105). This means that even the actions of 
atoms and elementary particles, let alone non-human life, in their own way, contribute 
to the human effort to work with God and create the body of Christ. 
 This means that, when creation loves, it really, truly, is doing the work of God, 
which is uniting through evolution. Of course, the love of creation is only ever an 
imitation of the love of God, and could never be considered equal to the role of the 
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love of God, but if the love of God is the ‘within’ of matter, then the love of creation 
can only help this spiritualization and evolution. 
 
g.  The Role of Passivities 
 Another element of the role of synergia in Teilhard’s thought is the place that 
passivities or diminishments play. What humanity does, it has been argued, plays an 
important part, but what happens to humanity also plays an important part, and forms 
a sizable portion of The Divine Milieu. Through love and scientific progress humanity 
work with God to bring about the Omega Point at the end of evolution. However, the 
submission of humanity to that process is equally important to allow evolution to 
continue unhindered (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968, p.123). 
 De Lubac evidences this writing that the part played by ‘passivities’ is more 
important than that played by ‘activities’, and that ‘passivities’ are ‘immeasurably the 
wider and deeper part, and the most indispensible [part]’ of humanity’s contribution 
to evolution (de Lubac, 1967, p.34). De Lubac continues that Teilhard’s ‘passivities 
are analogous, in their function of purifying and finally divinizing, to the “nights” of 
St. John of the Cross’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.56). 
 Grumett also notes the importance of passivities, writing that ‘the quest for a 
response to the human experience of suffering lies of the heart of Teilhard’s theology’ 
(Grumett, 2005, p.75). Suffering lies at the heart of the evolutionary progression, and 
that suffering plays an important part in shaping the body of Christ that is the Omega 
Point. Grumett continues that ‘at the ultimate kenotic, self-surrendering moment of 
death, humanity becomes open to the transforming power of Christ’ (Grumett, 2005, 
p.100). Humanity must be open to the love of God and surrendering to that love 
through a kenotic love of their own is the best way to do so. Human love is nothing if 
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it isn’t a surrendering to the other. It is therefore death, the ultimate surrendering to 
God, that this love is best seen. 
 Teilhard is most explicit in this regard when he writes that ‘one cannot 
progress in being without paying a mysterious tribute of tears, blood, and sin’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1978a, p.247). Science and technology may very well 
contribute to the evolutionary progression of the world, but tears and diminishments 
always accompany that progress. 
 
Original Sin and the Need for Christ 
 It is in this direction that a Teilhardian doctrine of original sin can be found.23 
Despite the fact that Delio writes that the reason for Teilhard’s censoring by his Jesuit 
superiors was ‘because he rejected original sin in light of evolution’ (Delio, 2013, 
p.xvi), Cuénot is correct that ‘Teilhard in no way ruled out the historical existence of 
individual faults. He asserted that all men have been, are and will be, tainted by sin’ 
(Cuénot, 1967, p.55), in other words what Teilhard offered is not a complete rejection 
of original sin, but a different appropriation of original sin. 
  
a. Sin as Statistical Necessity 
 Smith notes that: 
 
one has the impression that Teilhard would like to [jettison original sin] very 
much…yet he does the next best thing: instead of discarding the concept of 
                                                        
23
 For a discussion of Teilhard’s relationship with original sin see Smith’s chapter 
‘Biblical Fall and Evolutionist Ascent’ (1988, p.133ff.); Mooney, 1966, p.104ff; 
Grumett, 2005, p.15ff; O’Connel’s ‘Crisis and Faith: In Evolution’ (1982, p.115ff.); 
Grau, 1976, p.315ff. 
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original sin, he recasts it in strictly evolutionist terms. And this suffices to 
remove the sting of the ancient doctrine (Smith, 1988, p.138). 
 
Rather than being a legal category, or an ontological ‘stain’ as a result of a past 
human error, ‘sin, that is to say conscious and deliberately willed evil, the rejection of 
the love of God, therefore results from a cosmic structure, since it is evolutive’ 
(Cuénot, 1967, p.57; cf. Bruns, 1961, p.182). Teilhard saw this sin to be the result of a 
necessary statistical probability (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.161); a dynamic world 
in a state of evolution is inevitably going to lead to failure at some point. Cuénot 
continues that ‘evil is a by-product of evolution’ (Cuénot, 1967, p.87). This means 
that Teilhard can claim that ‘the cross is the symbol of the arduous labour of 
evolution – rather than the symbol of expiation’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.71). 
There is an explicit downplay of understanding the role of Christ in terms of sin and 
salvation, and an emphasis on seeing Christ as creator, as being responsible for 
evolution (which is how God creates); the cross is no longer expiation but explicitly 
linked to the ongoing work of evolution. 
 Kenney affirms that ‘the statistical aspect of sin tends to be the only aspect 
investigated. A process of evolutionary ordering necessity involves disorder’ 
(Kenney, 1970, p.204), as does North, who writes that ‘sin is in fact as inevitable in 
the human part of the evolutionary process as failure is in any other’ (North, 1968, 
p.31). Klauder also evidences this element in Teilhard’s theology writing that: 
 
ultimate progress is incompatible with a global and voluntary rejection of 
God…the point is that free men must work towards the goal of human unity and 
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God’s glory, overcoming opposing forces, yet knowing that there is no natural 
assurance of the immediate outcome of this effort (Klauder, 1971, p.116) 
 
Kropf, too, notes that: 
 
[Teilhard’s] own particular vision of the man as the summit of biological 
evolution led him to a more theologically sound agreement with the scriptural 
view that the destiny of the material creation is more or less consequent upon 
man’s fidelity to God’s redemptive plan for him (Kropf, 1980, p.104) 
 
The culmination of the evolutionary progress cannot happen without humanity’s 
consent, they must join their ‘Amen’ with Mary’s submission to the proclamation of 
the Angel Gabriel, ‘let it be done to me according to your will’ (supporting the idea 
that human passion is more important than human action). Failure to do so, 
humanity’s ‘voluntary rejection of God’, therefore comes to be seen as the pride of 
original sin. 
 Essentially, Teilhard is reinterpreting what it means to sin in the light of his 
theology of convergent evolution.24 The more evolved evolution is, the more 
                                                        
24
 Grau notes that Teilhard’s ‘position has remarkable resemblance…to the Roman 
Catholic thesis that it is morally impossible for a human person to avoid serious sin, 
without any destruction to the integrity of human freedom, unless assisted by the 
grace of God’ (Grau, 1976, p.92); in other words the tension between finished and 
unfinished creation in the thought of Teilhard is comparable with the classical 
doctrine of original sin and the reliance of God. He continues that ‘what complicates 
matters from the standpoint of Teilhard’s ethics is the apparent inconsistency of 
holding, on the one hand, a position that says sin cannot really destroy evolution, and, 
on the other hand, exhorting people to fight against evil, to recognize their 
responsibility to take control of evolution or it will be destroyed’ (Grau, 1976, p.317). 
However, it is important to note that, whilst this may be a criticism of Teilhard’s 
theory, it is likewise a criticism of the traditional, Augustinian formulation of it, in 
that all good deeds come from God but all bad deeds from man, confusing the idea of 
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conscious it is, and therefore the more responsibility it has. Faricy notes such an 
interpretation writing that 
 
in non-living things, this waste takes the form of disharmony or 
decomposition…in living beings it appears as suffering and death…and in the 
moral order, in the realm of human freedom, this waste and failure takes the 
form of sin (Faricy, 1981, p.53). 
 
 Teilhard wrote that ‘non-being, pain, sin – ontological evil, sensibly 
experienced evil, moral evil – these are three aspects of the same evil principle’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.103). The more conscious creation is, the greater the 
responsibility to build the earth, but the greater the possibility of failure (Cuénot, 
1967, p.108). North puts the same idea differently, ‘sin is evolutionary dropout 
transferred to the level of freedom’ (North, 1968, p.35). In the same way that 
unfavourable evolutionary changes tend to stunt progress, so sin (which is interpreted 
as evolutionary changes on the level of humanity, remembering that now evolution 
has undergone a fundamental qualitative change in the noosphere) stunts progress. 
Teilhard himself points to freedom as a category for understanding sin, writing ‘yes, 
there is suffering, and its amount is directly related to the extent of “consciousness” 
and thus to man’s freedom’ (Sproxton, 1971, p.95). In other words, the more 
consciousness that creation manifests the more responsible it is for the building of the 
earth, the more open to sin and suffering it is. In the same way that there is a 
                                                                                                                                                              
divine determinism and human freedom. Humanity has a responsibility to work 
towards and bring about the end of evolution, yet the process of evolution (and 
indeed, therefore, human consciousness), is controlled and directed by God. Any 
inconsistency in Teilhard’s version of original sin is only a re-appropriation of this 
very paradox (For a discussion of the problem of determinism and freedom see (Grau, 
1976, p.90ff.)). 
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correlation between complexity, consciousness, and deification, so there is a 
correlation between complexity, consciousness, and responsibility to build the earth 
and the possibility for sin and failure.25 
 
b. The Role of Christ 
 Teilhard’s solution to the problem of original sin is to be found in the tension 
between humanity’s striving towards the Kingdom of God and Christ’s assurance that 
it will be reached (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.105). If what the ‘sin’ of original sin 
is changed, then the nature of Christ’s ‘redemption’ must also be changed. Christ’s 
reversal of original sin is not understood now as judicial category, renewing 
humanity’s relationship with God, but as an assurance that evolution will be 
completed – Christ is no longer saviour in the sense of being the remedy for sin, but 
in terms of being the creator. 
 ‘Christ saves the world’, confirms Mooney, ‘in the sense that, without him, 
man’s effort would be without ultimate hope of success, and this would mean that 
man would inevitably lose his taste for life and abandon altogether his task on earth’ 
(Mooney, 1973, p.158). If sin is the possibility, or even the inevitability, of failure and 
the selfishness of humanity not to work towards building the kingdom, then salvation 
from this sin consists in the assurance that this Kingdom will be built, and, as the next 
chapter will show, that is the role that Christ takes. Through his resurrection he 
assumes the cosmos, and his person becomes the catalyst of the coming end of 
evolution. 
                                                        
25
 Savary, in his New Spiritual Exercises, notes the parable of the talents (Matt 25: 14-
30) as an example of the implications of what happens when synergia is not adhered 
to, the sin of omission. He even goes so far as to claim that failure to work with God 
in the bringing about the omega is devolution (Savary, 2010, p.58). 
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 Humanity still have to work towards the Kingdom, but now that Christ has 
come, now the Incarnation has happened, such an end has been assured, it is 
inevitable now that this process will not end in failure, thus sin is defeated, the 
possibility of failure is defeated and human selfishness, sin, no longer has an effect. If 
this is so, if sin is human selfishness to synergia and the statistical probability of 
failure, and Christ makes the Omega inevitable, then the relationship between sin and 
salvation is nuanced to a tension between failure and success; the paradigm of sin and 
salvation becomes one of the failure and success of creation, as Blair writes 
 
It could be said that whereas Orthodox Christianity hangs on the three main 
points, creation, restoration, and a final climax, Père Teilhard’s general concept 
hangs on two only: it stretches from creation directly to the final climax (Blair, 
1970, p.101). 
 
This comparison of Teilhard to Eastern Orthodoxy will be furthered in the next 
chapter. 
 Essentially, therefore, Teilhard provides a doctrine of original sin without the 
fall. His idea of ‘statistical probability of failure’ allows for the fact that humanity, or 
nature, is inherently sinful – i.e. selfishness, pride, the rejection of the need to submit 
to the grace of God – and still allows the postulation of Christ as ‘remedy’ to that sin, 
as the defeater of sin, without appealing to a literal fall in order to anchor that 
doctrine. It was such a doctrine that ultimately got him into the most trouble, not that 
he denied original sin itself, but that he denied the event on which it was based, 
however it was such a position that was necessary for his evolutionary theology.  
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 It is at this point, therefore, the point where Christ becomes most important in 
Teilhard’s evolutionary theory, that a discussion of Teilhard’s evolutionary theology 
is left and a discussion of his Christology is turned to. In the next chapter it will be 
shown how Christ fits into this understanding, expanding on the comments made in 
this chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Teilhard de Chardin and the Cosmic Christ 
 
 
 It was seen in the last chapter that Teilhard makes a connection, an 
identification, between the God of Omega and the Christ of revelation (Faricy, 1968, 
p.59). For Teilhard the person of Christ is both the end point of evolution and the 
guide of that process. Christ “uses” evolution to make himself a body, which is being 
completed in the phylum of the Church. At the same time, the end of evolution has 
already been anticipated and experienced in Christ. This chapter focuses on this 
reinterpretation of the role of Christ. 
 The following discussion will explore a number of different important themes 
in Teilhard’s Christology including the role of Pauline theology, the rejection of 
judicial categories, participation, and the postulation of a third Christological nature. 
In this analysis, these themes are separated into two distinct categories: first, the role 
of Christ as the sustainer of nature, as the principle that holds nature together, as élan 
vital; second, Christ as the end of evolution, as the telos of evolution, that which 
nature is travelling towards. For Teilhard, Christ is both the force that drives evolution 
forward and the end of that process (Mooney, 1966, p.54). ‘Through his Incarnation’, 
writes Mooney, Christ ‘has achieved in his body-person the purpose of the whole 
evolutionary process: the unity of humanity with God in and through a purification of 
matter’ (Mooney, 1973, pp.157-8). The doctrine of the Cosmic or Universal Christ26 
                                                        
26
 It is, perhaps, worth pointing out that up until very recently, any appeal to the 
cosmic sense of Christ would have been still fairly localized to this planet, i.e. it is 
only with Copernicus, Galileo, and modern space exploration, that ‘cosmic’ or 
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takes the discussion of Christology away from legal categories and makes Christology 
the object of evolution. 
 For Teilhard, as was seen at the end of the previous chapter, evolution 
necessitates a reinterpretation of the role of Christ in which the static, exclusive 
doctrine of salvation that became the dominant interpretation of the Western Church 
is replaced with an inclusive doctrine of deification. The juridical Christ is replaced 
with a universal or cosmic Christ, a Christology that ‘Teilhard was manifestly in love 
with’ (Kropf, 1980, p.155).27 This new conception of Christ will be considered in this 
chapter. Such a new conception sees Christ as being primarily concerned with 
creation, not salvation, and with his resurrection, which provides the setting for his 
taking over the process of evolution and thus ensuring its ultimate success. 
 
 This chapter will start by focusing on Teilhard’s rejection of legal and 
juridical categories in Christology, and explore his interpretation of Pauline themes. 
Moving on to the fundamental elements of his cosmic Christology, it will explore his 
interpretation of Christ as the bond of matter. This manifested itself, for Teilhard, in a 
reinterpretation of the doctrine of participation. Building on this, Teilhard postulated a 
third nature of Christ, distinct from his divine and human natures; Teilhard felt this 
third nature was needed to allow for Christ to be viewed as the guide, culmination and 
result of evolution. Finally, this Christology allows Teilhard to see the Parousia of 
Christ as synonymous with the end of evolution. Before that discussion, however, his 
Jesuit influences need to be discussed. 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘universal’ functions of Christ can include the whole universe. For the Early Fathers a 
universal Christ was still confined to this planet. In the modern world of multi-
dimensions or multi-verses, this universal Christ may have an even wider scope of 
inclusion. 
27
 See Lyons, 1982, pp.220-1 for a list of the uses of the phrase ‘cosmic Christ’ in 
Teilhard’s corpus. 
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The Starting Point of Teilhard’s Christology 
a. Teilhard and Ignatian Spirituality 
 If the previous chapters saw Teilhard inherit his scientific heritage through his 
father, an amateur scientist, then this chapter will explore a heritage that Teilhard 
inherited through his mother (Skehan, 2006, p.15-6), a pious and devoted Catholic, 
who instilled in her son a love for the church and devotion to the Sacred Heart of 
Christ (Corbishley, 1971, p.27), a devotion that was a distinctive part of French 
culture and identity (Grumett, 2005, p.95).28 Boyd writes that Teilhard takes 
 
Catholic theology for granted and seeks to build upon that foundation, even 
though he is not uncritical of its traditional formulations, especially where they 
conflict with the modern view of the world (Boyd, 1970, p.121) 
 
Teilhard was not attempting to reformulate theology in light of modern scientific 
advancement, but to present a Roman Catholic theology that was sensitive to the 
values of evolution. 
 More specifically, Teilhard was a Jesuit, and was a member of the order for 
the majority of his life: he attended a Jesuit college at the age of 12 before entering 
the Jesuit order as a novitiate at the age of 18, thus all of his theological training was 
conducted by Jesuits (cf. Cuénot, 1958, p.4f). One of the key influences on Teilhard’s 
Christology, therefore, was the mystical theology of St. Ignatius of Loyola, who 
developed a doctrine of ‘seeing’ God in all things in conjunction with his Spiritual 
Exercises (Kenney, 1970, p.46). Corbishley thus notes that 
                                                        
28
 See Boyd, 1970, p.113ff. for a comparison of Teilhard’s theology with modern 
Protestant thought, particularly that of Bonheoffer and Tillich. 
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during the whole of his life henceforward [from his novitiate in 1899] he would 
be under the influence of the Spiritual Exercises, that great instrument of ascetic 
and religious formation which, after the bible itself, is the book most familiar to 
Jesuits…Teilhard de Chardin was to add immeasurably to the content of such 
ideas [as found in the Spiritual Exercises] (Corbishley, 1971, pp.29-30 (cf. 
McCarty, 1976, p.31)) 
 
Likewise, Cuénot notes that, along with the Spiritual Exercises, ‘one only has to look 
through the Constitutions of the Jesuit Order to find in it the framework of Teilhard’s 
spirituality’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.405). De Lubac, too, observes that ‘anyone who is 
familiar with the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius will have no difficulty in 
recognizing in Pere Teilhard’s teaching an echo, enriched by modern overtones, of 
Ignatius’ Foundation’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.32). 
 As a Jesuit Priest Teilhard was also expected to give retreats and act as 
spiritual director (cf. Lobo, 1981, pp.204-6 & Grau, 1976, p.83ff), and it is in this 
capacity that Jesuit spirituality came to influence his thought. As Cuénot notes his 
retreats ‘treat[ed] such topics as “life and matter”, and “the religious value of the 
world”, and following the theme of Le Milieu Divin’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.88). Cuénot, 
further, notes that in his capacity as spiritual director he also used the principles of the 
Jesuit Order to influence his advice, quoting one of his letters ‘“only one thing is 
necessary – finding God in the everyday walks of life. This you have known a long 
time in theory; try to put it into practice” (1 Jan 1934)’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.104). 
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 However, as a number of theologians have noted, Teilhard’s Christology also 
has significant links to Franciscan Christology (cf. Allegra, 1971). Most significantly, 
Teilhard took the side of Duns Scotus in the Scholastic debate on the question of 
whether Christ would still have become incarnate even if Adam had not sinned. 
Teilhard had good reasons for this, not least because it emphasized the creative rather 
than the redemptive work of Christ. 
 
b. Teilhard’s Reading of Ferdinand Prat’s Theology of St. Paul 
 It was as a Jesuit student that Teilhard encountered probably the most 
enduring influence on his Christology: Ferdinand Prat. In his book Teilhard: 
Theology, Humanity and Cosmos, David Grumett suggests that it is possible to trace 
Teilhard’s Christology back to his time as a student of Biblical studies in Hastings, 
while the Jesuit Order was in exile from France. Grumett writes: 
 
during Teilhard’s four years residence at the Jesuit theology scholasticate, 
important new approaches to Pauline studies were being devised in French 
Catholic Biblical scholarship, and Teilhard lived in community with three 
figures of decisive importance in this movement: his tutors Ferdinand Prat and 
Albert Durand, and fellow student Joseph Huby (Grumett, 2005, p.114; cf. 
Cuénot, 1958, p.6ff) 
 
Prat, in particular, was important. According to Kropf, ‘of all the exegetes 
contemporary with Teilhard Ferdinand Prat, S.J, whose influence can be seen in the 
encyclical of Pius XII “Mystici Corpus”, is probably the most important’ (Kropf, 
1980, pp.140-1). Lyons also recognized this point, and argued that ‘Teilhard had 
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derived his appreciation of St. Paul from Ferdinand Prat’s The Theology of St. Paul’ 
(Lyons, 1982, p.43). 
 This book explored the theme of the mystical Christ in Paul’s theology, and 
saw Christ in terms of a cosmic being. According to Prat, ‘the natural Christ, the word 
made flesh, the priest and victim of Calvary, is a part, and indeed the principal part, of 
the mystical Christ; but he is not the whole mystical Christ’ (Prat, 1945, p.300). 
Moreover, it is important that Prat went on to argue that ‘the mystical Christ, 
composed of the church, and its head, aims to become a perfect man; which is to be 
understood as a collective personality’ (Prat, 1945, p.306). Phrases such as ‘perfect 
man’ and ‘collective personality’ clearly prefigure Teilhard’s understanding of the 
role that Christ took as the Omega Point, the end of evolution and the fulfillment of 
creation. Further, Prat’s explicit reference to the Church also prefigures aspects of 
Teilhard’s evolutionary theology. In much the same way that Teilhard could be seen 
as a Catholic interpreter of Bergson, so he may also be seen as an evolutionary 
interpretation of the new Jesuit Christology that was being formulated around him 
during his formative years at college. It is pertinent that at the time that he was 
coming to accept an evolutionary world-view he was also coming to accept an 
interpretation of Pauline theology that emphasized Christ’s cosmic role against his 
juridicial one; these two influences, more than anything else, helped to shape 
Teilhard’s own evolutionary Christology. 
 Such considerations have allowed Raven to argue that: 
 
Teilhard in his whole Christian vision of the process of cosmogenesis and 
Christification is actually and avowedly restating for us the theology of St. Paul 
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as this came to its fullest expression…[and] it is the unity of all life in Christ 
that gives its coherence to his outlook (Raven, 1962, pp.159-60) 
 
 Punchekunnel also confirms this view of the importance of St. Paul to 
Teilhard, writing: 
 
if one were to say that all that Teilhard did was to present in modern scientific 
idiom Paul’s vision of the world centred on Christ, he will not be far from the 
truth (Punchekunnel, 1981, p.183) 
 
Indeed, it must be remembered that the conclusion of the chapter on Teilhard’s 
evolutionary theory stated much the same thing, namely, that if Teilhard is criticized 
as a pantheist, then St. Paul must be as well. 
 On the other hand, Mooney warns that: 
 
what [Teilhard] is now dealing with is no longer the thought of St. Paul, but the 
thought of St. Paul incorporated into his own hypothesis of a converging 
universe (Mooney, 1966, p.88). 
 
Kropf makes a similar point regarding Teilhard’s use of Paul, writing that Teilhard’s 
quotations of St. Paul ‘serve only as so many springboards to deductive leaps of 
frightening depth and dizzying complexity’ (Kropf, 1980, p.62). Teilhard was no 
biblical scholar, and he never intended to offer a re-interpretation of Pauline theology; 
instead, he used the theology of St. Paul as a starting point, as a framework upon 
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which to hang his evolutionary theory.29 Nevertheless if ‘Teilhard truly intended to 
reinterpret St. Paul, still, in his own eyes, he remained entirely faithful to the spirit of 
the Apostle’ (Kropf, 1980, p.225). 
 However, as Kropf continues, such a use of scripture invites criticism from 
Biblical scholars. He writes that 
 
systematic theology has had much the same criticism leveled against it by 
exegetes and biblical theologians as that leveled against Teilhard…[namely,] 
the tendency to use scripture by taking words and phrases out of context and 
reading into them historically conditioned thought forms in the attempt to 
achieve an existential understanding meeting the specification of the 
theologian’s own system (Kropf, 1980, p.230) 
 
Such criticism is important, however this chapter is not primarily concerned with 
Teilhard’s use of scripture. It is more important to note that the seeds of Teilhard’s 
own evolutionary Christology can be found in the scriptural studies of his Jesuit 
tutors. 
 
c. Teilhard’s Acceptance of Eastern Christology 
 In this direction, the doctrine of the ‘cosmic Christ’ is not just a scriptural 
category but also one that permeates the tradition of the church (although the actual 
term ‘cosmic Christ’ seems to be a relatively recent one (Lyons, 1982, p.1)). If 
Teilhard de Chardin must be criticized for using Pauline theological categories to 
construct a new Christology, then the early church fathers must also be criticized for 
                                                        
29
 This thesis, therefore, can be seen to treat Teilhard as Teilhard himself treated St. 
Paul, i.e. as a ‘springboard’ to a neo-Darwinian Christology. 
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precisely the same. De Lubac writes that ‘such an attitude [, namely, the cosmic 
Christ], which is by no means confined to Teilhard, would be more frequently 
endorsed by tradition than might be imagined’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.62; cf. Fox, 1988, 
p.75ff). This cosmic Christology is altogether a broader category than a simple sin-
centred one; it is a Christology that is concerned with creation. As Cuénot explicitly 
recognizes, ‘it is worth noting that Teilhard was interested in Eastern Christianity 
because it had preserved the cosmic sense’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.251; cf. Deane-
Drummond, 2006, pp.7-8), and de Lubac again that Teilhard ‘regretted the too one-
sided Augustinianism of theological tradition as established in the west, and liked to 
dwell on the views of Clement of Alexandria, for example, or even more St. Irenaeus 
of Lyons’ (de Lubac, 1967, p.120). 
Pelikan, also notes such a Christology in his book Jesus Through the 
Centuries, in which he devotes a whole chapter to the idea of the Cosmic Christ in the 
Church Fathers, finding allusions to it in Athanasius and Gregory of Nazianzus. He 
writes that the Greek Fathers ‘interpret[ed] [Jesus] as the divine clue to the structure 
of reality (metaphysics) and, within metaphysics, to the riddle of being (ontology) – in 
a word, as the Cosmic Christ’ (Pelikan, 1985, p.58). 
 Grumett also notes that Teilhard’s Christology can be found anticipated in the 
Church Fathers. He writes that: 
 
[Teilhard’s] use of the concept of divinization should not be considered 
controversial, because it is fundamental to both the Patristic and Byzantine 
mystical traditions of the vision of God and participation in the divine 
life…[and that] Teilhard appropriates, more specifically, the cosmology of 
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Irenaeus of Lyons, in which he identifies an “astonishing anticipation of our 
modern views of progress” (Grumett, 2005, p.187, p.227) 
 
Indeed, ‘among the Greek Fathers none is, perhaps, closer to Teilhard than Irenaeus’ 
(Maroky, 1981, p.186), who is famous for providing the key definition of deification. 
Deane-Drummond also notes that 
 
it seems that Teilhard was influenced more directly by writers of the early 
church, including Irenaeus of Lyons, Origen of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, 
and Gregory of Nazianzus…aspects of their thinking including the divinization 
of the cosmos and the stress on apophatic theology has become embedded in 
[Teilhard’s] work (Deane-Drummond, 2006, pp.7-8). 
 
Berry, likewise, writes that ‘the cosmic Christ of St. John, St. Paul, and the Orthodox 
Churches of the East becomes identified in Teilhard’s view with an emergent 
universe’ (Berry, 2003, p.60). As does Corbishley who writes that 
 
Teilhard…tak[es] issue with the traditionalists who, neglecting the teaching of 
St. Paul and the Greek Fathers, have disregarded what he calls the “organic” 
side of the Incarnation…[and] the reluctance of the theologians to consider the 
purely physical relationship existing between the incarnate word and the 
material creation… (Corbishley, 1971, p.79) 
 
 However, Kropf argues that Teilhard’s use of the Greek Fathers may not have 
been so direct, writing that: 
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while Teilhard does not seem to have explored further the thought of the Greek 
Fathers through any personal first-hand study, certainly Newman’s conviction 
that the Incarnational principle stood at the very core of Patristic theology and 
that its corollary in the sacramental view of matter found its natural complement 
in the Athanasian theme of the divinization of man through grace could not but 
have helped convince Teilhard that he stood on solid and traditional ground in 
his own realistic interpretation of these doctrines (Kropf, 1980, p.260) 
 
 It is not just the Patristic Fathers who held to this view. Grumett writes that 
‘Teilhard identifies his theology of the cosmic action of Christ on the world with 
Scotist Incarnationalism’ (Grumett, 2005, p.121), Duns Scotus’ alternative approach 
to Scholasticism, which argued for the primacy of Christ, can be seen as a 
continuation of Eastern Orthodox themes. Klauder also attempts to relate Teilhard’s 
Christology in the context of Duns Scotus, ‘who cannot conceive [creation] without 
the incarnation’ (Klauder, 1971, p.80). Therefore, ‘in Teilhard’s viewpoint, this vision 
shared by Duns Scotus must be seen in the context of evolution and cosmogenesis’ 
(Klauder, 1971, p.79). 
 
 However, in the modern world, it is Teilhard who takes this idea seriously 
more than any other theologian and sees it as the natural, logical, conclusion to his 
evolutionary theory; ‘it was Teilhard who reawakened an awareness in modern times 
of the ancient doctrine of the cosmic Christ’ (Cousins, 2011, p.46). Lyons supports 
such an assertion in that even though there was an explicit link of incarnation and 
evolution before Teilhard, such authors 
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employ cosmic-Christ terminology very sparingly, at times as little more than a 
labeling device. But with Teilhard it multiplies in both frequency and form, to 
become a complex instrument for exploring, systematizing, and then generating 
further an expanding field of discourse, which involves not only his intellectual 
position but also his personal spiritual life…[yet] Teilhard developed cosmic-
Christ terminology as no other author has done…[and] it was Teilhard, 
however, who suggested more forcibly that the recovery [of the cosmic Christ 
idea] is due to the modern scientific world-view, even though he made the point 
with his own view of convergent evolution in mind (Lyons, 1982, pp.37-8, p.46, 
p.56). 
 
 In this way, it can be argued that throughout the history of the church, there 
has always been a tendency to see Christ in this inclusive role of creator, rather than 
as forgiveness of sin. Through the Patristic theology of the early church, the 
mediaeval theology of Duns Scotus, and now with Teilhard de Chardin, this 
Christology has always been present. Tracing a lineage through St. Paul, the Patristic 
Fathers, and the Franciscan Scotists there has always been an attempt to widen the 
scope of the incarnation, and Teilhard claims that it is this tradition that best fits the 
evolutionary paradigm. 
 
d. The Rejection of “Western” Juridicial Categories 
 Teilhard’s Christology, therefore, is a rejection of judicial Christological 
categories. His criticism of the preoccupation of legal sin-centred interpretations of 
Christ meant that the role that Christ had to occupy necessarily had to be more 
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inclusive of other concerns. Teilhard, in his essay ‘Christology and Evolution’, wrote 
that: 
 
without being unjust to the Latin Fathers, might one not blame them for having 
overdeveloped the Rabbinical and legalistic side of St. Paul in their 
theology?...under their influence the Christian history of the world has assumed 
the appearance of a legal trial between God and his creatures…[the universe] 
has ceased to be the formal garden from which we are temporarily banished by 
a whim of the creator. It has become the great work in process of completion 
which we have to save by saving ourselves (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, pp.89-
91; cf. Agourides, 1964, p.210) 
 
Likewise, Teilhard wrote: 
 
the principal obstacle encountered by orthodox thinkers when they try to 
accommodate the revealed historical picture of human origins to the present 
evidence, is the traditional notion of original sin (Teilhard de Chardin, 1969, 
p.36). 
 
In other words, Teilhard rejects the Western notion of sin as the relationship between 
Christ and creation as ‘exaggerating the effects of the fall and promoting a too-
negative image of the cross’ (Lane, 1996, p.73), and accepts the Eastern paradigm of 
seeing Christ as creator, as completing and bringing to fulfilment the process of 
creation. 
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Christ as Bond of Matter 
 The obvious question is what is it that makes Teilhard’s re-appropriation of 
this doctrine unique? It is important to note that, following the Eastern tradition, the 
role of Christ was no longer one of saviour but of creator, and for Teilhard creation 
was unification. Therefore, the most important of these new elements is the fact that 
Teilhard saw Christ as the bond of matter, the ‘centre of the entire universe’ (Teilhard 
de Chardin, 1965, p.14). In other words, Christ is the principle of unification in the 
universe. If Christ is the guide of evolution, if it is he that acts as the attraction that 
causes the convergence of matter, then it follows, for Teilhard, that Christ is the bond 
of matter, that which holds it all together; 
 
Teilhard unites the physical body of Christ, the physical30 centre, the personal 
present, the cosmic centre, into the one body of Christ. This becomes the true 
centre of the cosmos that actively radiates its divine energy to all men in an 
activity of transformation and deification (Maloney, 1968, p.206) 
 
a. Christ as Vinculum Substantiale 
 For Teilhard, drawing on the Leibnizian vinculum substantiale (Cuénot, 1958, 
p.121), which is ‘a substantial thing added to a group of monads and whose addition 
guarantees the real union of the monads of a composite substance’ (Look, 2000, 
p.217), the unity of body and mind and, also, the sacramental unity, is Christ himself 
(an idea he may have found in Blondel (Lyons, 1982, p.162)). Lyons, too, notes that 
‘the word incarnate is the vinculum substantiale of creation, the bond which gives 
                                                        
30
 ‘Perhaps “reality” or “ontological reality” would be a better way to translate 
Teilhard’s sense of physical, for it signifies not only a given being in its present 
existence and metaphysical constitutive parts but above all it includes the total being 
in its dynamic progression towards fulfillment’ (Maloney, 1968, pp.204-5). 
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unity to multiple created being’ (Lyons, 1982, p.161). This means that the universe is 
literally held together by Christ; ‘Christ was not just a historical person, Jesus of 
Nazareth, but that he is the whole inner energy of the universe and the goal to which 
all of the universe is moving’ (McCarty, 1976, p.27). 
 Grumett also notes that, ‘this vinculum substantiale…is a unique and 
ubiquitous entity unlimited to any particular union or set of unions who provides the 
ground for them all, and whom Teilhard identifies with Christ’ (Grumett, 2005, 
p.111). The important point is that Teilhard understood the bond of nature, the bond 
of substance, and indeed any and all unity (in fact unity itself) to be entirely 
dependent upon the presence of Christ, a presence that is the result of the incarnation. 
 Grumett continues that ‘matter, by virtue of the incarnation, is transformed, 
spiritualized, and directed towards the final end of the word’ (Grumett, 2005, p.120). 
This means that the incarnation takes on the role of directing evolution, as understood 
in this sense of the complexifying and centering life in Christ. The incarnation, 
therefore, represents the coming of the end, the coming to fruition of the Omega Point 
and the formation of the body of Christ, as ‘Teilhard viewed the whole history of the 
world as being that of “the progressive information of the universe by Christ”’ 
(Kropf, 1980, p.116), and not just metaphorically or ‘mystically’, but literally. As 
Kropf continues, ‘the body of Christ should be understood in a fully organic sense in 
respect to the whole universe’ (Kropf, 1980, pp.131-2). The incarnation, therefore, is 
not concerned with forgiveness of sin, but with union of nature, and if to unite is to 
create then it is Christ who is the creator because he is the unifying principle in the 
world, he is the unity of creation, and he results from the unity. 
 
b. Christ as Élan Vital 
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 This inevitably means that for Teilhard the élan vital is Christ himself. 
Teilhard takes over Lamarck and Bergson’s understanding that there is a driving force 
of nature that is the cause of evolution, and he explicitly identifies this force with 
Christ. Christ, therefore, performs the same function in Teilhard’s evolutionary theory 
as the élan vital did for Bergson. Teilhard writes that: 
 
Christ…put himself in the position to subdue under himself, to purify, to direct, 
and superanimate the general ascent of consciousness into which he asserted 
himself…he aggregates to himself the total psychism of the earth (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1959, p.204) 
 
More explicitly, Teilhard wrote that ‘Christ is the goad that urges creatures along the 
road of effort, of evolution, of development’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.209). 
 Thus, all the categories that were important for Teilhard’s evolutionary theory 
find their fulfillment in the person of Christ. It is Christ’s consciousness, Christ’s 
cosmic consciousness, that is being formed through convergence, therefore it is Christ 
who is responsible for the pull of evolution, who waits for evolution to finish 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.71). 
 
 The Jesuit principle of ‘finding God in everything’ is also clearly at work here. 
Not only does Teilhard’s evolutionary theory rely heavily on Bergson and Lamarck 
but his Christological representation and interpretation of that evolutionary theory, 
especially as outlined here as seeing Christ as the bond of nature, and the élan vital, is 
also influenced by the spirituality of his order, a spirituality that would have been at 
the centre of his life. 
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c. Christ as Physical Centre of The Universe 
 It is also important to note that Christ’s presence in the universe, especially in 
his function as the bond of matter, is eminently physical; it is not a purely intellectual 
category, but a real presence. Teilhard writes that ‘the mystical body of Christ should, 
in fact, be conceived as a physical reality, in the strongest sense the words can bear’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.51). This idea of a bond of nature is not a metaphorical 
category, nor, in labeling such a presence as mystical or sacramental, does it intend to 
remove any physical presence. In much the same way that the unity that is produced 
through evolution was emphasized in the previous chapters as being a real, physical, 
unity, so the presence of Christ in the world as the attractive centre is also physical. 
 This means that it is only in Christ that the process of evolution can happen. If 
creation is to unite, and it is Christ who unites, who is the bond of this unity, then it is 
only in Christ that evolution can happen, Christ is, to use one of Teilhard’s titles, ‘the 
Evolver’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.138). 
 
 The link and comparison with the role of the incarnation in the Eastern 
thought of Athanasius and Nazianzus demands attention. For them it was the fact that 
Christ entered the world that was important, it was his physical presence that was the 
all important element, thus his influence was seen to extend mechanically and 
automatically (cf. Finch, 2006, p.106; Williams, 2007, p.38). The role of Christ is 
similar for Teilhard. He writes that ‘[Christ] sanctifies human flesh by a specific 
contact’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.64); it is his presence in the world that fastens 
and controls evolution, attracting and uniting matter, and bringing it together into his 
body. Christ, therefore, is that which grounds matter, that which provides it with its 
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substance, and that which pulls it together. Indeed, if to be created is to be united, and 
it is Christ who represents the bond of this unity, if it is Christ who is the bond of this 
unity, then creation is impossible without Christ; ontology is entirely dependent on 
Christ. This leads to the idea of participation as being a key category for 
understanding Teilhard’s theology. 
 
Participation 
 The fact that Christ is understood to be the bond of nature, the bond of 
substance, and therefore creator and evolver (which, of course, are now understood to 
be completely synonymous terms) also means that the category of participation is 
important for understanding the role that Teilhard assigns to Christ. Since there is no 
way to be created in Teilhard’s theology other than to be united, the only possible 
way to be created is to participate in the presence of Christ, or, differently, 
participation in Christ’s presence unifies. As Grumett notes ‘Christ himself suffuses 
material substance and sustains it’ (Grumett, 2005, p.131), thus evidencing that the 
doctrine of ‘Christ as the bond of nature’ becomes synonymous with a doctrine of 
participation. 
 
a. Teilhard’s Use of Participation 
 There is disagreement about whether Teilhard’s use of participation is 
comparable with that of the Scholastic usage. Lobo, for example, claims that Teilhard 
‘took seriously the scholastic ideas of the creature’s relationship to God by analogy 
and image and thence the value of participated being’ (Lobo, 1981, p.203). However, 
Mooney disagrees, writing that Teilhard was ‘completely unsympathetic with 
Scholasticism as he understood it’ (Mooney, 1966, p.189; cf. Teilhard de Chardin, 
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1971, p.226). Nevertheless, it will be argued that this is a good way to categorize 
Teilhard’s thought. 
 Teilhard’s understanding of participation, and his use of the term ‘participated 
being’ is to be understood, like the rest of his Christology, in relation to the idea of 
unity (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.186). Mooney writes that ‘Teilhard defines being 
in terms of a movement indissolubly associated with it, that of union’ (Mooney, 1966, 
p.171), and Cuénot writes that ‘creation, then, [Teilhard] considered above all an act 
of union; and it is this union that produces being’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.39). Lyons, 
likewise, writes that ‘Teilhard’s view of creation is correlated with a progressive 
concept of being. Being is not “to be” (“esse”), as in classical scholastic metaphysical, 
but “to unite” (“unire”)’ (Lyons, 1982, p.178). 
 In this way Teilhard’s ontology is not a static category but a dynamic one. ‘To 
be’ is to become more united; ‘to be’ is to become more convergent upon Christ. 
Thus, participated being is being that participates in the union of the world, or the 
future body of Christ. Participation is that which unites creation. In a very real sense, 
therefore, creation participates in Christ. 
 
 This also has the result that there can be no such thing as a ‘hierarchy of 
being’ in Teilhard’s theology because such a hierarchy implies a static ontology, 
rather than a dynamic one of interrelated convergent unity. Beings are not separated 
from each other, but evolve into each other, thus the only difference between ways of 
being is that they become more centred and more united. They are not different ways 
of being, but a progressive, more united, understanding of being in general (Cuénot, 
1958, p.39). Each ‘being’ does not ‘be’ for its own sake, but only as a process of 
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convergent union on Christ. In a very real way, therefore, all creation is simply a 
participation in the Being of Christ, eventually evolving into his body. 
 Teilhard writes that 
 
God did not will individually (nor could he have constructed as though they 
were separate bits), the sun, the earth, plants, or man. He willed his Christ: and 
in order to have his Christ, he had to create the spiritual world, and man in 
particular, upon which Christ might germinate (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, 
p.79) 
 
This means that an individual of creation, a monad, cannot exist without reference to 
the completion of creation in Christ, and thus as a process of union. The ‘being’ of the 
individual is always viewed in relation to the end of evolution in the person of Christ. 
 To be participated being is, therefore, to participate not in the above but in the 
ahead. As Smith writes, ‘according to Teilhard’s theory, heaven is neither “above” 
nor “within”, but ahead of us in time: it is situated in the indefinite future’ (Smith, 
1988, p.34). This is because the supernatural is the natural end of the universe, i.e. 
deification is the end of the evolutionary process. To progress ahead is to progress 
above, or, as Teilhard puts it, they ‘collide’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.203). To 
participate in God, to participate in the being of God, is to be united in the body of 
Christ at the Omega point. To increase in being is to become more united, and this is 
achieved evolutionarily, forwards, progressively. 
 Participation, thus, becomes a temporal category, rather than a spatial one, 
precisely because God, who is the object of participation, is now a future being, and 
the only way to progress temporally is to unite (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.203). As 
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Teilhard himself writes ‘a world that is being born instead of a world that is: that is 
what the phenomenon of man suggests’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 2004, p.80). To 
participate, to be participated being, is now no longer a ‘spatial’ category centred 
around the person of Christ but a ‘temporal’ one centred around the future fulfillment 
in Christ. The individual participates in Christ because through union (which is being) 
that individual forms, evolutionally (thus temporally rather than spatially), part of the 
body of Christ. Grumett confirms that  
 
the entire cosmos participates in his fullness, and is complete only when doing. 
Christ’s body is the “active centre, the living link, the organizing soul”, or in the 
words of the letter to the Ephesians, the “fullness of him who fills all in all” 
(Grumett, 2005, p.113). 
 
 
 Certainly Teilhard’s most direct reference to this idea of participation, whilst it 
is important to reiterate that he does not explicitly use the language of participation 
per se, comes from his essay ‘The Mass on the World’, in which he sees the world 
itself as sacramental.31 In other words, Teilhard understood the presence of Christ in 
the world to be of such central importance – such that he was the principle of 
evolution and the end of such evolution – that when Teilhard found himself without 
the means to celebrate Mass he offered God the world, of which he saw himself a 
part, as a substitute. 
 Teilhard wrote: 
 
                                                        
31
 For a discussion of Teilhard’s Eucharistic vision see Grey, 2006, p.197ff; 
Mannarkulan, 1981, p.32ff. 
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nothing, Lord Jesus, can subsist outside of your flesh; so that even those who 
have been cast out from your love are still, unhappily for them, the beneficiaries 
of your presence upholding them in existence. All of us, inescapably, exist in 
you, the universal milieu in which and through which all things live and have 
their being (Teilhard de Chardin, 1977, p.33). 
 
The use of the phrase ‘in which all things live and have their being’ is clearly a 
reference to Acts 17.28 (which was used extensively by Teilhard (cf. Kropf, 1980, 
p.303ff)), and the cosmic Christ that is found in the Pauline letters of imprisonment, 
in which Paul writes that ‘in him all things hold together’ (NRSV, 1995, Col 1.17). 
 In such small quotations a whole host of ideas can be found in which 
Teilhard’s theological ideas can be fully expressed, namely, that Christ sustains the 
world, sustains creation, by indwelling it (in the sense that he is the bond of nature) 
and in being that in which the world dwells (in the sense that ‘outside’ of Christ 
nothing can exist (Teilhard de Chardin, 1977, p.25)). In both of these ways Christ can 
be seen as the vitalistic principle of creation, and indeed in Teilhard’s thought these 
two dimensions cannot be separated. Christ is the élan vital by holding nature 
together, by grounding its being, and by causing it to change, which is to unite, 
through evolution, bringing it to fulfillment in which everything will be one. Thus, 
everything will be Christ, precisely because ‘to be’ is ‘to unite’; to exist, to ‘be’, is to 
be united, and union is evolution. Thus, Christ sustains creation, keeps it in ‘being’, 
by evolving it – Christ’s act of sustaining creation is his causing it to evolve. In this 
way, whilst Teilhard does not use the rhetoric of participation, it is still a concept that 
can categorize his thought. 
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b. Participation as Divine Milieu 
 It is within this context that the idea of Teilhard’s ‘divine milieu’ might best 
be understood. Christ, as the bond of matter – that which holds everything together – 
also becomes, and is, the divine milieu, ‘that milieu in which all is made one’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1977, p.25). Hefner writes that Teilhard could have employed 
other images to that of mystical or divine milieu, ‘another image might have been 
God as creative ground of our being, from which we emerge, and the foundation of 
our lives’ (Hefner, 2011, p.85). In other words, Hefner is claiming that the divine 
milieu is a synonym for the idea that has just been expounded, namely, that Christ is 
the bond of nature and thus all creation participates in him and finds its being in him. 
Likewise, Mooney argues: 
 
“omnipresence” is indeed the central theme of the whole work [i.e. The Divine 
Milieu], and the title itself is a synonym for the presence of Christ, who 
“through his humanity” is the active centre radiating all those energies which 
lead the universe back to God (Mooney, 1966, p.80) 
 
 Participation in the divine milieu is deification. Becoming participants in the 
divine nature is now participation in the divine milieu. However, it is more than this, 
it is also within the divine milieu that creation is sustained and given life because 
creation and deification are now two ends of the same event. Creation abides in the 
divine milieu, and it is the divine milieu that grounds creation. Indeed, ‘all the cosmos 
is the divine milieu’ (Farria, 2011, p.vi). Precisely because deification and creation 
are two ends of the same event, so participation in the divine milieu as deification 
must also include creation. 
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 Hefner also explicitly links this divine milieu with the incarnation. It is the 
incarnation that establishes this divine or mystical milieu, writing that ‘Christ is 
incarnated in it all, and thus he and the material order he permeates can also be 
designated as the mystical milieu in which we have our being’ (Hefner, 2011, p.87). 
Raven makes the same point, writing that for Teilhard ‘Christ was and is le milieu 
divin, the light and life and love of the world…evolution, the cosmogenesis, is the 
christification of all things’ (Raven, 1962, p.186), arguing that for Teilhard it is not 
just enough that Christ sustains and holds creation together, literally, but that through 
his indwelling, he is pulling it towards him, incorporating it into himself, making the 
world his body. 
 
 The Teilhardian concept of genèse, so important for defining the specific 
Teilhardian doctrine of evolution (Mooney, 1966, p.51), can help to further shape his 
doctrine of the divine milieu. Cuénot notes that Teilhard places the risen Christ in the 
divine milieu (Cuénot, 1958, p.307), and in doing so makes explicit the link between 
the divine milieu as participation in the divine nature, and the incarnation and 
resurrection of Christ (see the section on ascension below). This provokes the 
question of the role that evolution plays in giving rise to the divine milieu, that in 
which humanity has its being. In other words, in much the same way that the 
biosphere referred to that living envelope that exists in the world at the threshold of 
life, and the noosphere referred to such an envelope of thought, then the divine milieu 
is better thought of as that divine layer that envelopes the world, the result of the 
incarnation, the coming of Christ, and the catalyst that unites matter and pulls it into 
himself (Teilhard de Chardin, 1977, p.108). In the same way that the onset of thought 
 161 
meant that evolution under went an ontological change, so the incarnation cannot but 
result in such another ontological change. 
 The divine milieu becomes another critical threshold which creation crosses, 
as it did with the emergence of life and thought. Or, more precisely, the divine milieu 
is always present, yet the incarnation becomes a critical threshold that creation must 
cross, making the divine milieu permeating creation to greater degrees; the more 
evolved, the more one participates in the divine milieu, in Christ. If deification is the 
result of evolution, then the divine milieu is an evolved state, an evolved condition of 
life. Christogenesis, now, becomes the appearance of the divine milieu, and the 
Christosphere is this divine milieu. This means that the evolution of the world is just 
as much an evolution of Christ as it is of humanity, hence Teilhard’s insistence on the 
Parousia as an event of significant importance (see below). However, the Parousia can 
only occupy such a role if the divine milieu is seen as another critical threshold, as 
indeed the Parousia is, and that this is responsible for the formation of Christ’s body – 
‘one single thing is being made in creation: the body of Christ’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 
1971, p.74). 
 This means, therefore, that when Teilhard talks of Christogenesis, this is 
precisely what he is referring to, the emergence of the divine milieu in the world – the 
genèse of the divine milieu – which in turn will herald the complete convergence of 
the universe in the body of Christ, as Mannarkulan evidences ‘the process by which 
the cosmic body of Christ is being built up is called “Christogenesis”, this is seen as 
related to “cosmogenesis” and “noogenesis”’ (Mannarkulan, 1981, p.39). 
 With the equation of the divine milieu with the presence of Christ and thus 
deification, the evolutionary process not only brings about the complete convergence 
of all creation, it does so within the body of Christ, within the presence of Christ; 
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‘through his Incarnation, [Christ] has achieved in his own body-person the purpose of 
the whole evolutionary process: the unity of humanity with God in and through a 
purification of matter’ (Mooney, 1973, pp.157-8). 
 
 Not everyone agrees with this interpretation, however. In her chapter on 
ecological implications of Teilhard’s theory, King writes that the noosphere is ‘quite 
wrongly spiritualized’ (King, 2006, p.83). However, she does not take into account 
the close tension between nature and the supernatural that Teilhard maintains, and 
more importantly, the correlation between consciousness and spirituality. 
 Drawing on the conclusions of the previous chapter, King’s criticism of a 
spiritual noosphere cannot be upheld. If the noosphere is the conscious envelope in 
the world, then it is likewise more spiritual than the geosphere and the biosphere. The 
Christosphere or divine milieu thus represents a continuing greater spiritual presence, 
a greater role to spirit, and a fastening, a speeding towards omega. If evolution is 
convergence, a convergence of matter that brings a complexity-consciousness that 
involves a ‘grouping’ together, and ‘enmassing’ of consciousness, the constant 
creation of deepening consciousness, then this also causes a greater spiritual 
awakening. Teilhard’s convergent and accelerating vitalism, which was so influential 
in formulating his evolutionary theory (whereby union of matter, consciousness, and 
spirit are seen in the one action), can only end in the conclusion that the divine milieu 
becomes a category of evolution, the result of the incarnation’s ‘injection’ into the 
universe and the resurrection’s placing Christ at the heart of the universe (cf. Cuénot, 
1958, p.372; Kropf, 1980, p.150), Christ’s taking it over for his body; ‘by the 
resurrectional presence of Christ who fills all things, the whole of creation has a 
meaningful consistency’ (Maloney, 1968, p.192). 
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c. Participation: The Relationship between Nature and Spirit 
 This idea of participation also provides further evidence of the strong link 
between nature and grace, the ‘synonymity’ of deification and creation, and the 
employment of the concept of vision, as has already been hinted above. For Teilhard, 
creation is as dependent upon Christ for its being as it is for deification and the 
fulfillment of creation in him. Thus the tension between the categories of nature and 
the supernatural become collapsed upon each other, the one being only a furtherance 
of the other. As Passmore so helpfully put it, the mystical union with God may be 
‘supernatural in character, [but it] is at the same time the natural outcome of 
evolution’ (Passmore, 1970, p.252). The only way to separate the two notions, 
therefore, becomes Teilhard’s doctrine of vision. It is through ‘vision’ – that is, he 
who has eyes and sees (cf. NRSV, 1995, Mk. 4.9; Mk 8.18 – that one is able to 
perceive Christ for who he is. It is through ‘vision’, therefore, that one is able to 
perceive the divine milieu, to see the world as the coming fulfillment of Christ, when 
God will be ‘all in all’ (NRSV, 1995, 1 Cor. 15.28). It is only ‘vision’ that is able to 
perceive the divine milieu, and thus it is only those who have eyes that can see who 
can understand that the world participates in the being of God, that creation 
participates in Christ. 
 King, in her chapter from Teilhard and the Future of Humanity, describes the 
divine milieu as ‘a deep faith in a divine centre and heart of the world that suffuses 
every context and environment with the energy, presence, and grace of the spirit 
whose dynamic action animates the entire universe’ (King U, 2006, p.16), and thus 
links the divine milieu with the category of ‘vision’ that was so important for 
Teilhard’s evolutionary theory. The incarnation establishes the divine milieu, the 
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principle that unites the world and thus creates it, and it is when one sees the world 
for what it is, when one is able to ‘see’ the divine vitalism that holds the world 
together, the attractive centre of evolution, that one participates in the divine milieu, 
which is deification. 
 Garcia-Rivera, again in reference to vision, writes that: 
 
vision is a sensibility to union, which, in turn, is a growth in being, so in seeing, 
one also becomes united to what is seen…but what is seen? Teilhard answers: a 
divine milieu, a luminous world illuminated by Christ’s transfiguring 
presence…this divine milieu is the place where we live and move and have our 
being and becoming, surrounded, penetrated, and shaped by Christ’s divine 
loving presence (Garcia-Rivera, 2009, p.73) 
 
It may be added that, in this way, evolution is the illumination of the world; the whole 
interpretation given in the previous chapter is the illumination of Christ that Garcia-
Rivera mentions. 
 What is also interesting about this quotation, along with Grim and Evelyn 
Tucker who write that ‘the divine milieu, within which we live, and breathe, and have 
our becoming’ (Grim & Evelyn Tucker, 2003, p.9), is that the word ‘being’ from Acts 
17:28 has been replaced by ‘becoming’, and thus conforms to the idea that Teilhard 
has been influenced by Bergson. However, they are thus both incorrect, as it has been 
argued that Teilhard went further, replacing the idea of ‘becoming’ with the idea of 
‘unity’ – hence his reinterpretation of Bergson’s divergent evolution with a 
convergent one. 
 165 
 Nevertheless, in this way the Teilhardian concept of vision that was outlined 
in the previous chapter as being so important for the relationship between matter and 
spirit and the relationship between nature and the supernatural, cannot be separated 
from his doctrine of participation in the divine milieu. Everything that was described 
in the previous chapter regarding the tension between nature and the supernatural 
comes to be seen as synonymous with Teilhard’s understanding of the divine milieu, 
and thus participation. 
 
d. Participation, Divine Milieu, and Kingdom 
 It may also be suggested that a comparison can be made between the 
Teilhardian idea of divine milieu (which works as a doctrine of participation) and the 
biblical notion of the kingdom of God (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.137), as 
Thomas King notes that ‘[Teilhard] claims the Kingdom of God – a central theme of 
the Gospel – can be seen as “a prodigious biological operation”’ (King T, 2011, p.27). 
 In Luke 17.21, the kingdom is said to be ‘within’, whereas in Matthew 7.21 
the kingdom is implied to be a future reality, not to mention the parables in which 
Jesus likens the kingdom to a seed or yeast that must be fulfilled, indicating that the 
kingdom is not yet fulfilled. Such a notion of the fact that the kingdom of God is 
present yet not fulfilled fits with the Teilhardian teleology of unity of creation in 
Christ yet fuller unity through the continuing process of evolution, which has not yet 
reached its apex in humanity. The fact that the kingdom of God is present yet not 
fulfilled perfectly fits with the relationship and tension between nature and grace, as 
Teilhard understands it. The two are two sides of the same coin, such that those who 
have eyes can see, those who have the ‘vision’ see the world bathed in the light of 
God. Christ’s body is not yet complete, he has not attained his fullness, although his 
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incarnation heralds that event, secures its success, and fastens its happening. De 
Lubac confirms that: 
 
like the Kingdom of God, [the divine milieu] has been with us since all time, 
even though our natural blindness has, practically always, made us exiles from 
it…further, as the Kingdom of God is within us as well as around us, so the 
divine milieu surrounds us on all sides, “so intimately and profoundly that 
nothing can make it apparent to us only a faith that is rooted deep in our lives 
can introduce us to it” (de Lubac, 1967, p.57). 
 
Thus, de Lubac furthers this interpretation that synergia and submission to the will of 
God, which is faith and vision, the seeing God in all things, is coming into and finding 
oneself in the divine milieu. Indeed, it is recognizing that one has always been in the 
divine milieu. 
 However, there is more that can be said here. The fact that the divine milieu 
can be likened and compared with the biblical imagery of the kingdom of God means 
that more traditional or classical eschatological categories can be retained, or 
absorbed, by Teilhard’s theology, and re-interpreted to take on new meaning in the 
light of his evolutionary theology. Doctrines such as resurrection and deification are 
now implicitly pointed to by the divine milieu. This doesn’t necessarily point to a 
realized eschatology because, as much as the divine presence can be discerned in the 
world by those who can see, Christ’s body is not yet complete, evolution has not yet 
finished. 
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 Participation, then, forms a major part of Teilhard’s Christology. Christ 
completes evolution, and in completing it he takes it over, it becomes united to him. 
The resurrection now becomes of primary importance. It is by the resurrection, and 
the ascension as will be seen below, that Christ takes over the universe as his mystical 
body (which has clear ecclesial overtones (Binns, 1968, p.140)). Therefore, it is the 
resurrection that establishes the divine milieu, it is the resurrection that becomes the 
means by which participation in the divine nature happens, and the unity of creation is 
speeded up. 
 
Cosmic Christ and Ascension: The Role of the Resurrection and The Holy Spirit 
 In his eco-theological book The Garden of God, in which Garcia-Rivera 
suggests that Teilhard’s theological legacy can be used to construct an ecologically 
sensitive theology, he argues that the doctrine of the ascension can be used as a way 
to interpret the themes found in Teilhard’s Christology. He writes that 
 
it is the doctrine of the ascension that strongly implies the cosmic Christ…for 
him, ascension was not simply a movement upward but also forward. With 
Christ-the-Evolver at the helm, evolution is taking us upward and forward to the 
omega point…[and that] in the doctrine of the ascension we have the reverse of 
the incarnation (Garcia-Rivera, 2009, p.42, p.59) 
 
Cuénot, too, writes 
 
Teilhard is recorded as describing the Ascension as ‘the most beautiful feast of 
the year and that we did not celebrate it with enough solemnity, since it is the 
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anticipated consummation of the universe returning to the Father in the heart of 
the glorified Christ (Cuénot, 1958, p.262) 
 
In this way, Garcia-Rivera posits that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit can be a way of 
allowing Christ to be ‘at the helm’ of evolution. Christ, the ascended Christ, the 
Cosmic Christ, sends his Spirit to bring creation to its fulfillment. This means that the 
bond of nature, the bond of matter – which is Teilhard’s equivalent of Bergson’s élan 
vital – is not Christ himself, but the Holy Spirit, which is the Spirit of Christ; and it is 
the ascension which provides the context through which this happens. The ascension 
is when Christ takes up his place as cosmic Christ (see Christ’s ‘third nature’ below), 
and the Holy Spirit continues the work of pulling creation, through evolution, together 
forming this cosmic body. 
 Mooney supports this approach, writing that ‘For Teilhard the resurrection is 
that “tremendous cosmic event” which inaugurates the actual exercises by Christ as 
his function as physical centre by which, in the words of St. Paul, he “fills all things”’ 
(Mooney, 1966, p.147). Christ, in the resurrection and ascension, takes up the role of 
cosmic Christ (Klauder, 1971, p.42). The resurrection ‘marks Christ’s effective 
assumption of his function as the universal centre’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, pp.63-
4), and where he waits for the world to fulfill its evolution so that he may take up his 
body in the Parousia. The resurrection, and ascension, is the moment when Christ 
takes up his role of cosmic Christ. Faricy writes: 
 
God was not “up there”, above, in some way distant, he was here, in Jesus risen, 
through the intense love that radiates out from the heart of Jesus, present to 
everything created, and to all of creation together, and to Teilhard, through the 
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love of the risen Christ for each creature and for all creation (Faricy, 2006, 
p.131). 
 
 The use of the Holy Spirit as the ‘Spirit of Christ’ is also suggested by Smith 
in his essay ‘God and Evolutive Creation’, in which he writes that ‘the “penetrating 
influence of Christ-Omega” is surely the Spirit of Christ. The “will of God”, active in 
all beings and causing them to develop towards the goal of personal union with God, 
is surely the Spirit of God’ (Smith, 1970a, p.50). Although Smith does not explicitly 
connect this idea with the doctrine of ascension, he does understand such an idea to 
provide a Trinitarian element to Teilhard’s work. 
 
a. Teilhard’s Theology as Christocentric 
 This understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit within a Christic context 
means that Teilhard’s work is ultimately Christocentric. The fact that Teilhard’s 
theology is Christocentric, without a clear pneumatology, is one of the more pressing 
and concrete criticisms of his work (Grey, 2006, p.118), and the need to find a 
solution to it is certainly one of the more important avenues of Teilhardian 
interpretation needed. Not only this, but postulating that the role of the Spirit as the 
continuation of the role of the Son fits well with the Western Trinitarian tradition that 
led to Rahner’s famous claim that ‘the immanent trinity is the economic trinity’. 
 However, in many respects, this interpretation goes too far. Maloney writes 
that ‘in the ascension, Christ lost [his] determinate presence but only in order that 
through the Holy Spirit he could come into his disciple’s experience in a new and 
more effective way’ (Maloney, 1968, p.241). It is clear that such a view diminishes 
the person of the Spirit. If Maloney is correct, then the Spirit becomes a vehicle for 
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Christ, a new mode of his existence, or a ‘third’ nature, rather than a person in his 
own right. Indeed, such a criticism is used by many Eastern theologians to criticize 
the Western idea of the Holy Spirit. By understanding it as a continuation of the 
mission of the Son, or by seeing it as the relationship between the Father and Son, the 
personhood of the Spirit is diminished. 
 It must be noted that such criticisms are certainly valid, although this is not the 
place to deal with them. The arguments surrounding Trinitarian theology are vast and 
too detailed to be considered here. It must only be noted that in the ascension, in 
claiming that through the resurrection and ascension Christ takes on his cosmic 
function, the role of the Holy Spirit becomes prominent. It can be argued that it is 
when Christ sends his Spirit, as he promised in the Gospel of John, it is this Spirit that 
becomes the élan vital, it is the Spirit that guides and directs evolution, preparing 
Christ’s body for when he returns in the Parousia. 
 
b. Ascension and Sacramental Theology 
 In this way, Teilhard treats doctrines of the resurrection and ascension in a 
similar way to transubstantiation and sacramental theology; the universe, creation 
itself, becomes a sacrament. McCarty writes that, according to Teilhard ‘what 
happened to the individual elements according to transubstantiation happened to the 
entire universe in the Incarnation’ (McCarty, 1976, p.59), as does Mannarkulan, who 
writes that ‘the event of transubstantiation does not end with the material species of 
bread and wine but extends to the whole universe’ (Mannarkulan, 1981, p.35). Thus, 
when Christ takes over the world, when he takes over the evolutionary process, to 
complete it and create a body for himself, a comparable process to the epiclesis is 
happening (Lane, 1996, p.77). In the same way that the host becomes the body of 
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Christ, so the world becomes the body of Christ, and this process is evolution; 
evolution can now be likened to transubstantiation. 
 Teilhard’s famous essay ‘The Mass on the World’, which has already been 
pointed to in support for his doctrine of participation, confirms this interpretation of 
his theology. In this sense, the process of evolution is taken over by Christ through his 
resurrection and ascension into heaven. Evolution, which has been, by itself, leading 
upwards towards humanity, now that it has been taken over by Christ, is being 
brought, through his Spirit, towards its fulfillment. In this way Mannarkulan writes 
that ‘Teilhard de Chardin identifies the cosmic Christ with the Eucharistic Christ’ 
(Mannarkulan, 1981, p.37). In other words, in the same way that the ascension of 
Christ means that he can take over his role as the substance of the host, so too he can 
take over the universe as his body, there is essentially no difference in his role as 
Eucharistic Christ and cosmic Christ (although, it must be said, some argue that 
Teilhard still maintained a difference between the sacramental presence of God and 
his deifying/evolving presence (Wildiers, 1977, p.13)). 
 
Christ’s Cosmic Function as Third Nature 
 The role of the ascension in Teilhard’s theology leads to one of the most 
important and controversial elements of his Christology. With the resurrection and the 
ascension, Christ takes over his role as Cosmic Christ, Christ the evolver, and in order 
to distinguish this role from his incarnation, Teilhard argues that Christ assumes a 
new nature. Whilst this idea is central to Teilhard’s Christology, there are only three 
places where Teilhard refers to it explicitly. In his essay ‘The Heart of the Matter’ 
Teilhard writes that: 
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hitherto, and in spite of the dominant position accorded to it by St. Paul in his 
view of the World, this third aspect or function – we might even say, in a true 
sense of the words, this third ‘nature’ of Christ (neither human nor divine, but 
cosmic) – has not noticeably attracted attention of the faithful or of theologians 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, p.93) 
 
Likewise, in ‘Christianity and Evolution: Suggestions for a New Theology’, he writes 
that: 
 
hitherto, the thought of the faithful could hardly be said explicitly to distinguish 
in practice more than two aspects of Christ: the Man-Jesus and the Word-God. 
Yet it is clear that a third aspect of the theandric complex was left in the 
background…until today, I repeat, this third aspect of the incarnate word has 
been sufficiently distinguished from the other two (Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, 
p.179) 
 
Again, in ‘My Fundamental Vision’, Teilhard writes that: 
 
between the word on one-side and the man-Jesus on the other, a kind of “third 
Christic nature” (if I may say so) emerges – constantly to be found in the 
writings of St. Paul: it is the nature of the total and totalizing Christ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1975, p.198) 
 
The allusion to St. Paul is, again, supremely important. Teilhard is claiming that he is 
not ‘inventing’ anything new here; he is merely following the thought of Paul in an 
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evolutionary paradigm. Thus in arguing that Christ is the bond of nature, i.e. the 
evolver, and that it is through the resurrection and the ascension that such a 
participation in the divine nature happens, he is pointing to this third function, or third 
nature, of Christ. It is this third nature that creation participates in. More precisely, 
this third nature is creation; it is slowly being formed through evolution before, 
through the Parousia, Christ returns to assume it. 
 In Lyon’s book The Cosmic Christ in Origen and Teilhard de Chardin he 
presents a detailed discussion of this idea of Teilhard de Chardin. He writes that 
‘through his resurrection he assumes the cosmic role of Omega. As Omega, Christ is 
the supernatural goal of creation and the vinculum holding together everything from 
on high’ (Lyons, 1982, p.180). 
 The resurrection plays an important role in this idea, as it has been claimed 
already. It is the resurrection whereby Christ takes over his new function. In other 
words, the resurrection may be said to be the event in which Christ assumes another 
nature, that of a cosmic nature, one in which he is the ‘prime mover of the evolving 
universe’ (Lyons, 1982, pp.185-6). Lyons also writes that: 
 
the precise link between Christ’s human and cosmic natures Teilhard locates in 
the resurrection. Indeed, even when he is not speaking in terms of natures in 
Christ, it is a common theme of his that Christ assumes his cosmic role through 
the resurrection (Lyons, 1982, p.187) 
 
This confirms the interpretation of Teilhard’s Christology in this chapter. 
 Lyons continues that ‘what Teilhard appears to have in mind is a distinction in 
Christ between the word as Trinitarian person and the word as divine instrument of 
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God and cosmic principle in formation through the process of creation’ (Lyons, 1982, 
p.189). In other words, Teilhard’s intention in creating a new nature for Christ, a third 
nature, is that he can ascribe creation to him, since it is through Christ that everything 
is created. He thus has to make Christ the centre of the universe as an attractive 
centre, because ‘to create is to unite’, therefore if Christ creates then Christ unites. If 
Christ creates then he has to be that which pulls the monads together, hence vitalism, 
and this Christ does through his ascension and his immersion in the universe as the 
Spirit. Hence the Eucharistic link that Teilhard makes in ‘Mass on the World’. 
Teilhard, therefore, ‘creates’ this third nature for Christ so that his function as creator 
is sufficiently distinguished from his divinity and his humanity. In the same way that 
Christ assumes a human nature in the incarnation so in the ascension, or more 
precisely at the Parousia, Christ assumes his cosmic nature, his role as creator, in 
which he pulls the universe together. Such a postulation of a third nature is needed to 
effectively describe Christ’s role as creator. 
 
a. Problems with Teilhard’s Theory 
 However, there are obvious problems with this idea. If Teilhard is being 
literal, that there is a third nature of Christ, then he is clearly at odds with classical 
Christology. Mooney notes that 
 
Teilhard himself was obviously aware that something was wrong with the word 
[‘third nature’]…its use here is rather careless, but its purpose is simply to 
emphasize once more the organic character of his final plentitude in Christ 
(Mooney, 1966, p.179) 
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Mannarkulan, too, writes that ‘Teilhard wanted in fact, only to stress the third 
dimension of Christ which is so evident in Pauline theology’ (Mannarkulan, 1981, 
p.36), again emphasizing the link with Pauline theology and his Jesuit heritage. In 
other words, Teilhard realizes that postulating a third nature for Christ is an 
unacceptable way of addressing the question of the cosmic Christ and he uses the 
term loosely to make a point about the way that Christ penetrates the universe 
following his resurrection. 
 Kropf notes that ‘the Christologically speaking heterodox suggestion [i.e. the 
postulation of a ‘third’ nature of Christ] is, taken in its context, more properly a 
soteriological preoccupation of Teilhard’ (Kropf, 1980, p.65). In other words, 
Teilhard does not postulate a third nature of Christ strictly or systematically but 
merely to emphasize that after the resurrection Christ’s mission is charged with 
greater significance and thus becomes the catalyst for the increasingly convergent 
evolution. Kropf continues that ‘[Teilhard’s] use of the word nature was directed 
more by lack of vocabulary than by any desire to invent heterodox formulas’ (Kropf, 
1980, p.189). 
 Maloney agrees that ‘in his use of the terms cosmic or Christic “nature”, 
Teilhard did not intend to give a metaphysical definition of a new and distinct nature, 
existing outside of the gloriously resurrected Jesus Christ’ (Maloney, 1968, p.202). 
Nonetheless, his use of the word does betray a certain element of his thought, namely, 
that Christ after the resurrection is fundamentally different, and Lyons explicitly 
refers to 
 
Teilhard’s concept that in Christ there are three natures: divine, human, and 
cosmic…it was suggested that, in proposing three natures in Christ, [Teilhard] 
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was attempting to combine a Chalcedonian with an Arian Christology. With 
Origen we find a similar situation. Some commentators read in [Origen’s] 
doctrine of the Son in such a way that it does not conflict with Nicene 
orthodoxy. Others see it as looking forward to the subordination of Arius 
(Lyons, 1982, p.37, p.86) 
 
This further affirms that Teilhard’s Christology has major problems with its 
formulation. Lyons also writes that 
 
the Son is also the first–born of all creation. In his use of this title Origen does 
not apply it to the Incarnate Christ, unlike a number of Fathers from Athanasius 
onwards, who do so in order to remove one of Arius’s scriptural supports 
(Lyons, 1982, p.114) 
 
Thus, whilst Lyons does not affirm the precise theory outlined here, he provides 
support for linking the act of creation with the historical event of the incarnation. By 
linking Teilhard with Origen, especially in linking Origen’s ‘twofold doctrine on the 
Son’ (Lyons, 1982, p.106), this Arian criticism can also be leveled at Teilhard. In 
other words, if Lyons can show that there is significant similarity between Origen and 
Teilhard in the postulation of a third ‘nature’ of Christ to correspond to his cosmic 
function, or as Lyons puts it ‘[Christ’s] superior nature of first-born of all creation’ 
(Lyons, 1982, p.141), then the Arian criticism of Origen can, and must, also be 
applied to Teilhard. 
 However, this does not mean that Christ as creator cannot be a viable 
interpretation of his role, only that seeing him as a creator in this evolutionary 
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paradigm leads Teilhard to make assertions that cannot be the case. Again, whilst 
Kropf and others comment that Teilhard is not referring to nature in the traditional 
sense, if Lyons is correct that ‘in his operation as Omega, what we immediately 
encounter in Christ is not his divinity or his humanity but rather his cosmic nature, 
through which he holds together the whole creation’ (Lyons, 1982, p.199) then it is 
clear that there exists between Christ’s cosmic nature and his other two a similar 
tension as that which exists between his divine and human natures. Thus the use of 
the word nature is appropriate to describe this third dimension or function of Christ. 
 
b. Teilhard’s Neglect of the Historical 
 Another problem with this idea of Teilhard’s is that his reliance on the cosmic 
Christ neglects the historical. In other words, by focusing on the role of Christ as 
creator, and by understanding union as creation having to place Christ as the attractive 
centre of the universe, in which through his resurrection and ascension he takes over 
the process of evolution and through his Spirit, the historical person of Christ 
becomes irrelevant. By redefining the meaning of original sin, and by reinterpreting 
the role of Christ to be more inclusive, his scope becomes so wide that the specific 
historical context becomes unimportant; it becomes only a small section of the wider 
context of creation and deification. Kropf notes this problem, writing that 
 
in a journal note of September 28 1953, where Teilhard admitted that he had not 
decided whether the historical Jesus was the “real Christ” or more of less a 
projection of the “Trans-Christ” in such a way that it can be said that Jesus has 
released or unleashed the (true) Christ (Kropf, 1980, p.284). 
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In other words, the historical Christ becomes only a means to an end. The incarnation 
becomes just a means to another end, rather than the focal point of the mission of 
Christ. However, Kropf writes that ‘of some seventy explicit quotations from the 
gospels, forty-three are from the synoptics. Thus Teilhard can hardly be charged with 
ignoring the historical Christ’ (Kropf, 1980, p.34). The issue, therefore, is not one of 
neglect of the historical but concentration on the cosmic. 
 Nevertheless, it is still important to affirm the unity of Christ, that even though 
he has different functions, it is still the same person who performs them; ‘Christ born 
of the virgin, and Christ risen from the dead: the two are one inseparable whole’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.159). De Lubac qualifies his discussion of the cosmic 
and universal dimensions of Christ by writing that ‘there is no disjunction between the 
one state of Christ and the other: it is always the same Christ’ (de Luabc, 1967, p.63). 
That being said, there must be an equal act of distinguishing between the two natures, 
but keeping it clear that these two natures belong to the same person; thus, again, the 
relationship between Christ’s human nature and his cosmic nature is the same as that 
between his divine nature and human nature. 
 
Omega Point as Parousia 
 The Parousia is undoubtedly one of the central categories of the whole of 
Teilhard’s Christological vision. As Mooney notes, ‘Teilhard was in fact preoccupied 
all his life with this relationship between the culmination of evolution and the 
Parousia of Christ’ (Mooney, 1966, p.61). Indeed, E. Borne described him in his 
eulogy as ‘a man of the Parousia’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.394). For him, the Omega Point 
that was discussed in the previous chapter that represented the end point of evolution, 
the point at which all of life and matter converges upon itself, and spirit is 
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concentrated most intensely, is the second coming of Christ. Thus the evolutionary 
process, in a very real sense, is the coming into being, the becoming, of Christ’s body. 
When evolution has finished, when Christ’s body has been completed, then he comes 
back to take it over for himself. In this way the Parousia becomes a ‘second 
incarnation’; in the first, Christ assumes an historical human nature; in the second, he 
assumes creation itself, now complete through the process of evolution, or his cosmic 
nature. 
 Teilhard writes that 
 
when the end of time is at hand, a terrifying spiritual pressure will be exerted on 
the confines of the real, built up by the desperate efforts of souls tense with 
longing to escape from the earth…it is then, we may be sure, that the Parousia 
will be realized in a creation that has been taken to the climax of its capacity for 
union (Teilhard de Chardin, 1964, p.309) 
 
In this respect the convergence of matter and spirituality that has been taking place 
through evolution will reach a crescendo, a ‘spiritual tension’, due to the pulling of all 
matter towards Christ, that when this tension becomes unbearable Christ will burst 
forth, complete, fully formed, the end of evolution culminating in the completion of 
his body, which is the unity of nature in the Church (Teilhard de Chardin, 1975, 
pp.191-2). Mooney, too, refers to this element of Teilhard’s thought, writing that 
Teilhard ‘saw that one day the tension gradually accumulating between humanity and 
God would touch the limits prescribed by the possibilities of the world, and this 
would bring an end to time’ (Mooney, 1966, p.32). 
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 However, it is in his book The Divine Milieu where his doctrine of the 
Parousia is most explicit. He writes that 
 
one day, the gospel tells us, the tension gradually accumulating between 
humanity and God will touch the limits prescribed by the possibilities of the 
world. and then will come the end. Then the presence of Christ, which has been 
silently accruing in things, will suddenly be revealed – like a flash of light from 
pole to pole (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968, p.150). 
 
The Parousia, for Teilhard, therefore represented the final stage in evolution. It was 
the event that evolution was heading towards, and thus it was the event that evolution 
was set in motion to achieve; cosmogenesis is Christogenesis. Thus the supernatural 
fulfillment of the world is its natural conclusion, deification is creation; the last 
moment of the act of creation is the deification of the universe, when God will be all 
in all, i.e. the body of Christ. Mooney writes that 
 
this system of [human] growth in Teilhard’s system [i.e. evolution, noospheric 
union] is not a state which humanity reaches before the Parousia, but a critical 
point coinciding with the Parousia…to reach this supreme consciousness the 
human race may well have to pass another “critical point”, a second threshold of 
reflection (Mooney, 1966, p.181) 
 
The Teilhardian doctrine of critical thresholds is operative here; it is this idea of 
qualitative change through evolution that provided the grounding upon which 
Teilhard saw the end of the world. ‘That moment’, Mooney continues, ‘when the 
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psychic temperature of the noosphere, in conformity with the law of complexity-
consciousness, reaches its maximum of tension’ (Mooney, 1966, p.182); that tension, 
that pressure caused by the convergence of human thought upon one another reaches a 
point whereby Christ is burst forth, Christ’s body is the result of this psychic tension; 
‘Christ emerges when the universe converges’ (Boissannat, 2006, p.103).  
 
a. The Role of Synergia 
 It is here, therefore, that the role of synergia has its Christological aspects. In a 
letter quoted by Mooney, Teilhard asks whether ‘without the human striving of every 
human cell to unite with all the others, would the Parousia be physically possible?’ 
(Mooney, 1966, p.151), in which he answers negatively. Once the evolutionary 
process reaches hominization, once it has converged to produce the free, conscious, 
beings that are humanity, it was argued, it becomes impossible for the evolutionary 
process to be completed without their help, without their effort to build the earth, 
therefore the Parousia, too, becomes an event that is in many respects dependent on 
human action. Grau writes that ‘the Christian has a call, from Christ, determinative of 
his very essence as a Christian, to build the body of Christ and bring the incarnation to 
fulfillment’ (Grau, 1976, p.214); everything that was claimed in the last chapter 
regarding the role of human effort in evolution now has a specific object, the body of 
Christ. 
 However, it is also important that ‘the terminal maturation of the evolutionary 
process did not mean that the Parousia was achieved within history by human effort 
alone’ (Grau, 1976, p.340). In much the same way that synergia was criticized in the 
Pelagian controversy, so it must be made clear that the Parousia is an event that is 
caused by God, not humanity. As Faricy is keen to point out, as much as the Parousia 
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and the end of evolution coincide, ‘the Parousia is a supernatural event, a gift from 
God, a divine intervention. It is not the product of a natural progress of human effort’ 
(Faricy, 1968, p.65). The end of evolution and the Parousia are events that coincide, 
but one does not cause the other; the end of evolution is a condition of the Parousia 
but not its cause (Teilhard de Chardin, 1975, p.155). However, this does not stop the 
Parousia being a part of the evolutionary process, since ‘the Parousia is an ultimate 
critical point of evolution’ (Faricy, 1968, pp.65-6). 
 The close relationship between nature and the supernatural is evident here; 
regardless of how supernatural the Parousia is, it is a part of the natural evolutionary 
progression of the world. 
 
b. The Rejection of Indefinite Progress 
 It is also important, therefore, as Klauder notes, that there is no ‘question of 
indefinite progress. Quite the contrary’ (Klauder, 1971, p.116). This means that the 
end of evolution, which is synonymous with the second coming of Christ, is an 
objective event in the future, it is something that will happen in time, not simply a 
subjective event that can be de-mythologized. The end of time is an event that will 
come to pass, when spirit has converged upon itself to such an extent that the final 
threshold is crossed and Christ takes up his body, then the world will be deified. 
Teilhard himself writes that evolution is ‘not an indefinite progress, which is an 
hypothesis contradicted by the convergent nature of noogenesis’ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1959, p.289). 
 Teilhard, therefore, denies the prospect of an indefinite progress precisely 
because his evolutionary theory is convergent; precisely because it is being pulled 
together means that it is a finite process, there will be a point in the future at which 
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matter cannot converge anymore. As it was noted in the previous chapter, the end of 
evolution, the unity of creation in the body of Christ is a real event, it is something 
that will happen in the future, and thus the participation in the divine nature is a 
participation in a future event, the Parousia. 
 Mooney writes that 
 
Paul’s thought on the “physical” relationship between Christ and mankind has 
received increased attention in recent years due to the modern trend towards a 
strong realism in explaining his use of the term “body of Christ”. Far from 
interpreting it as a metaphor signifying the collectivity of Christians as an 
organization, Pauline scholars, Catholic and Protestant alike, explain it as a 
literal designation of the risen Christ in all his concrete reality…in the famous 
two-strophed hymn of Colossians 1.15-20 Paul goes back to the pre-existence of 
Christ with the Father, in whose image he is the source as well as the instrument 
and final end of creation (Mooney, 1966, pp.90, 96) 
 
For Teilhard, the cosmic body of Christ is the physical end of creation. The fact that 
evolution is the creation of a body for Christ, it is the coming into being of the body 
of Christ – or as Sproxton writes, ‘the universe constitutes Christ’s cosmic body’ 
(Sproxton, 1971, p.28) – means that God becomes a future reality, God creates from 
the future, pulling creation towards him, gathering creation up in him – ‘the world is 
converging towards someone’ (Cuénot, 1958, p.221). It means both that his theology 
is necessarily process (Hanson, 1970, p.175), and that Christ is attractive, God is 
attractive (in the same way that Christ comes to represent the élan vital, which is 
evolution, and that for Teilhard that vitalism, that evolution, is attractive, pulling 
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matter together in converging unity). God creates by pulling creation upwards, 
forwards, towards him (Mooney, 1966, p.55); God is the ‘prime mover ahead’ 
(Grumett, 2005, p.208). It is not a participation in the being of God who is ‘above’ or 
‘within’, but participation in the future completion of God; to be participated being is 
to be united, and union is creation through evolution, thus a reality that always points 
to the future. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Christological aspects of Teilhard’s theology, therefore, are not separate 
from his evolutionary theory. Indeed, as it was mentioned above, the two form an 
indissoluble whole. However, what is important about this Christology is that, 
although Teilhard saw it as being necessitated by his evolutionary theory, it is, as 
commentators have argued, nothing more than a reinterpretation of a theology that has 
been implicit throughout the history of theology. Through Paul, the Greek Fathers, 
Duns Scotus, and now Teilhard, this idea of seeing in Christ a more fundamental role 
as that of creator, rather than that of saviour, has been a constant feature of theological 
discourse.  
 This thesis will argue, therefore, that this Christology is essentially correct, 
based as it is on firm foundations. However, the evolutionary context with which it is 
built needs correcting. This will produce a nuanced cosmic Christ; a cosmic Christ 
that to all intents and purposes is still Teilhardian, but with a neo-Darwinian context. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Neo-Darwinism: Teleological Neutrality and Subjectivism 
 
 
 As has already been claimed, whilst Teilhard de Chardin is perhaps the most 
important theologian to tackle the subject of evolution, his evolutionary theory was 
incorrect. As Kenney succinctly writes, ‘orthogenesis is scientifically non-existent’ 
(Kenney, 1970, p.86; cf. Birx, 1972, p.53; Corte, 1960, p.61; King, 1997, p.140; 
Medawar, 1961, p.99). Likewise, there is widespread condemnation of Lamarckism as 
having no support among laboratory experimentation (McCarty, 1976, p.131; Elliot, 
2012, p.10; Dodson, 1984, p.150; Huxley, 1942, p.457ff.). Importantly, though, 
Teilhard never claimed to be Darwinian (Teilhard de Chardin, 1978a, p.256; Teilhard 
de Chardin, 1966, p.136; Cuénot, 1958, p.292); his failure was not in backing the 
wrong horse but in hedging his bets. Instead, he tried to find a common ground 
between Darwinism and Lamarckism (Grim & Tucker, 2006, p.68). Such a synthesis, 
it will be shown in this chapter, is impossible. Regardless of how simple life is, 
Teilhard always postulated a direction to evolution. This chapter will show how such 
a teleology is altogether absent from evolution and completely incompatible with 
Darwinism. 
 Even though Teilhard claims to offer a synthesis of Lamarck and Darwin, he 
was, perhaps, always going to be unable to present a truly Darwinian account of 
evolution due to his intellectual environment. Lamarck, Bergson, and Teilhard were 
French, and therefore it is reasonable to suggest a predisposition to a particular 
interpretation of evolution based on nothing else but language parameters (cf. 
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Chettany, 1981, p.119; Grim & Tucker, 2006, p.69; Raven, 1962, p.33ff). Grumett 
writes that: 
 
in France, Darwinian theory itself became generally known only during the 
controversies which followed the publication of Bergson’s Creative Evolution 
in 1907, and even then was not accepted as fully as in the Anglo-Saxon world, 
Russia or Germany. The true context for Teilhard’s study of evolution, 
crucially, is Lamarckian (Grumett, 2005, p.199) 
 
Further, Domming writes that: 
 
the French scepticism to Darwin is well documented…[and] from about 1903 to 
1933 there seems to have been no Darwinian biologist in France…in short, 
Teilhard’s background was not conducive to enthusiasm for the neo-Darwinism 
synthesis that was developing [around him] during his mature years (Domming, 
2010, p.159, pp.190-1) 
 
Simpson agrees that: 
 
[Teilhard] betrayed a complete failure to grasp the theory that he called “neo-
Darwinism”, now often called “the synthetic theory”…[indeed] it is a French 
scientist, Georges Pasteur, who has recently (1971) declared that the French 
mentality in general is incapable of understanding natural selection (Simpson, 
1973, pp.92-7) 
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 Birx, in his discussion of the life and work of Darwin, also notes a tension 
between Lamarck and Darwin, writing that ‘[Darwin] was always unkind to Lamarck’ 
(Birx, 1991, p.145), and that ‘apparently, Charles Darwin did not take the writings 
of…Lamarck…seriously, he often ignored the important contributions of the French 
naturalists’ (Birx, 1991, p.116). Just as the French found it difficult to accept 
Darwinism, so Darwin found it difficult to accept Lamarckism. The two biologists 
represent opposite ways of understanding the mutability of species. Such a mutual 
criticism will be important for maintaining that Teilhard’s assertion that a synthesis 
between Darwin and Lamarck can be reached is untenable. 
 This chapter will attempt to outline the basic points of neo-Darwinism, and 
thereby reach some fundamental precepts with which to reinterpret Teilhard’s 
Christology. The most fundamental of these is undoubtedly the rejection of teleology. 
If Teilhard’s theory could be summarized in the term ‘progress’, then neo-Darwinism 
can likewise be summarized in the term ‘preservation’. The appeal to genetic 
mutation (by which is meant any change in gene structure (cf. Foster, 2009, p.9; 
Dobzhansky, 1982, p.39, p.114, pp.128-30; Huxley, 1942, p.21)), and natural 
selection as the mechanism by which change and diversity happens, does not in and of 
itself represent Darwinism. Instead, an emphasis on seeing change as an accidental32 
occurrence in the continuing process of replication and copying – that nature does not 
want33 to change – does. 
                                                        
32
 Throughout this thesis the term ‘accident’ and ‘accidental’ (as well as ‘error’ and 
‘mistake’), especially when used in relation to genetic mutation and evolution, will 
never have pejorative connotations. These words will be used solely as pointing to a 
contingent event, an event that happens without apparent determinative cause. 
33
 The use of the ‘want’ here does not imply a conscious activity on the part of genes.  
The use of the word ‘want’ merely affirms that the primary function of genes is to 
replicate, and it is only the failure of this activity that produces change. 
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 The universe, therefore, could be said to be mutable as opposed to dynamic 
(dynamism is a tendency to change whereas mutability simply excepts that change 
happens), and the diversity that appears in the universe is due to errors in copying and 
replicating, not because of an impetus towards change. To claim otherwise is a 
distortion of Darwinism (Medawar, 1961, p.103). Further, it may be argued that 
evolution is not a process at all (understood as a means to a particular end), but an 
ontological condition of creation. Evolution occurs, not because it is bringing 
something into being, but because the created world is mutable and open to change, 
because the copying process is not perfect but open to mistake.34 
 Essentially, therefore, this chapter is concerned with the tension between 
teleology and teleonomy, or, in other words, a tension between, on the one hand, the 
goal orientated direction of a process that is inherent to it, and, on the other, the 
retrospective appearance of direction in a random and accidental sequence of events 
(cf. Davies, 1993, p.237, Dennett, 1995, pp.53, Dawkins, 1986, p.224, Monod, 1972, 
p.115). This chapter is concerned with a tension between seeing evolution as a 
forward looking process, looking toward what it changes into, and seeing evolution as 
a backward looking stand point, looking back at what evolution is trying to copy, 
between seeing design as a directed occurrence or as an accumulation of accidents 
                                                        
34
 This means that the evolutionary paradigm affects everything (Delio, 2003, p.xviii); 
it ‘determines’ the creation of the higher atoms, the formation of molecules and cells, 
to life and multi-cellular life. Whilst this chapter will mainly deal with the biological 
phenomenon of evolution as it was discovered and outlined by Darwin and his 
intellectual descendents, it must be borne in mind that what is concluded in this 
chapter applies just as well for both ‘chemical’ and ‘physical’ evolution, i.e. what is 
called genetic mutation in one discipline may be seen as comparable to elementary 
particle instability in another (cf. Delfgaauw, 1961, p.72; Delio, 2003, p.xviii; Corte, 
1960, p.60; Huxley, 1942, p.125ff.). Mivart thus writes that ‘“natural selection” seems 
capable of application…beyond the biological domain altogether, so as possibly to 
have relation to the stable equilibrium of the solar system itself, and even the whole 
sidereal universe’ (Mivart, 1871, p.22; cf. Jonas, 1996, pp.168-9; Rolston, 2006, 
p.93). 
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(much like a game of Chinese whispers). To put the point simply, evolution is never 
‘into’ something, it is always ‘from’ something; life never evolves into something 
else, it always evolves from something. This may seem like a subtle difference but it 
is immensely important as it shows one of the main problems regarding 
conceptualizing evolution. Genetic mutation and natural selection are not the whole 
story; it is essential to Darwinism that it is not teleological but teleonomic.  
 
The Development of Neo-Darwinism  
a. Charles Darwin and the Emphasis on Preservation 
 Darwin did not invent the notion of evolution. The concept that the world was 
mutable had been around since at least ancient Greece. The fact of evolution is not 
new. However, Charles Darwin presented a new mechanism that radically 
reinterpreted what this fact meant. An exhaustive presentation of Darwin’s most 
famous work On the Origin of Species would be impossible in such a short space; 
however, a few important elements will be expounded here. Often over looked, it will 
be shown that these elements form the basis of Darwin’s own contribution to what 
would become the neo-Darwinian synthesis. 
 What characterized Darwin’s presentation of evolution was that such change 
did not present progress but was neutral. ‘In fact’, writes Gould: 
 
evolution entered our language as the favoured word for what Darwin had called 
“descent with modification” because most Victorian thinkers equated such 
biological change with progress…Darwin initially resisted the word because his 
theory embodied no notion of general advance as a predictable consequence of 
any mechanism of change (Gould, 1997, p.137) 
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Not only does Darwin explicitly deny that there is any progress inherent in evolution, 
but he purposely avoids using the term so as not to confuse it with previous theories, 
such as Lamarck’s, that did. Thus Darwin: 
 
cautioned himself against writing “higher” and “lower” when discussing plants 
and animals. He always insisted that natural selection did not produce a perfect 
world, merely a world in which those organisms which survived were better 
adapted than those which had perished (Bynum, 2009, p.xlvi) 
 
Continuing this point, Darwin wrote: 
 
there has been much discussion whether recent forms are more highly 
developed than ancient…[yet] naturalists have not as yet defined to each other’s 
satisfaction what is meant by high and low forms (Darwin, 2009, p.297) 
 
No plant or animal, regardless of how many different variations and changes it has 
gone through, can be termed higher or lower. There is simply no inherent judgment 
value within the process of evolution (Delfgaau, 1969, p.113). It does not provide 
nature with a means to seek perfections, it does not describe the process by which the 
universe finds perfection,35 and it is merely a ‘process’ by which life continues to 
adapt to its environment. 
                                                        
35
 The presence of homologies – traits that are similar not because they perform a 
particular function, but because they have been copied – proves this (Dennett, 1995, 
p.136). Dennett uses the example of what may be called the ‘QWERTY 
phenomenon’, namely, that there are other, and ‘better’ ways of arranging the keys on 
a keyboard, yet the QWERTY pattern will, probably, almost never be changed due to 
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 In fact, even this is misleading; life does not actively adapt to its surroundings 
but is passively shaped by the fact that some individuals die and some survive thus 
giving the impression from hindsight of adaptation (Dawkins, 2006, p.183). Indeed, 
Darwin confesses, ‘I believe…in no law of necessary development’ (Darwin, 2009, 
p.310), everything, therefore, is completely accidental and arbitrary; ‘Darwinian 
evolution, at least, knows of no teleology’ (Deane-Drummond, 2009, p.229). This 
means that, although Teilhard criticizes neo-Darwinism for being the ‘mere spread’ of 
life without an ascent (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.109), this is exactly what neo- 
Darwinism contends. 
 Lacey can highlight such an idea by misunderstanding the role of natural 
selection in evolution, writing that ‘natural selection may eliminate unwanted 
variations, but what guarantees that the right variations arise?’ (Lacey, 1989, p.180). 
The point of Darwinism is that there is no such thing as either an ‘unwanted variation’ 
or a ‘right variation’. The correct variation is the one that survives; every variation is 
potentially a correct variation.36 
 
 Darwin also notes, something that becomes a significant theme in his work, 
that ‘natura non facit saltum’ (Darwin, 2009, pp.177-8), that nature makes no leaps. 
In other words evolution is a smooth process of accumulated small changes;37 small 
                                                                                                                                                              
historical accident. The inference being, that, like the human eye, there are ‘better’ 
ways of designing particular organs, yet these will not be ‘found’ because evolution is 
not concerned with perfection, but with preservation (Dennett, 1995, p.122). 
Evolution does not seek out perfect solutions or perfect forms, but simply and 
relentlessly copies and replicates. 
36
 Dawkins notes a certain tautology in that selection ensures that the correct 
variations survive but the correct variations are simply the ones that survive – what 
survives, survives because it survives (Dawkins, 1999, p.181). 
37
 It must be noted that ‘smooth’ is meant to refer to genotypes not phenotypes. For 
example, individuals born with an extra digit (i.e. polydactyly) may be seen as a 
phenotypic leap but not a genetic one; species may not gradually grow a full new digit 
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copying errors are themselves copied, and it is the accumulation of these small errors 
that account for evolutionary change (Darwin, 2009, p.157). The production of all of 
life on the planet is the result of these accumulative changes through natural selection, 
passed on from generation to generation, creating only ever small, infinitesimally 
small (Darwin, 2009, p.93), change – ‘natural selection is daily and hourly 
scrutinizing, throughout the world, every variation, even in the slightest’ (Darwin, 
2009, p.83). However, of course, it is only in reproduction that such ‘scrutiny’ is felt – 
such that all groups, all species, ‘all would blend together by steps as fine as those 
between the finest existing varieties’ (Darwin, 2009, p.378). Between any two 
individuals in existence there is a lineage of extremely small (so small to be almost 
undetectable) generational changes. 
 Darwin continues that: 
 
slow though the process of selection may be, if feeble man can do much by his 
powers of artificial selection, I can see no limit to the amount of change, to the 
beauty and infinite complexity of the co-adaptations between all organic beings, 
one with another and with their physical conditions of life, which may be 
effected in the long course of time by nature’s power of selection (Darwin, 
2009, p.104) 
 
If humanity is able to selectively breed plants and animals to conform to their 
whimsical fancies, then why cannot nature, blind as it is, also make such selections 
(albeit in a passive sense)? 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
from a small bump all the way up to full finger but a full extra finger may grow after 
just one small genetic mutation. 
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 Another problem with understanding Darwinian evolution can be illustrated 
by the argument of ‘form before function’. Smith writes that ‘what is still more 
damaging to the evolutionist, however, is that under Darwinist auspices…even in our 
age there should exist transitional forms, living species, therefore, which exhibit 
structures of a nascent kind’ (Smith, 1988, p.7). However, Smith fails to understand 
that Darwinian evolution is about passive accumulation of change, not active 
searching for solutions. Indeed, just as every variation is potentially a correct 
variation, so every single individual is a transitional form of some description. 
Organs, for example, arise from performing, or supporting, a different function to the 
one that they end up performing, slowly changing into something else and performing 
a different role. ‘There is a difference between the “origin or emergence of a thing 
and its ultimate usefulness”’ (Weinert, 2009, p.142), thus ‘the function is the effect, 
not the cause, of an organ. The organ and its structure develop before function’ 
(Weinert, 2009, p.162). Expecting to see animals that contain ‘half an organ’, or an 
organ in development, is completely to miss the whole point of Darwinian evolution. 
 Darwin himself offers an important example of this aspect of his theory. He 
writes that: 
 
the illustration of the swim bladder in the fishes is a good one, because it shows 
us clearly the highly important fact that an organ originally constructed for one 
purpose, namely flotation, may be converted into one for a wholly different 
purpose, namely respiration (Darwin, 2009, p.174) 
 
This has the effect of denying final causality, and thus teleology (i.e. it affirms that 
evolution is not into something but from something). Any one of the organs that an 
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individual possesses may become eventually useless or come to perform a completely 
different task. 
 
 This leads to another important element of Darwin’s theory, often overlooked, 
that ‘selection can only modify what it has been presented with’; in other words, 
natural selection cannot create, it can only preserve (Bynum, 2009, p.xxxviii), or, it 
cannot create, only eliminate (Crysdale & Ormerod, 2013, p.36). As Darwin writes, 
‘this principle of preservation, I have called, for the sake of brevity, natural selection’ 
(Darwin, 2009, p.121), thus ‘natural selection can act only by the preservation and 
accumulation of infinitesimally small inherited modifications’ (Darwin, 2009, p.93). 
In fact ‘Darwin sometimes thought that the expression “natural preservation” might 
be more suitable than “natural selection”’ (Haught, 2010, p.32). Simply put, natural 
selection is not a creative process but a modifying one; natural selection does not add, 
it only shapes. 
 Darwin presents a number of situations that evidence this suggestion, for 
example, the tumbler pigeon and the pointer dog (Darwin, 2009, p.195), claiming that 
man would never have thought to select those features if nature had not first presented 
them. This means that nature does not actively seek out solutions to problems. The 
phenotypic problems of survival and reproduction do not influence the genetic 
mutation that causes such solutions. Natural selection can only work with what it has 
been presented with, it can only modify, not create. Natural selection must wait until a 
mutation accidentally happens before it can ‘cultivate’ it and make any ‘progress’, 
and if that mutation never happens, then natural selection cannot influence its 
appearance. Simply put, evolution is not concerned with creation or change, but with 
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the slow, gradual, accumulative modification of existing individuals due to the 
introduction of variation through slight replication errors. 
 
 The important elements of Darwin’s presentation of evolution, therefore, are 
the absence of ‘correct variations’, the absence of ‘intermediate individuals’, and the 
‘un-creativeness’ of natural selection, all of which can be summed up in the idea that 
evolution is more concerned with the preservation of previous forms than with 
change, which is only an accidental occurrence. After all, the original title of 
Darwin’s On The Origin of Species has been shortened and originally included the 
phrase Or The Preservation of Favoured Species in the Struggle for Life (Haught, 
2010, p.2). 
 
 At the time that Darwin was introducing the world to his theory of evolution 
through natural selection, another biologist, the Augustinian monk Gregor Mendel, 
was conducting experiments that would provide an answer to the ‘whatever’ that was 
the cause ‘of each slight difference in the offspring from their parents’ (Darwin, 2009, 
p.157), namely, the gene and the modern scientific discipline of genetics. However, 
Darwin was unaware of this development and had no knowledge of Mendelian 
genetics (Weinert, 2009, p.113), and it was subsequently only in the twentieth century 
that genetics was rediscovered and incorporated into, and used as support for, 
Darwin’s theory. The combination of Mendelian genetics with Darwinian selection is 
termed the neo-Darwinian synthesis. 
 
b. Theodosius Dobzhansky: Experimental Evidence of Preservation 
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 Theodosius Dobzhansky, in his seminal Genetics and The Origin of Species, 
presents one of the first attempts at this neo-Darwinian synthesis, confirming, and 
finding support for, the Darwinian contention that evolution is due to blind selection 
of accidental genetic change, writing that ‘evolution is a process resulting in the 
development of dissimilarities between the ancestral and the descendent populations’ 
(Dobzhansky, 1982, p.9). 
 One of the most important contributions from Dobzhansky, however, is 
evidence for preservation and accidental mutation. He contends that: 
 
some critics have hastened to remark that since mutations and chromosomal 
changes can be induced by destructive an agent as x-rays, such changes bring 
about degeneration and not evolution. The logic of this criticism is certainly 
rather ludicrous…here, then, a beginning of a differentiation of species into 
geographical chromosomal races is witnessed (Dobzhansky, 1982, pp.82-3, 88; 
cf. pp.98, 118) 
 
 In other words, Dobzhansky criticizes the assertion that genetic mutation is a 
creative process of addition, and instead affirms that genetic mutation, the raw 
material of natural selection, is entirely due to deleterious occurrences in replication 
(Dobzhansky, 1982, p.83). What this means, therefore, is that there is direct evidence 
that evolution occurs when the genotype/karyotype fails to replicate properly; 
evolutionary change is the accidental occurrence in nature of deleterious effects in a 
laboratory. In other words, precisely the same kind of chromosomal and genetic 
changes that account for deletions in laboratory settings are precisely the same 
changes that are found in nature in terms of differentiation of individuals into species. 
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Precisely the same changes that cause performance inhibitions in genes are those that 
provide the ‘random changes’ (Dobzhansky, 1982, p.127) that are selected by blind 
natural selection, suggesting the conclusion that genetic mutation cannot account for 
‘objective’ progress. 
 Thus, Dobzhansky also affirms that, just because genetic mutation is a 
mistake, this does not make evolution a regression. Evolution is teleologically neutral; 
in the same way that evolution does not represent progress so it does not represent 
regress either. Thus, Dobzhansky affirms, the ‘classification of mutations into 
favourable and harmful ones is meaningless if the nature of the environment is not 
stated’ (Dobzhansky, 1982, p.23). Evolutionary change can never be judged 
objectively because the same mutation may prove to be both beneficial and harmful 
(cf. Delfgaau, 1969, p.113). The deleterious occurrences that account for variations 
might prove to be favourable; from a biological point of view the process of 
replication is deleterious, but from the subjective point of view such deletions may be 
favourable. 
 
 Dobzhansky also highlights the role that isolation plays in evolution, noting 
that ‘species formation without isolation is impossible’ (Dobzhansky, 1982, p.229). 
On a simple level, when individuals become isolated geographically their respective 
genes do not have a chance to ‘mix’ with each other and thus form non-reproductive, 
isolated species – in other words, individuals that are unable to produce offspring with 
each other. All this means for the purposes of this chapter is to provide further 
evidence that historical accident plays an important part in the largely arbitrary 
process of speciation. In other words, there is no direction to evolution; instead, the 
individuals alive today are the result of historical accident. 
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c. Julian Huxley: A Further Attempt at Neo-Darwinian Synthesis 
 Julian Huxley, grandson of ‘Darwin’s Bulldog’ Thomas Huxley, also 
attempted to defend the combination of Darwinian selection with Mendelian genetics, 
writing that: 
 
evolution consists in the accumulation and integration of very numerous and 
mostly small genetic changes…but a large fraction of it is in a sense an 
accident, a biological luxury (Huxley, 1942, p.371-89) 
 
Huxley continues that: 
 
the fact that the genes and their arrangement normally remain constant, until 
altered by some kind of mutation (after which they again remain constant in 
their new form until a further mutation supervenes), accounts for the 
resemblance between parents and offspring. The fact of Mendelian 
recombination, by which new combinations of old genes are produced 
according to Mendel’s second law (and to the rules of crossing-over), accounts 
for the great majority of differences between parents and offspring, and between 
members of a family or population (Huxley, 1942, p.51) 
 
This provides further evidence for the primacy of preservation in evolutionary theory 
(that genes and there arrangements remain constant until a mutation occurs), and that 
when a mutation does occur it is accidental, in no way determined or guided towards 
a particular end (even if that end is temporary). 
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 Thus Huxley defends the subjective nature of evolution. He writes that: 
 
it was one of the great merits of Darwin himself to show that the purposiveness 
of organic structure and function was apparent only. The teleology of adaptation 
is a pseudo-teleology, capable of being accounted for on good mechanistic 
principles without the intervention of purpose, conscious or subconscious, either 
on the part of the organism or any outside power…[and that] just as the 
apparent purpose of adaptation is only a pseudo-teleology, so its apparent inner 
direction is only a pseudo-orthogenesis (Huxley, 1942, p.412, pp.465-6) 
 
He continues that ‘in some cases mutations, which in what may be described as 
normal conditions are deleterious, may become advantageous in other conditions’ 
(Huxley, 1942, p.119). Likewise, ‘all that natural selection can ensure is survival, it 
does not ensure progress, or maximum advantage, or any other ideal state of affairs’ 
(Huxley, 1942, p.466), and all natural selection can work with is the genetic mutations 
and recombinations that are errors in copying (Huxley, 1942, p.54). 
 
d. Jacques Monod: The Primacy of Preservation 
 Jacques Monod, a French Nobel Prize winning biologist (and exception to the 
quotation above that French biologists were incapable of understanding Darwinism), 
also provides evidence supporting the interpretation outlined in this chapter, namely, 
that ‘invariance necessarily precedes teleonomy…teleonomy [is] a secondary 
property deriving from invariance – alone seen as primary’ (Monod, 1972, p.32-3). 
To put that into simpler terms, if genes cannot preserve themselves (invariance), then 
any change that does occur cannot be accumulated in order to produce complex life – 
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i.e. the primacy of preservation over change. If Darwin is correct that evolution is due 
to the accumulation of small variations, then these accumulations must be able to be 
preserved for any change to be detected in the first place. Invariance, therefore, for 
Monod, is the primary focus of the evolutionary ‘process’. He refers to 
 
random chance caught on the wing, preserved, reproduced by the machinery of 
invariance and thus converted into order, rule, and necessity. A totally blind 
process can by definition lead to anything; it can even lead to vision itself 
(Monod, 1972, p.96) 
 
Random, chance mutation causes blips in the ongoing and relentless copying, 
replicating, and preservation of genetic information, and this randomness is caught up 
and ‘accidentally’ preserved. Monod continues that 
 
the Darwinian idea that the initial appearance, evolution, and continuous 
refining of ever more intensely teleonomic structures are due to disturbances 
occurring in a structure which already possesses the property of invariance – 
and hence is capable of preserving the effects of chance and thereby submitting 
them to the play of natural selection (Monod, 1972, p.32) 
 
 Not only these explicit claims, but also the rhetoric used by Monod, contribute 
to this interpretation. Monod regularly refers to genetic mutations and changes as 
‘disturbances’ and ‘perturbations’, further evidencing Dobzhansky’s contribution that 
the changes that occur in nature, which represent the raw material of evolutionary 
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change, are failures in replication, the same failures that can be reproduced in the 
laboratory using ‘destructive’ or ‘deleterious’ x-rays. Monod further continues that: 
 
we say that these events are accidental, due to chance. And since they constitute 
the only possible source of modifications in the genetic text, itself the sole 
repository of the organism’s hereditary structures, it necessarily follows that 
chance alone is at the source of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere 
(Monod, 1972, p.110). 
 
 However, more important than any of these confirmations is his affirmation 
that: 
 
it might seem then that by virtue of its very structure this system [of replication 
through DNA] ought to resist change, all evolution. This it certainly 
does…[however] living beings, despite the perfection of the machinery that 
guarantees the faithfulness of translation, are not exempt from this law [of 
physics that no microscopic entity can fail to undergo quantum perturbations 
(Monod, 1972, p.112)]…[the] mechanism of replication [cannot be] completely 
immune to disturbances, or accidents (Monod, 1972, pp.108-9) 
 
This suggests that evolution cannot possibly be guided or set-up because not only is 
such mutation an accidental error, but the process of DNA preservation actively 
resists this accidental error (cf. Guttman, Griffiths, Suzuki, and Cullis, 2002, p.238); 
not only is the raw material of selection and evolutionary change an accident but it is 
actively resisted, thus supporting the contention that evolution is a backwards looking 
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phenomenon bent on preservation, rather than a forward looking one seeking change. 
Yes, that change sometimes brings about an advantage in survival, an increased 
‘success’ (‘success’ is a tautologically subjective term itself (cf. Dawkins, 1999, 
p.181)), but the point is that such a change, and the ‘happening to bring about an 
advantage’, is entirely accidental. It is not what genes ‘want’ to do, and, further, such 
an advantage is only judged subjectively. 
 
e. Richard Dawkins: Further Evidence for the Centrality of Preservation 
 In the late twentieth century, perhaps no biologist is more important, nor more 
famous, than Richard Dawkins, and he clearly supports the interpretation offered 
here. He writes 
 
natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process which Darwin 
discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and 
apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no mind 
and no mind's eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, 
no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the 
blind watchmaker (Dawkins, 1986, p.5) 
 
Dawkins continues: 
 
it is only when we look, with hindsight, at the large macromigrational pattern, 
that we can see a trend in the direction of the promised land (Dawkins, 1986, 
p.224) 
 
 203 
Design is retrospectively attested, it is not inherent in the process itself, and as such 
can only be subjective. 
 Likewise, he also supports the slow, smooth nature of Darwinian evolution, 
writing: 
 
we shall explain [complexity] coming into existence as a consequence of 
gradual cumulative, step-by-step transformations from simpler things, from 
primordial objects sufficiently simple to have come into being by chance 
(Dawkins, 1986, p.14) 
 
Change is so small that it is only over vast periods of time that any change can be 
detected at all. It is precisely because of this vast timescale that Dawkins can write 
that ‘a species never has a clearly defined beginning, and it only sometimes has a 
clearly defined end (extinction); often a species does not end decisively but turns 
gradually into a new species’ (Dawkins, 1986, p.264). 
 
 However, most importantly, on the subject of the preserving nature of 
evolution, Dawkins writes that ‘most of natural selection is concerned with preventing 
evolutionary change rather than with driving it’ (Dawkins, 1986, p.125). Natural 
selection is not concerned with the creation of new species but with the survival of the 
genetic make-up. Thus, Dawkins writes: 
 
living organisms exist for the benefit of DNA rather than the other way 
around…each individual organism should be seen as a temporary vehicle, in 
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which DNA messages spend a tiny fraction of their geological lifetimes 
(Dawkins, 1986, pp.126-7). 
 
Change is only an accidental occurrence that happens when the genetic code attempts 
to preserve itself, moving to ‘another vehicle’; evolution is not a ‘thing’ that nature 
does, it is the observation of a passive change wrought on it through mistake. But 
genes do not ‘want’ this to happen. The most successful genes, therefore, are the ones 
that have been around for a long time, i.e. that have managed not to succumb to 
accident, as Dawkins writes ‘a successful unit of natural selection…[must have] 
longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity’, in other words, long-living, reproductive 
tenacity, and freedom from mutation (cf. Gould, 1997, p.176ff).  
 ‘“Good” genes, Dawkins continues 
 
are blindly selected as those that survive in the gene pool…the gene pool will 
become an evolutionary stable set of genes defined as a gene pool that cannot be 
invaded by any new gene. Most new genes that arise, either by mutation or 
reassortment or immigration, are quickly penalized by natural selection: the 
evolutionary stable set is restored’ (Dawkins, 2006, p.86) 
 
This further supports Monod’s claim that evolutionary change is actively resisted. 
Dawkins states that 
 
occasionally, a new gene does succeed in invading the set: it succeeds in 
spreading through the gene pool. There is a transitional period of instability, 
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terminating in a new evolutionary stable set – a little bit of evolution has 
occurred (Dawkins, 2006, p.86) 
 
 However, regardless of how much natural selection ensures that the ‘best’ 
variations are preserved, there must be variation to begin with. Dawkins confirms that 
‘no matter how strong a potential pressure [i.e. environmental conditions] may be, no 
evolution will result unless there is genetic variation for it to work on’ (Dawkins, 
1999, p.42). This variation, as has been claimed already, is due to the fact that the 
process of replication is mutable. Dawkins agrees that ‘no copying process is 
infallible…the mutation brings into existence a new kind of replicator which “breeds 
true” until there is a further mutation’ (Dawkins, 1999, p.85). Again, the only source 
of variety and material for natural selection is the relative efficiency of replication. 
 
Contemporary Criticisms of Neo-Darwinism 
 Neo-Darwinism is not without its critics, even when it seems that there is so 
much experimental evidence in favour of it. However, these criticisms can help to 
further elucidate the neo-Darwinian synthesis and cement it as the dominant theory of 
evolution. 
 
a. Stephen Jay Gould and Simon Conway Morris: Re-interpretations of The Neo-
Darwinian Synthesis 
 Stephen Jay Gould and Simon Conway Morris are also important scientists to 
consider in a discussion of the development of evolutionary theory. However, neither 
are explicitly strictly neo-Darwinian. Whilst they both agree that Darwin is essentially 
correct they argue, respectively, that, on the one hand, the ‘Darwinian unit’ is not the 
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individual but the species (Gould, 2002, p.781, p.1004) – thus denying accumulative 
change, and therefore the primacy of preservation – and, on the other, that convergent 
evolution evidences the presence of certain values and directions that are inherently 
fruitful (Morris, 2003, p.297, p.309) – and thus present a certain direction to 
evolution. Although the general neo-Darwinian mechanism of blind natural selection 
of accidental genetic mutation can adequately account for all the variety, diversity, 
and appearance of design in the world, the rate at which change occurs, and the 
degree of difference possible, have been the subject of discussion. 
 Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium argues that sparse fossil record 
evidences that the vast majority of evolutionary history is typified by stability, which 
is subsequently punctuated by ‘moments’ of rapid change (Gould, 2002, p.758). 
Whilst the relative sparcity of the fossil record may very well be explained by other 
factors, it is not unreasonable to suggest that, at least partly, this is due to an actual 
absence of change. However, this does not mean that speciation is actually rapid, as 
Gould claims, although it may certainly be relatively rapid compared to the periods of 
stasis.  
 Morris, on the other hand, argues that the phenomenon of convergent 
evolution, the discovery of the same solution to ‘evolutionary problems’ numerous 
times independently by different species argues that the number of possible changes 
are not as numerous as might have been assumed (Morris, 2003, p.12). It may be 
more accurate to say Morris claimed it is not that certain mutations are impossible but 
that the survival of certain mutations is impossible, which, if he meant that historical 
accident forever cuts off certain evolutionary paths (as does Dawkins (1999, 
pp.30ff)), may very well be the case. However, the fact that he argued, against Gould, 
that the replaying of the evolutionary tape would always yield intelligent life meant 
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that he claimed the survivability of certain mutations is objectively impossible, rather 
than subjectively impossible, which this chapter has argued cannot be the case. 
 Certainly the time and ‘selection’ of a particular mutation is entirely random 
and entirely dependent on historical accident, but this does not mean that a particular 
gene can mutate in an infinite number of ways. Morris, therefore, may ultimately 
require criticism, but it is certainly helpful to point out that there is a difference 
between random and infinite, and just because mutations are random does not imply 
that an infinite number of mutations are possible. 
 
 Both theories are not without problems, not least since they both take issue 
with a strict neo-Darwinian position (which this thesis takes as axiomatically correct), 
yet, assuming that a strict neo-Darwinian theory is kept, they may still make useful 
contributions to the neo-Darwinian synthesis. In other words, it may be that change 
does not occur as frequently as first thought, and when it does happen, the number of 
possible changes are likewise not as numerous. 
 
b. Epigenetics: A Retrieval of Lamarckian Values 
 The relatively recent field of epigenetics has led a number of biologists to 
claim that Lamarckism has been unduly rejected. The reason for such a claim is that it 
has recently been discovered that there are chemical and hormonal effects on genetic 
expression. This means that evolution is not just as simple as DNA replication, it is 
also dependent on the chemical and hormonal environment in which that DNA is 
copied. Epigenetics is concerned with the transmission of acquired characteristics due 
to a consistent chemical environment. 
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 However, significantly, this epigenetic environment is usually reset during 
genetic replication. Carey writes that: 
 
wherever possible, a cell’s default setting is to maintain the genome in its 
original state, as much as it can…the epigenome is usually reset in sexual 
reproduction, but…this process is occasionally subverted to allow the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics (Carey, 2012, pp.264-307). 
 
Gorelick & Heng confirm that: 
 
epigenetic reset reduces variation. Epimutations accumulate over the course of 
diploid and haploid38 development, while epigenetic reset removes much of this 
epigenetic variation by restoring epigenetic signatures to levels that worked in 
the previous generations (Gorelick & Heng, 2010, p.1094). 
 
This means that the failure of the epigenetic environment to reset to the default state 
of the genome becomes itself a ‘Darwinian mistake’. The acquisition of characters 
due to epigenetics is itself due to an accidental occurrence. 
 Burggren also points to the Darwinian interpretation of epigenetics when he 
writes that: 
 
epigenetic phenomena result from epigenetic mechanisms that are themselves 
heritable, selected for and part of speciation and evolution. For example, the 
ability of the DNA alpha helix to be modified by methylation is, in itself, a 
                                                        
38
 Haploid is when a cell has half the usual chromosomes and Diploid when a cell has 
paired chromosomes. 
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structural trait of the helix that is genetically copied for (Burggren, 2014, 
p.685). 
 
Not only this, but he continues that ‘epigenetics is not independent of evolution’ 
(Burggren, 2014, p.685). Having already noted Lamarckism and Darwinism as 
distinct theories, at this point it is clear that Burggren is assuming that ‘evolution’ is 
itself synonymous with ‘Darwinism’. This provokes the inference that he does not 
consider ‘Lamarckism’ as contributing to the theory of evolution but only describing 
a separate phenomenon. ‘Epigenetics’ may be Lamarckian, but this is distinct from 
(but not independent of) ‘evolution’, which is Darwinian. 
 Whilst this is an important element of evolutionary biology, and it must be 
accepted that improvements in the understanding of this field may very well lead to 
radical reformulations of the neo-Darwinian synthesis, it must also be recognized that 
this chemical, physiological, and hormonal environments are, essentially, still random 
and accidental and therefore do not significantly alter the conclusion given here that 
evolutionary change is due to the deleterious effects of imperfect replication 
processes. 
 
The Neo-Darwinian Synthesis 
 Essentially, therefore, there are two elements to the neo-Darwinian synthesis, 
namely, genetic variation and natural selection, each concerned, respectively, with the 
genotype and the phenotype. Mutation affects the genotype (and also the karyotype, 
i.e. the chromosome), which then has certain phenotypic expressions (Dawkins, 1999, 
p.83). Selection then affects the phenotype, such that ‘the greater the phenotypical 
change the easier the detection of a mutation’ (Dobzhansky, 1982, p.24) – natural 
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selection does not select genetic mutations, it selects the phenotypic expressions of 
those genetic mutations (Dawkins, 1999, p.83). Yet selection of phenotypes does not 
cause genetic mutation (cf. Dobzhansky, 1982, p.120; Huxley, 1942, pp.473-4; 
Monod, 1972, p.107; van Inwagen, 2009, p.110; Dawkins, 1986, p.312; Weinert, 
2009, p.96.). Simply because more individuals are produced than can survive, any 
survival advantage is going to be passed on (because those that survive will have a 
greater opportunity to reproduce, and for their progeny to subsequently survive), 
hence Darwin claims that ‘natural selection follows from the struggle for existence’ 
(Darwin, 2004, p.168) – an idea that Darwin discovered from Thomas Malthus’ An 
Essay on the Principles of Population (Crysdale & Ormerod, 2013, p.61). This gives 
the ‘appearance’39 of adaptation to surroundings or directed change. Genes are 
selected by their phenotypic expressions, but those expressions (and their subsequent 
selection) cannot influence mutation. ‘If Darwinism is about copying the instructions 
(genotype), Lamarckism is about copying the product (phenotype)’ (McGrath, 2005, 
p.127); it is only the genotype that is copied, but it is the phenotype that is ‘selected 
for copying’. 
 Environmental changes might cause selection to be ‘more selective’ (cf. 
Dodson, 1984, p.83) but selection cannot cause those mutations, it must wait for 
them. Change may be inevitable (cf. Morris) but it does not make it certain, and it 
especially does not make a particular change certain either.40 In other words the onset 
of a new ice age may cause rapid evolution of thicker fur due to harsher selection 
                                                        
39
 Adaptation is only an appearance because the species or individual does not 
actively attempt to adapt, it only appears to adapt because everything else dies out, i.e. 
teleonomy. Species do not adapt to their surroundings, they are lucky (through 
historical accident) to fit into their surroundings, and only those who survive do. 
Adaptation is only due to teleonomic hindsight. 
40
 It is inevitable that given enough rolls of the dice a six will occur, but this is not to 
say it is certain. See Gould’s idea of the ‘drunkard’s walk’ (Gould, 1997, p.149), and 
‘left wall’ and ‘right skewered’ ideas of averages (Gould, 1997, p.169). 
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parameters (i.e. only those who have significantly thick fur will survive and thus can 
be said to be selected), but the individuals must ‘wait’ for those mutations to happen. 
If they don’t, they will become extinct. Evolution (or more accurately natural 
selection) can only work with what it is given, it cannot create anything itself. That 
‘creation’, that ‘what it is given’, is the subject matter of genetic mutation. 
 It thus needs to be maintained that, whilst genetic mutation is entirely random 
and accidental, natural selection isn’t; ‘selection is always relative to the 
environment’ (Huxley, 1942, p.523). This doesn’t mean that natural selection is 
guided or directed, it just means that, for example, a thick fur coat is not going to 
evolve in a desert environment – the random genetic mutations that allow for thick fur 
may well occur, but they will probably not survive, thus nature is not going to blindly 
preferentially ‘select’ them (cf. Guttman, Griffiths, Suzuki, and Cullis, 2002, p.258). 
Natural selection is not a real, actual selection process but only the ‘differential 
survival of genes’ (Dawkins, 1999, p.18), i.e. those that have a higher rate of survival 
can be said to be selected by nature. Thus, it is only a passive survival, not an active 
choice. This means, therefore, that natural selection only works in a population that 
contains difference (cf. Dobzhansky, 1982, p.150), but that difference only occurs due 
to random and accidental mutation (cf. Dawkins, 1999, p.21-3, p.195). Likewise, 
natural selection can only work if there is variance, but it can only have an effect if 
there is invariance – if genes don’t attempt to preserve themselves then the results of 
natural selection won’t have an enduring effect – the efficiency and fidelity of 
reproduction actually explains the diversity. 
 Evolution happens as a result of the interaction between these two principles. 
Without natural selection, ‘intermediary species’ will not become extinct (thus 
difference would be less perceptible), and without genetic mutation variation would 
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not occur (thus there would be nothing to select); both are needed to give the 
appearance of direction and adaptation. 
 
Criticism of Teilhard 
 It should be clear that this interpretation of evolution is markedly different to 
Teilhard’s in a number of ways, namely, the accidental nature of change, the lack of 
direction of such changes, and the rejection of the ontological emergence that happens 
as a result. If neo-Darwinism is correct, as Dobzhansky’s evidence seems to strongly 
suggest, and that evolution is not only more concerned with preservation but actually 
resists change, then, quite simply, the process of evolution cannot be one used by God 
to create. Evolution is completely accidental, the result of differential survival of 
errors in preservation. 
 Further to this, there is no evidence that evolution always moves towards 
complexity. Smith writes that ‘thus, tricked (as it would seem) by his famous law, 
Teilhard fails to recognize the obvious: that there are, namely, many kinds of 
complexity and many different modes of consciousness, and that not everything can 
be neatly parceled out on a numerical scale’ (Smith, 1988, p.168). Gould also notes 
that ‘no feature of such local adaptation [i.e. natural selection] should yield any 
expectation of general progress (however such a vague term be defined). Local 
adaptation may as well lead to anatomical simplification as to greater complexity’ 
(Gould, 1997, p.139 (cf. Dodson, 1984, pp.146-8; Rolston, 2006, p.117; Weinert, 
2009, p.116)). 
 This means that Teilhard’s contention that evolution is a synthesis between 
Lamarckism and Darwinism must be incorrect. The fact that Teilhard argues for 
panpsychism, such that ‘there is something corresponding to consciousness even 
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among the atoms’ (Hanson, 1970, p.170) means that ultimately Teilhard always 
ascribes a direction, even at the very simple (or ‘fragmented’) level, as where there is 
consciousness there is a control of evolutionary direction. Therefore, Teilhard saw 
Darwinian ‘chance’ as being ‘directed chance’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.110), or 
‘strokes of chance that are recognized and grasped – that is to say, psychically 
selected’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.149n.1). Teilhard saw Darwinism as a ‘blind 
fantasy of large numbers with the precise orientation of a specific target’ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1959, p.110), which neo-Darwinism explicitly denies; indeed, Teilhard’s 
understanding of Darwinism can be seen as a Lamarckian appropriation of a 
Darwinian principle (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965a, p.140). 
 In short, this is not Darwinism. This means that Teilhard’s theory can 
adequately be described, not as a synthesis of Darwinism and Lamarckism, but as 
solely Lamarckian, and thus at odds with the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Any appeal to 
direction, even a weak one, is against neo-Darwinism. In the last analysis, no 
synthesis is possible between Darwinism and Lamarckism, and whilst Teilhard’s 
original attempt is intriguing it ultimately fails. Indeed, Huxley (1942, p.123) 
explicitly argues that orthogenesis and natural selection are two opposing mechanisms 
that cannot both be correct. If natural selection (i.e. Darwinism) is correct then 
orthogenesis (i.e. Lamarckism), by definition, is incorrect. 
 
 Not only does Teilhard postulate consciousness universally, thus never fully 
embracing the neo-Darwinian paradigm of random, accidental chance, but the fact 
that he argues for ontological leaps (which he calls critical thresholds), which serve to 
separate humanity from the rest of creation, means that he likewise fails to take 
seriously the small accumulative change of Darwinian theory. Darwinian evolution is 
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about accumulation of mistakes and, whilst new manifestations of life do come into 
being, these do not represent completely new, emergent properties – evolution is 
simply the spread of life, it is not an ascent. Whatever is new in evolution is not real 
‘novelty’, as both Bergson and Teilhard would claim. It is not new in kind but in 
degree, and thus nothing really new ever happens in evolution but only new 
aggregations of existing genetic material – natural selection can only work with what 
it is given, and that is only ever-slight variation. 
 
 In short, no matter how much Teilhard, or anybody else for that matter, points 
to genetic mutation (even at the lower levels of evolution), the fact that he points to 
directionality – even if very vague – and ontological leaps, means that he is 
fundamentally opposed to the Darwinian synthesis. Quite simply, there can’t be a 
synthesis between the two theories, they are mutually exclusive, and by appealing to 
directionality, Teilhard must be labelled a Lamarckian – or more specifically a 
Bergsonian – and criticised as such. 
 
Philosophical and Metaphysical Considerations 
 With the neo-Darwinian synthesis, and criticism of Teilhard de Chardin, new 
philosophical considerations need to be considered, around which a new Christology 
will be constructed. These philosophical considerations will be limited to what 
happens to understandings of humanity and what happens to understandings of God in 
the light of neo-Darwinism. It is obvious that the neo-Darwinian synthesis has 
important implications for humanity, but claiming that the ‘process’ of evolution has 
no goal and no director, it has important implications for doctrines of God. These new 
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considerations of humanity and God will therefore necessitate a new consideration of 
Christ, who was both truly man and truly God. 
 
Doctrine of Humanity (creatures) 
a. The Non-Uniqueness of Humanity 
 Neo-Darwinism, in rejecting teleology, also rejects the concept of a hierarchy 
of being. There is no such thing, objectively, as higher and lower; ‘the “tree” of life, 
then, is a shrub’ (Dodson, 1984, p.137). Moreover, the distinction between species is 
only a luxury from hindsight due to the fact that ‘intermediary species’ have died out; 
‘there are no ontological separations in the evolutionary process, merely distinctions 
due to natural differences’ (Birx, 1972, p.75 (cf. Delio, 2013, p.52; Delfgaauw, 1969, 
p.26, p.111)). Darwin is emphatic that, were a perfect fossil record available, all 
individuals would blend together and the only possible way to separate individuals 
would be genealogically (cf. example of ‘herring gull/lesser black-backed gull ring’ 
(Dawkins, 2003, p.25)). He writes that ‘now all these modified descendents form a 
single species, [and] are represented as related in blood or descent to the same degree’ 
(Darwin, 2009, p.369 (cf. Darwin, 2009, p.165, p.378, p.392)). Dawkins, similarly, 
writes that: 
 
to a non-punctuationist, “the species” is definable only because the awkward 
intermediates are dead. An extreme anti-punctuationist, taking a long view of 
the entity of evolutionary history, cannot see “the species” as a discrete entity at 
all. He can see only a smeary continuum…the extreme anti-punctuationist sees 
“the species” as an arbitrary stretch of a continuous flowing river, with no 
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particular reason to draw lines delimiting its beginning and end (Dawkins, 1986, 
p.264). 
 
This is clearly a criticism of Gould, and affirms that, as Darwin himself wrote, the 
species, far from being a unit of selection, is in fact completely arbitrary. 
 What this means therefore is that humanity no longer occupies a unique, 
theologically superior position in creation. Humanity is no longer on an exodus from 
heaven, but truly of the Earth (cf. King, 1997, p.4). Kenney ‘vehemently affirm[s] that 
the question [of humanity’s superiority] was unanswerable; all the varied living 
species equally solve life’s problem, so “who is to say that one form of life is superior 
to another”?’ (Kenney, 1970, p.65), as does Ayala, who is quoted as claiming that 
‘maybe all complex forms of life will go extinct and only the microbial prokaryotic 
cells will survive. Nothing in evolutionary theory would prohibit such an outcome’ 
(Peters & Hewlett, 2003, p.119). 
 Strictly speaking, there is nothing, truly, that can be called ‘humanity’ any 
longer since the distinction of humanity from other life forms is only apparent. In any 
case, many see in Darwinism a relegation of human worth, that humanity have been 
removed from their vaulted pedestal in the universe (cf. Rolston, 2006, p.159), yet 
this negative outlook has a positive corollary: it is not humanity who have been 
removed from their pedestal, but the rest of creation that has been brought up to it. 
 
 Thus, God’s treatment of the rest of creation must now be equal – humanity is 
no longer uniquely in need of God’s grace nor uniquely favoured by him – as there is 
nothing that can distinguish humanity from the rest of creation. What God does for 
humanity, neo-Darwinism suggests, he does for all creation. The traditional 
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anthropological doctrine that humanity was made in the image of God must now be 
expanded to include all of creation; ‘[Christ] is the Logos, the image according to 
which not only man but all creation is fashioned’ (Maloney, 1968, p.7). 
 The biological unity of creation is mirrored in the ontological unity in Christ, 
as de Lubac confirms: ‘the unity of the mystical body of Christ, a supernatural unity, 
supposes a previous natural unity, the unity of the human race [or, now, creation]’ (de 
Lubac, 1947, p.25). If humanity are brothers and sisters in Christ because of a unity 
that they find in Christ, a familial and genealogical unity, then the rest of creation, the 
whole of the universe are brothers and sisters in Christ as well (cf. Boff, 1997, p.211; 
Coulson, 1958, p.125; NRSV, 1995, Mk. 3.35), and thus what God does is equally 
relevant for all creation. 
 
b. A New, Neo-Darwinian Ontology 
 The rejection of teleology from evolution also necessitates that a new ontology 
is posited. One of the common philosophical moves in the light of evolution is to 
disregard the category of ‘being’ in favour of one of ‘becoming’, as did Bergson. 
Haught confirms that ‘a metaphysics of esse (or “being”) [has] obscured the obvious 
fact of nature’s constant “becoming” and its perpetual movement toward the future’ 
(Haught, 2000, p.84). Neo-Darwinism, as expounded here, however, disagrees that 
‘perpetual movement towards the future’ is not only not obvious but also incorrect! 
 A neo-Darwinian interpretation of theology completely removes direction and 
teleology from creation such that there cannot be an end, a finish, towards which 
creation is headed. Evolution becomes merely the observation of change, it becomes 
the principle of mutability in creation, as such it does not postulate something to 
which creation is changing into, in fact quite the opposite: ‘becoming’ is forward 
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looking, concerned with what evolution becomes, rather than concerned with 
preservation, and more concerned with what evolution has come from. As such, 
Darwinism strongly suggests that ‘becoming’ cannot be an adequate ontological 
category. 
 This ontology of becoming sets up an unhelpful distinction between finished 
and unfinished. Neo-Darwinians disagree with this distinction. If there is no point at 
which creation will be finished, no future fulfillment of creation towards which the 
universe is being created, then it cannot be claimed that creation is now unfinished 
(De Lubac, 1956, pp.150-1). However, neither does neo-Darwinism imply that 
creation is brought into being already finished, as it is still clearly changing (even if 
that change has no ontological value). Instead, neo-Darwinism argues that the whole 
dichotomy of finished/unfinished is completely inappropriate. Creation, as an action, 
is neither efficient causality nor final causality. God is unconcerned with ‘building the 
earth’ (as he was for Teilhard (King, 2006, p.87)), with the ‘stuff’ of creation.  
 Creation is not a process that will finish because evolution is not a process at 
all; the categories of creation and deification are thus to be dropped in favour of one 
of conservation – there can be no point at which nature is without a ‘supernatural 
finality’ (Rahner, 1966, p.217), nature is at every moment grounded in the 
supernatural. A new ontology must be posed that deals with this tension. 
 
 The modern (and Teilhardian) metaphysic of ‘becoming’ as an ontological 
position, then, is completely false. To change, yes, to be mutable, yes, but to become, 
no, precisely because to become has overtones of finality, or telos, that are completely 
rejected by the Darwinian position. Evolution is not a dynamic doctrine it is a mutable 
one. In this way, neo-Darwinism represents a sort of ‘half-fixity’ (cf. McCarty, 1976, 
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pp.65-6, p.121). Darwinism denies that there is no change at all, such that a static 
universe, the static universe of Aristotle and the Scholastics or the creationists, is 
denied, however, quite importantly, it also denies that the dynamic universe of 
Bergson and Teilhard as being equally false (cf. Monod, 1972, p.98). 
 When Teilhard writes that ‘without orthogenesis life would only have spread; 
with it there is an ascent of life that is invincible’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p.109), 
this is exactly what evolution does proclaim, that life does ‘just’ spread, and that there 
is no ascent. Darwinism is completely neutral, in the same way that Darwinism allows 
for no progress so it allows for no regress either. Evolution is just a spread of life, 
with change not being promoted but the opposite; change is actively resisted. 
Ontology, therefore, is one of ‘being’ not ‘becoming’ (or indeed ‘union’ as Teilhard 
would claim), but it is not a static ‘being’, it is a mutable one. This means that the 
whole universe shares an ontology – ontological equality – and that ontology is one of 
a spread of life with mistakes in such a spread providing different manifestations of 
this ontology. 
 Ontology is neither one of immutable being, nor one of dynamic becoming, 
but mutable ‘half-fixity’, the constant attempt to remain immutable and the 
ontological inability to do so. 
 
Doctrine of God 
 It is obvious that neo-Darwinism has a big influence on the doctrine of man, or 
the doctrine of creatures as it should now be referred, but it also has important 
implications for the doctrine of God. In the introduction, it was affirmed that the 
languages of science and religion are not mutually exclusive and enjoy a certain 
commonality, thus neo-Darwinism can claim something about God, or better, it can 
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suggest ways in which discourse about God can be fruitful – ‘Scientific method will 
demonstrate that certain theological opinions are false’ (Grumett, 2005, p.234 (cf. 
Vogel, 1996, p.3, 25; Rolston, 2006, p.26; Mahoney, 2011, p.144; O’Leary, 2007, 
p.195; Cuénot, 1967, p.63; Delio, 2013, p.xxvi)). 
 
a. Materialism 
 By acknowledging that blind natural selection of accidental genetic mutation 
is alone sufficient, evolution has strong tendencies towards materialism; nothing else 
needs to be appealed to. This means that categories such as spirit and soul have no 
place in a theological interpretation of evolution; there is no ‘soul’ that separates or 
distinguishes humanity from the rest of creation (cf. Humani Generis), and there is no 
‘spirit’ that either guides or provides the telos for evolution. This means, quite 
importantly, that the vitalism that was so important to the understanding of Teilhard’s 
theology (and indeed any theologian who sees God as guiding evolution) must be 
completely rejected. There simply is no evidence that evolution works in this way. If 
anything, so this chapter has argued, the suggestion is that there is something that is 
preventing evolution from happening, but even this postulation of  ‘something’ else 
preventing evolution is not supported by the evidence. There is nothing further to the 
blind selection of accidental mutations that can be appealed to in order to explain 
evolution. 
 However, this rejection of the Teilhardian role of spirit does not mean that the 
general framework of his theology is incorrect. In fact, the rejection of spirit means 
that Teilhard’s theory that heaven is attained through the Earth is even more 
applicable. The material is all there is; therefore, ascent to God must be through the 
Earth. This also means, therefore, that Teilhard’s relationship between nature and the 
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supernatural is also affirmed. Of course, as noted above, teleology is removed from 
the whole framework, however the same basic structure is the same. 
 
b. ‘Psychological’ Materialism 
 This also means, perhaps more importantly, that a psychological materialism 
is also entailed. There is nothing called ‘mind’ that is separate from or transcends the 
brain (cf. Cooper, 1989, p.205ff). The history of modern psychology and neuro-
biology has served to relegate the importance of consciousness, which is now nothing 
but one possible ‘solution to the problem of survival’. There is nothing inherently 
valuable, nor ontologically distinct about consciousness – ‘Copernicus stuck a 
cosmological blow…Darwin struck a biological blow…and now, in Freud, we suffer 
a psychological blow’ (Rolston, 2006, p.159 (cf. Jaki, 2005, p.220; Davies, 1993, 
pp.158-9; Wildiers, 1973, p.78, p.239; Pope, 2009, p.194; Dennett, 1995, p.374; 
Jonas, 1996, p.92; Gould, 1997, p.15)). The fact that humanity possess consciousness 
does not make them higher or better than any other life it just means that this is the 
path that its genes have been ‘chosen’ (passively) as a way of seeking to replicate 
themselves, nothing more (cf. Pannenburg, 1985, p.29). Jonas agrees: 
 
the continuity of descent linking man with the animal world made it henceforth 
impossible to regard his mind, and mental phenomena in general, as the abrupt 
intrusion of an ontologically alien principle in the total stream of life (Jonas, 
1996, p.63) 
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Neurons and neuro-tissue came into being by accident, as the result of selection 
pressure for other things (i.e. form before function), and then accidentally provided 
life, and eventually hominids, with high intelligence. 
 Consciousness, therefore, is not the central property that Teilhard claimed it to 
be. There is no support for panpsychism. This means that the noosphere, or at the very 
least, the noosphere as improvement upon the biosphere, must be rejected. The 
argument that consciousness adds anything to the universe – objectively or 
ontologically – is a fallacy that is not supported by neo-Darwinism. This means that, 
not only is it incorrect to argue that consciousness directs evolution (so there is a 
correlation between the degree of consciousness and the directness of evolution), but 
it is likewise incorrect to attribute consciousness, however fragmented, to all matter; 
orthogenesis and ‘groping’ have no support in science. 
 
 Many theologians, for example Haught (2000, pp.25-6), are unhappy about the 
assumption that neo-Darwinism leads to materialism, and claim that this is an a priori 
position, rather than a true conclusion. However, the point here is that, if evolution is 
about preservation, then any ‘spiritual’ dimension, any argument that God is 
controlling evolution ‘on another level’, would have to accept that such a spiritual 
dimension would be attempting to continue the preservation of the world – a task that 
it fails in because change happens. If consciousness is a result of this failure to 
preserve then it certainly cannot occupy the privileged position they ascribe to it. As it 
has already been claimed, even if it is affirmed that religion and science deal with 
different areas of knowledge, claiming that evolution is directed, on any level, 
undermines the conclusions of science and biology. 
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 In the final analysis, therefore, the appeal to materialism is the affirmation that 
blind natural selection of accidental genetic mutations is alone sufficient. Materialism 
means that nothing else needs to be appealed to in order to account for anything in 
existence. Materialism, therefore, is simply a reaction against vitalism, intelligent 
design, theistic evolution, or evolutionary creationism and not (at least not wholly) an 
affirmation of reductionism. 
 
c. The Non-Influencibility of God 
 This appeal to materialism ultimately means, therefore, that God has no 
influence on the world. God is ‘functionally redundant’ or has no ‘utility function’ 
(McGrath, 2005, p.57). God cannot have a causal relationship with the rest of the 
world41 because God is not a thing like other things (however, ‘even if the existence 
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 Interestingly, this must include the tremendously improbable parameters that 
govern the conditions that make life possible in the universe; such conditions, which 
produce the so-called ‘Goldilocks region’, are likewise random accidental occasions. 
As Collins notes in his book The Language of God ‘the chance that all of these 
constants [i.e. speed of light, electromagnetism, gravity] would take on the values 
necessary to result in a stable universe capable of sustaining complex life forms is 
almost infinitesimal’ (Collins, 2007, p.74). Collins, however, as does Boff, argues that 
‘only an organizing intelligence would be able to calibrate all these factors’ (Boff, 
1997, p.18), and thus sees the infinitesimal chance of these conditions as proof as the 
existence of God, that God set up the universe to create for him. 
 However, the conclusions of Darwinism apply just as much to the Big Bang 
and the initial moment of the universe as they do to biological life. Jonas notes that 
‘we have at first, therefore, an aimless disorder in the emergence of natural order. The 
foundation of all order in nature, of any nature at all, lies in the laws of conservation. 
But these have come to govern because it is only self-conserving reality that 
conserves itself. This tautology explains the lawfulness of nature as it is given to us: 
nature itself is already a result of selection, a universal result which then posits rules 
for further, more specific, and local selections. This means that the laws of nature 
arose through the emergence – also in the midst of disorder – of stable, relatively 
long-lasting realities that behave always (or for a very long time) in the same way and 
thus “succeed”. Here we have the most primordial and fundamental instance of “the 
survival of the fittest”. Order is more successful than disorder. That which has no 
laws and regularities, and obeys no laws of conservation, could have existed in some 
arbitrary multiplicity…thus there came about the formation and proliferation of 
protons and, as a result, the law of gravity and mechanics: from hydrogen atoms to the 
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of God is not necessary to complete a philosophy of nature…God may in fact happen 
to exist. Not everything that is true needs to be true in order to preserve the world’s 
intelligibility’ (Vogel, 1996, p.21)). God’s complete transcendence from creation is 
supported, or at least suggested, by neo-Darwinism (Davies, 1989, p.ix). 
 The example of the discovery of neutrinos can help to set the tone as to what 
this means. The neutrino was elusive to scientists for so long because it was 
completely undetectable; scientists needed to wait until such sophisticated technology 
was available in order to observe interactions of neutrinos (Cox & Forshaw, 2009, 
pp.163-4). The problem of the ‘observation’ of God can, in many ways, be 
comparable. God can’t be detected because God isn’t a ‘thing’ and, therefore, can’t 
interact with other ‘things’, from which observations may be made. Whereas with 
neutrinos sophisticated machinery was needed, with God no machinery will ever be 
                                                                                                                                                              
rise of the periodic table of elements and chemistry (including the beauty of the 
crystals) – in brief, to the whole realm of matter. Likewise from the initial radiation 
there arose the quantum structure of electromagnetic energy: in a word, the 
elementary particles, the four forces, etc. the laws of conservation and, along with 
them, strict causality as such and its cosmic predominance are products of 
development and selection…there was always enough “disorder” left over to occasion 
the formation of new characteristics (structural factors) by accidental, random events, 
and the momentary successes were subject to the process of selection with its criterion 
of survival by sheer numbers’ (Jonas, 1996, pp.168-9), although it must be noted that 
he qualifies this by claiming that ‘although there should be no plan in it – this we have 
rejected with good reason – we might ascribe to it a tendency, something like a 
yearning, which the chance opportunities of the world seize upon and the drive 
forward’ (Jonas, 1996, p.173), which is obviously unacceptable from a strict 
Darwinian perspective (and somewhat similar to Teilhard’s own idea of ‘groping 
evolution’). Nonetheless, Jonas attests to the fact that (perhaps somewhat similar to 
the ontological proof of the existence of God), the fact that creation is mutable yet 
attempts to remain the same – the emphasis in evolution on preservation and an 
imperfect replicating process that makes change inevitable yet accidental (i.e. 
‘disorder’) – which comes to demand an ontology of ‘half-fixity’ (see next chapter), 
means that it can spontaneously create itself out of nothing so long as it is mutable, 
i.e. susceptible to mistake, disorder, or instability. (It may be noted that the use of the 
tension between order and disorder as representing a Darwinian selection of 
accidental events, and the claim that ‘there is always enough “disorder”’, may suggest 
that the presence of entropy, and its use in physics, is evidence of a ‘physical’ 
Darwinism (although entropy posits a definite direction to physical systems).) 
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possible. God doesn’t ‘react’ or influence anything therefore he will never be able to 
be detected; this doesn’t mean that God cannot ‘act’ but it means that he cannot 
‘influence’ creation.42 
 Whilst it must be maintained that science cannot speculate on the nature of 
God it can, as it has just been shown, speculate on his relation to creation. More 
specifically, a re-appropriation of the relationship between eternity and space-time is 
needed.43 Eternity, therefore, becomes not the simultaneous possession of all time and 
space, but the opposite of time and space. Eternity is literally no-thing.44 The sentence 
‘nothing is eternal’, therefore, has both negative and positive connotations. It means 
both that no ‘thing’ is eternal (i.e. nothing can exist without time and space and 
therefore nothing can be eternal) and that ‘nothing’ is eternal (i.e. whatever nothing 
‘is’, it is eternal (time and space are absent)); ‘something’ or ‘anything’ is temporal 
and fleeting but ‘nothing’ is eternal. This is what God ‘is’. God is nothing, God 
doesn’t exist, God is not, God is nothing, God is no-thing. Thus, God creates from 
nothing (cf. Dirac, 1958, p.ix). God’s being eternal (i.e. non-temporal and 
incorporeal), therefore, is not Platonic (nor Boethian or Thomistic) but scientific. 
                                                        
42
 Polkinghorne writes that ‘if all mental processes have brain correlates, and that is 
true of the operation of the unconscious ego, then God could not interact with the 
depths of our psyches without also interacting in some way with the material 
processes of our brains. If that is the case, one can then go on to enquire about the 
possibility of his interacting in a specific way with matter not organized into complex 
wholes supporting consciousness’ (Polkinghorne, 1989, p.10). However, he 
understands this as support for God’s ability to influence the world whereas this thesis 
will argue ‘from the other perspective’. If God can influence human consciousness, 
and consciousness is ‘material’, then God can influence matter; however this thesis 
argues that if God cannot influence matter then, consciousness being ‘material’, he 
cannot influence consciousness either. God, it will be maintained, can only influence 
by himself becoming matter (cf. Barbour, 1971, pp.315-38). 
43
 Due to the fact that space and time are fundamentally linked, ‘eternity’ will be 
taken as having just as many spatial connotations as temporal. 
44
 Importantly, this is not simply ‘immaterial’. Barbour notes that ‘the term 
“immaterial” has misleading connotations of “mental” and “spiritual”’ (Barbour, 
1971, p.288). 
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 However, neo-Darwinism also suggests that traditional doctrines associated 
with the eternal nature of God such as omnipotence and omniscience must be 
rejected.45 God is nothing, and as such can neither do anything nor know anything (cf. 
Conee & Sider, 2005, p.40). He is completely separate from creation. This means that 
neo-Darwinism not only affirms the use of apophatic language (a tradition carried 
through writers such as Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Dionysius),46 but 
strongly suggests that this ‘apophaticism’ is not just an inability of language but 
points to an ‘ontological vacuity’; language becomes incoherent about God because 
he really does not ‘possess’ any characteristic.47 
 
d. Deism 
 It is at this point that it becomes necessary to affirm deism (cf. Peters & 
Hewlett, 2003, p.130; Barbour, 2001, p.2; Wiles, 1986, p.40). Previously, with 
reference to Teilhard de Chardin, it was argued that evolution shows how God 
creates, and thus a doctrine of pantheism, or at the very least panentheism, must be 
appealed to. God doesn’t just create as a one off event, he continues to create, and 
evolution shows this continual creation. However, now, with the neo-Darwinian 
                                                        
45
 This rejection of omniscience, this rejection of a divine ‘mind’ or ‘intelligence’ is 
itself a rejection of intelligent design. Materialism, the affirmation that mind is a 
product of the brain; therefore, it is also a rejection of intelligent design, that an 
intelligent being is responsible for the world, since for God to be intelligent God 
would have to have a brain, i.e. be material. 
46
 Nothing is an oxymoron in that it is a thing that is an absence of things, therefore it 
is not what it is, i.e. a thing; this points to and references the apophatic theology of 
Pseudo-Dionysius and contradiction of not being able to name God, yet even saying 
God cannot be named, names God (cf. Nelstrop, 2009, p.54). 
47
 The second commandment can also be seen to demand such a claim. Even 
intellectual ideas about God are still idols; in fact in the concept of God is a human 
invention and cannot adequately be applied to God (cf. Hauerwas, 2004, p.142; 
Hafner, 1995, p.8.). 
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synthesis becoming increasingly adept at explaining the ‘mechanism’ of ‘creation’ 
without God, deism is once again the most appropriate explanation of the relationship 
that God has with creation, as David Brown defines deism as ‘little more 
than…“belief in a non-interventionist God”’ (Brown, 1985, p.5 (cf. Brown, 1985, 
pp.4-5, p.9)). 
 However, whilst it may be correct to label deism as a ‘non-interventionist 
theism’, at least one act of intervention is required. Deism does not claim that God 
doesn’t intervene at all; it claims that God intervenes only once. The caricature of the 
deist God is of one who creates and then leaves (cf. Peters & Hewlett, 2003, p.30, 
p.131, p.160). Deism, therefore, is not ‘non-interventionist’, it argues that God 
intervenes once, and, taking into consideration the absurdity of applying temporal 
categories to God (i.e. that one act of God cannot be ‘before’ creation), all that is 
being affirmed here is that God acts eternally (not continuously (cf. Torrance, 1978, 
p.53)). The act of creation is not a continual process, it is an eternal event (cf. 
Augustine, 1991, pp.225ff; Viney, 2010, p.77).48 
 This appeal to the single act of God also supports the assertion that there is a 
unity, an equal value, among creation: ‘O truth, everywhere you preside over all who 
ask counsel of you. You respond at one and the same time to all, even though they are 
consulting you on different subjects’ (Augustine, 1991, p.201; cf. Lossky, 1975, 
pp.161-3). In other words, if God only does ‘one’ thing, then this ‘one’ act must be 
equally relevant to all creation, and thus humanity are no longer uniquely treated by 
God. 
                                                        
48
 Maurice Wiles also attempts to see the act of God ‘as a single divine act’, however 
Wiles’ single divine act is not ‘numerically singular’ but ‘a unity of intention’ (Wiles, 
1986, p.54). What is argued here, again, is that God does not continue to do the same 
thing, but only does one thing. 
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 Previously, it was claimed that the fact that God did something new in Christ 
was a stumbling block to deism, but now, taking seriously the eternal nature of God’s 
activity, God cannot do anything new, because to do so would add temporal 
categories to his action (cf. Polkinghorne, 2001, pp.103-5; Peacocke, 2001, pp.46-7; 
Barbour, 2001, p.20). It can then be questioned, taking into account God’s inability to 
influence creation, why that ‘one act of intervention’ cannot be identified with the 
incarnation, as Brown seems so adamant to deny (Brown, 1985, p.14). This means 
that God can’t interact or influence his creation unless God became a thing like other 
things – ‘God could not create [read ‘influence/interact’] unless God was incarnate’ 
(Delio, 2013, p.127 (cf. Torrance, 2001, p.68)), which can also be seen as the 
conclusion of the neo-Darwinian suggestion of materialism. The person of Christ is 
the sole meeting of divinity and creation, the person of Christ is the door through 
which the divine influence enters creation. In other words, the neo-Darwinian 
synthesis suggests something about divine influence, and that suggestion is precisely 
what Teilhard took from the ‘Eastern’ paradigm: it is Christ who creates. This, it will 
be argued, is the meeting place of Teilhardian Christology and Neo-Darwinian 
science, and it will be termed ‘incarnational deism’ – that God only does one thing 
(eternally), and that thing he does by becoming created – in Christ, ‘the singular 
moment in the universal bestowal of grace’ (Deane-Drummond, 2009, p.42). All that 
is being argued here is that the one act of God for the deist is eternal (thus not 
confined to a ‘beginning’) and it is identified with the historical body of Christ. 
 
 It now becomes necessary to reinterpret Teilhard’s cosmic Christology in the 
light of these two philosophical implications of neo-Darwinism, namely, a nuanced 
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understanding of what it means to be a creature, and a nuanced understanding of what 
it means to be God. 
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Chapter 7 
 
A Reinterpretation of Teilhard’s Christology 
 
 
 In the last chapter it was argued that neo-Darwinism fundamentally disagrees 
with Teilhard’s own evolutionary theory, and subsequently suggested a new way to 
understand humanity (as a part of the wider creation) and God (as having no influence 
on creation apart from the incarnation) respectively. If, as it was claimed in the 
introduction, the ‘fact’ of evolution demands a cosmic Christology, regardless of the 
‘mechanism’49 appealed to, then the overall direction of Teilhard’s Christology must 
still be correct, but it must be reinterpreted to account for this disagreement; the 
‘mechanism’ of neo-Darwinism needs to be allowed to nuance this cosmic 
Christology. Teilhard was entirely correct to conclude that evolution demanded a 
cosmic Christology, but what he got wrong was the evolutionary foundation upon 
which he built such a Christology. 
 Essentially, the main criticism of Teilhard’s evolutionary theory was the 
appeal to teleology. Neo-Darwinism rejects the notion that evolution is a forward-
looking process that culminates in a future completion. Instead, neo-Darwinism 
affirms that evolution is a backward-looking ‘process’ with no comprehension of 
future or ‘end’; ‘perfection’ is subjective. Secondly, it was argued that neo-Darwinism 
strongly suggests materialism, denying that there is ‘something’ else to matter, let 
alone something more important than matter. Thus, the basic principle of Teilhard’s 
evolutionary theory, namely, a convergent process culminating in a unified spirit, is 
                                                        
49
 Again, ‘mechanism’ is used here to refer to the ‘how’ of evolution, rather than as a 
technical term as used by Bergson. 
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completely rejected by neo-Darwinism. If this is the principle upon which he builds 
his cosmic Christology then it is reasonable to assume that his cosmic Christology is 
likewise incorrect. 
 This chapter will attempt to reformulate Teilhard’s cosmic Christology within 
a new, neo-Darwinian paradigm. This reformulation will return to the themes that 
were important for Teilhard and attempt to reconstruct a Christology based on the 
same themes yet built on a neo-Darwinian foundation. This should lead to a 
Christology that is capable of dealing with the scientific and philosophical demands 
of the twenty-first century, yet still taking the Chalcedonian definition as axiomatic. 
This in turn should help to form the basis of a theology that can seriously contribute 
to the ongoing conversation between science and religion, which is the overall 
intention of this thesis. 
 
The Rejection of Western Juridical Christology and The Acceptance of Eastern 
Christology 
 In the introduction, two basic Christological paradigms were outlined: a 
Western paradigm with a focus on sin and salvation, and an Eastern paradigm with a 
focus on creation as a process with future completion. Evolution, it was claimed, 
deems that the first is incorrect. The fact that there is no longer any actual historical 
event on which to pin the reason for the incarnation means that ‘Western’ Christology 
is no longer possible. Teilhard agreed. In Christianity and Evolution he wrote that 
‘without being too unjust to the Latin Fathers, might one not blame them for having 
overdeveloped the Rabbinical and legalistic side of St. Paul in their theology?’ 
(Teilhard de Chardin, 1971, p.89). This led to Teilhard de Chardin affirming Eastern 
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Christological values over and against Western, precisely because of the issue of ‘the 
traditional notion of original sin’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1969, p.36). 
 
a. The Eastern Christology 
 This Eastern Christology, following such influential writers such as 
Athanasius and Gregory of Nazianzus, focused not on Christ’s death but on his 
incarnation. For them, deification ‘extend[s] mechanically or automatically to all 
humanity…thus evacuating the need for Christ’s atoning death’ (Finch, 2006, pp.106-
7). It is not the death of Christ that is efficacious but his incarnation.  
 It is with Gregory of Nazianzus, however, that this Christology obtains its 
most poetic expression. In a Letter Against the Apollinarians he famously exclaims 
‘for that which he has not assumed he has not healed’ (Gregory of Nazianzus, 1954, 
p.218), therefore, if ‘[Christ’s] soul should be that of a horse or an ox, or some other 
of the brute creation…this, then, would be what he saves’ (Gregory of Nazianzus, 
1954, p.219). The important point for Gregory is that Christ became a human; it is in 
the assumption of human nature that humanity is saved. 
 This led Williams to write that: 
 
it is the sheer joining of divinity and humanity in a single person, Jesus Christ, 
which renovates the nature sickened by the fall…[thus it is] the union of fallen 
nature with the utterly holy divine nature [that] necessarily changes the unholy’ 
(Williams, 2007, p.38) 
 
It is the sheer joining of creation and divinity that is efficacious. It is mere contact 
with divinity that is important, not what that divinity does subsequently. Volz, in the 
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same direction, confirms that ‘one’s growth in Christ is related to one’s exposure to 
the word of God’ (Volz, 1992, p.100). Teilhard, likewise, agrees that ‘[Christ] 
sanctifies human flesh by a specific contact’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.64). 
 This means that it is the incarnation itself, as an event (distinct from the 
crucifixion or the resurrection), that is alone important; ‘the word of God is the means 
by which we live in God, some call it “the word of life”…when God speaks, things 
come to be’ (Bianchi, 1998, p.24). Everything that Christ does is now seen in the 
context of his assumption of human nature, not in the context of his atoning death. 
Thus Aghiorgoussis can write that 
 
everything that Christ did throughout his earthly life was based upon the 
presupposition that humanity was already saved and deified, from the very 
moment of his conception in the womb of Mary (Aghiorgoussis, 1992, p.41) 
 
Likewise, Russell writes that 
 
the unity of humankind, which Athanasius took for granted, means that the 
whole human nature is deified in principle when the human nature which the 
logos assumed is deified in him (Russell, 2004, p.172) 
 
Henri de Lubac, who was himself heavily influenced Teilhard de Chardin, develops 
this interpretation, writing that 
 
the word did not merely take a human body; his incarnation was not a simple 
‘corporatio’, but, as St. Hilary says, a ‘concorporatio’…in making a human 
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nature, it is human nature that he united to himself, that he enclosed in himself, 
and it is the latter, whole and entire, that in some sort he uses as a body (de 
Lubac, 1947, pp.37-8) 
 
 What Christ achieved he achieved in the incarnation. Christ assumes not just 
an individual of humanity, but humanity itself (of course, it has been argued that there 
is now nothing so concrete as ‘humanity’, which will be dealt with below), and is 
coming into contact with divinity that humanity is transformed and deified. 
 This means that Kelly can write that ‘human nature was sanctified, 
transformed, and elevated by the very act of Christ’s becoming a man’ (Kelly, 1965, 
p375). Christ does not deify as man, he deifies by becoming man; Christ does not 
become man and then deify, it is his actual becoming human, that meeting of divinity 
and creation, that is efficacious. ‘It is not in the first instance what Christ does that 
saves us’, confirms Williams, ‘but who he is’ (Williams, 2007, p.38). 
 
b. The ‘Rejection’ of Eastern Christology 
 However, as much as evolution suggests the Western paradigm is incorrect, so 
neo-Darwinism now suggests that this Eastern paradigm is also incorrect. The ‘fact’ 
of evolution rejects the Western paradigm because of the need to reject the ‘traditional 
notion of original sin’, and the ‘mechanism’ of neo-Darwinism further rejects the 
Eastern paradigm because of the need to reject the notion of a process of creation with 
future completion. 
 This is not a complete rejection however; it is more a shift of focus. Firstly, 
the focus is shifted away from the death of Christ to his birth. Secondly, the focus is 
shifted away from the incarnation as a part of a wider process to the event of the 
 235 
incarnation as a once-for-all event. Any reference to a ‘completion’, or to the fact that 
the Christ event is part of a wider process of creation – an ‘addition’ or continuation 
of the ‘initial’ creation – must be rejected; the tension between complete and 
incomplete, between finished and unfinished, must be rejected. Likewise, any notion 
that in the incarnation God is doing something new must similarly be rejected as 
contradicting the suggestions of the neo-Darwinism synthesis. 
 Again, it is the ‘fact’ of evolution that makes the biggest impact; it is the ‘fact’ 
of evolution that makes the biggest demands on Christology. The ‘mechanism’ of 
evolution simply ‘streamlines’ what can be said; it is the ‘mechanism’ of evolution 
that clarifies what can be said of Christology after the role of Christ is re-cast. With 
neo-Darwinism the content of Christology is not the issue but the context; with a new 
understanding of humanity and a new understanding of God, the application of this 
Eastern paradigm is shifted. 
 To put the point differently, the teleology that is a feature of the Eastern 
paradigm needs to be removed; as it was claimed in the introduction, the problem 
with both the Western and Eastern Christological paradigms is that they see evolution 
as a temporary process. 
 
c. Incarnational Deism 
 As it was claimed in the last chapter, ‘God could not create unless God was 
incarnate’ (Delio, 2013, p.127), and it is only the Son who becomes incarnate 
(Meyendorff, 1964, p.231). This means that the incarnation is not part of a wider 
process because God cannot influence the world unless he becomes incarnate; the 
incarnation is the creating act of God. Neo-Darwinism, therefore, does not completely 
reject the Eastern Christology; it further clarifies it. In other words, it is not so much a 
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rejection of the Eastern paradigm as a whole, but an Eastern paradigm that primarily 
understands Christ as creator without the teleology. 
 God does not need to ‘try again by this time becoming human’ (Mahoney, 
2011, p.72), but by this becoming human he creates, for the first and only ‘time’. 
‘Indeed’, Mahoney muses, ‘on reflection there may be something ridiculous, not to 
say mildly blasphemous, about the idea that Almighty God failed in his first attempt 
at creating human beings and had to try again by this time becoming human himself’ 
(Mahoney, 2011, p.72). The one act of God is the incarnation of Christ. This, it was 
suggested in the previous chapter, led to what is termed ‘incarnational deism’. 
Everything that was said regarding the incarnation above is still affirmed, yet that 
incarnation is the one event of intervention and influence of deism (cf. Brown, 1985, 
pp.4-14). Thus, returning to Gregory of Nazianzus, now that the notion of salvation is 
being replaced with that of creation, it must be ‘that which he has not assumed he has 
not created’. 
 However, this one act of God is not temporal but eternal. This means that the 
‘initial’ act of creation does not need to happen at the beginning of time, it can happen 
at any ‘time’, it only needs to happen. This is an incarnational deism, not a 
‘traditional’ deism. This can be understood as a conflation of creation, conservation 
and deification. These are not three acts of God, not even three separate elements of 
the same act, but one act. Just as number cannot truly be applied to the Trinity, such 
that the affirmation of three persons in one God is only an analogy, so number cannot 
be applied to the acts of God (cf. Farrow, 1999, p.53). Vladimir Lossky, an exponent 
of the Eastern paradigm, writes that ‘in the one and the same act the Word assumed 
human nature, gave it its existence, and deified it…[thus] it is hard to distinguish 
between the first state of creatures and their union with God, their final end’ (Lossky, 
 237 
1957, p.142). This not only confirms what has been claimed here regarding the role of 
the incarnation, but it also shows that the Eastern paradigm does not need to be 
completely rejected. Likewise, Haffner writes that: 
 
some would say [about God’s act of creation and his act of conservation] that 
there is no essential difference, because God is performing one act outside of 
time which ‘maintains the whole temporal sequence from its first moment 
onwards’ (Haffner, 1995, p.91) 
 
Thus, as Radcliffe writes, ‘to be a creature is to receive existence, not just at 
conception but at every moment’ (Radcliffe, 2005, p.93). Creation and deification are 
not two parts of the same act, they are one and the same act, and both are achieved 
through the incarnation of Christ. 
 Webster confirms such an interpretation, writing that ‘the human history of 
Jesus is the divulgence in time of divine grace’ (Webster, 2011, p.32), as does de 
Lubac, who writes that ‘the grace of Jesus Christ, [must] never on any account be 
thought of apart from the incarnation itself’ (de Lubac, 1969, p.81). Such a 
Christology may also be read back into Teilhard when he recognizes that ‘the 
incarnation is an act co-extensive with the duration of the universe’ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1965, p.64). 
 
Christ as Bond of Matter: A Reinterpretation 
 For Teilhard, the claim that Christ was the bond of matter was essentially an 
affirmation of unity. If ‘to create is to unite’, and Christ creates, then Christ is the 
principle of unity. For Teilhard, this unity represented a process of convergence in 
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which full union is always a future reality until the Parousia. However, this was also 
the biggest problem that Teilhard’s evolutionary theory faced in the light of neo-
Darwinism: there can be no teleology. This means that, although Christ can still be 
the principle of unity, this cannot be a future reality, it must be a present one. 
 
a. Christ as “Form” of Creation 
 The role of Christ as creator, therefore, for Teilhard was to be the principle of 
unity. It is Christ who pulls creation together to form his body. For Teilhard, to 
conform to the Eastern Christological paradigm is to claim that Christ unites matter 
and causes its convergence. However, now that this forward-looking process is 
rejected, Christ’s being the principle of unity must be conflated to one single event. 
 It was also argued in the last chapter that efficient causality must be rejected in 
favour of an emphasis on formal causality. The neo-Darwinian synthesis suggests 
both that teleology is rejected and that God has no efficient or final causality, both of 
which argue that God’s action is one of formal causality. What God does is 
ontologically define the universe; he only has to account for ‘mutability’. The rest 
happens by accident, simply because it is mutable.  
 Likewise, the rejection of a ‘within’ to matter also creates problems for a neo-
Darwinian interpretation of Teilhard’s Christology. Christ can no longer be the 
‘within’ of matter, pulling it together. Instead he must be the form of nature. Christ’s 
historical body is the ontological ground of all creation (Peacocke, 2001, p.175). 
Christ is the bond of matter, not pulling creation together from within, but the form of 
matter, uniting creation through being the ground of existence. 
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 Teilhard seems to allow such an interpretation when he writes that ‘in 
Scripture Christ is essentially revealed as invested with the power of giving the world, 
in his own person, its definitive form’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.252). Again, all 
that is being argued here is that the teleological context in which Teilhard made such 
a comment must be reformulated. This means that a neo-Darwinian cosmic 
Christology suggests a God who creates through the event of the incarnation, once-
for-all, and that the content of such creation is simply ontological grounding. 
 
b. Incarnation as Proleptic Event 
 Understanding the role of the incarnation as responsible for unity has the 
effect of arguing that the incarnation is a proleptic event (not in the sense that it 
anticipates something future, but that it is an event that happens ‘before’ the first 
moment of time). It is not the moment at which God does something new, it is the 
only ‘thing’ that God does. The rejection of efficient causality, and especially the non-
temporal nature of God’s act, means that such an event does not need to happen at the 
beginning of time. 
 Cullman makes a similar point when he writes that ‘the divine plan of 
salvation opened up in both a forward and backward direction’ (Cullman, 1962, 
p.107). As does Boff who claims that Christ is the ‘universal observer’. He asks 
 
who [is] the universal observer who caused the universal wave to collapse and 
thereby enabled the universe to cease being probability and become reality as 
we have it today? There had to be a universal observer who could interact with 
the probabilities and possibilities and could pull them from that situation and 
draw them to concrete realization. The religious and sapiential traditions of 
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humankind give the name God to the principle that creates, sets in motion, and 
orders everything. Thus it was God who caused the universal wave to collapse; 
God is the creator and the organizer. (Boff, 1997, p.142) 
 
Christ’s incarnation therefore can be seen in this way, not as being responsible for the 
‘efficient’ reason for creation, but for its ‘formal’ reason. Christ’s incarnation is the 
act of God’s ‘observation’. The incarnation is an event that has as much relevance to 
the past as it does the future; i.e. God does not do something new in the incarnation 
because the incarnation influences all time. 
 Understanding the incarnation as a proleptic event, with only a ‘formal’ 
relationship with the world and not an ‘efficient’, also answers the ‘problem’ of cause 
and effect: how is it that a future event can have a causal relationship with a past one, 
and, more importantly, if Christ creates by coming into contact – since contact is the 
operative feature – how can Christ come into contact with something that hasn’t been 
created yet? If creation is effected by assumption, how can Christ assume something 
that isn’t already there? 
 
c.  A Christological Interpretation of TzimTzum 
 It is suggested here that understanding Christ’s incarnation within the context 
of the Kabbalah-ic doctrine of Tzimtzum adequately deals with these new 
Christological demands: a single event, coterminous with the incarnation, which 
provides the ‘reason’ for mutability in the world, and thus being the ontological 
foundation of all creation through evolution. This doctrine of Tzimtzum can also be 
coupled with the Christian doctrine of kenosis, and in many respects they can be seen 
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as synonyms: the same doctrine, one from a Jewish perspective and the other from a 
Christian. 
 Essentially, the argument is that the emphasis of Christ’s incarnation is not on 
his assumption of something else, but on the ‘contraction’ of his divinity; it is his 
‘emptying’ of his divinity that is the ‘coming into contact’ so important for the 
Christology expounded above. The incarnation, in this sense, is a subtraction rather 
than an addition; the incarnation does not ‘add’ anything to Christ’s person, it 
‘subtracts’. Christ is God, and ‘when’ he eternally ‘empties’ his divinity, creation 
results; this, it will be argued, is how the incarnation can be seen as the act of 
creation, i.e. how God creates (cf. Brown, 1985, p.231). What is created is the 
historical body of Christ, which ‘remains’ after his ‘emptying’, and that historical 
body is the ontological grounding of creation. 
 
 The doctrine of Tzimtzum was originally postulated as part of Kabbalah, a 
Jewish mystical sect, and therefore [even though it has been referenced by Christian 
theologians in the past, such as Moltmann (2001, pp.145-6), Polkinghorne (1988, 
p.61), Peacocke (2001, p.87), and Fiddes (2001, p.185)] it would be more appropriate 
for a Jewish philosopher to introduce it. Hans Jonas writes that: 
 
in the beginning, for unknowable reasons, the ground of being, or the Divine, 
chose to give itself over to the chance and risk and endless variety of becoming. 
And wholly so: entering into the adventure of space and time, the deity held 
back nothing of itself: no uncommitted or unimpaired part remained to direct, 
correct, and ultimately guarantee the devious working-out of its destiny in 
creation…to view the world as left to itself, its laws as brooking no interference, 
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and the rigour of our belonging to it as not softened by extramundane 
providence…tzimtzum means contraction, withdrawal, self-limitation. To make 
room for the world, the En-Sof (infinite; literally, No-End) of the beginning had 
to contract himself so that, vacated by him, empty space could expand outside 
of him: the “nothing” in which and from which God could then create the 
world. Without this retreat into himself, there could be no “other” outside God, 
and only his continued holding-himself-in preserves the finite things from 
losing their separate being again into the divine “all in all” (Jonas, 1996, p.134, 
p.142) 
 
God withdraws himself and in doing so makes room for creation; creation results 
from the withdrawal of God. 
 However, the problem with the doctrine of tzimtzum as presented by Jonas, 
and other Christian theologians who reference the doctrine, is that they apply it to 
God generally, rather than to Christ specifically (because, more often than not, they 
see the incarnation as being an event that happens later in time and represents God 
doing something new – God creates and then becomes incarnate). However, if 
creation happens through the incarnation as an event, then tzimtzum, as a doctrine of 
creation, can only be applied to the Son specifically. It is not strictly God who creates, 
but Christ. Or, put better, it is not the Father nor the Spirit who create, but the Son (cf. 
Polkinghorne, 1989, p.87). 
 This is not Tri-theism, the Father and the Spirit still share one nature and one 
will and so act through the Son (cf. Cabasilas, 1974, p.74; Meyendorff, 1964, p.215; 
Kelly, 1965, p.258; Lossky, 1957, p.53), but neither the Father nor the Spirit become 
incarnate (cf. Meyendorf, 1964, p.231; Lane, 1990, p.73), and if creation is a single 
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event, and this God does through the incarnation, since God must become himself 
created in order to influence creation, then it can only be the Son who creates. This is 
the natural conclusion to patripassianism, and the interpretation offered here can be 
seen as affirmed in the light of the Sabellian controversy.  
 This means that creation is a personal event not a natural one; it is not in 
God’s nature to create but in Christ’s person (cf. Meyendorff, 1964, p.231). It is not 
the divine nature that withdraws or empties but Christ’s person (hence Christ being 
two natures in one person); or, more specifically it is the divine nature that is 
retracted, leaving ‘space’ for the created nature, but this retraction happens in the 
person of Christ.50 This means that God does not become what he is not, God does not 
retract and leave a space, but Christ does – the sole meeting of divinity and creation 
happens in the person of Christ, not the divine nature (cf. Delio, 2013, p.127). 
                                                        
50
 This requires an exposition of precisely what is meant by the term ‘person’. There 
is not the room here to discuss every issue, but something needs to be said regarding 
how the tern ‘person’ is used. There is a sense in which the term ‘person’ is being 
used here as a ‘vessel’ into which both divine and human natures are poured, or more 
specifically human nature is ‘empty’ space in the ‘vessel’ when divine nature is 
removed. But this cannot be the case. The category of person is not something that 
works like this. Not least, the use of spatial language is entirely incorrect when 
discussing God, especially in relation to the personhood of God (cf. Torrance, 1978, 
pp.38-9). However, for this (and indeed for the Chalcedonian definition) to work, 
person cannot either simply be the presence of a particular relationship or condition 
such as ‘self-awareness’. 
 This means that the ‘retraction’ of divinity, and the ‘empty space’ that 
remains, is purely an ontological category. This means that there can be absolutely no 
contradiction between claiming that creation is ‘only’ the creation of Jesus the man, 
and also seeing in him the whole of creation, because creation has nothing to do with 
‘materiality’ but with ‘ontology’; creation is not about making space for creatures in 
God, but about defining what it means to be created (i.e. mutable, temporal, corporeal 
etc.), it is not ‘efficient’ causality but ‘formal’ causality. 
 Of course, the application of language applied to God must be analogical, and 
claiming that God is three persons in one nature must mean something concrete. The 
term ‘person’, therefore, is being used here in an analogical sense, without a real 
definition (this being open to further consideration and research), but referring to 
something ‘real’ or ‘concrete’ in the same way that it must have meant for the early 
Fathers who approved the use of this language (cf. Lane, 1975, p.112ff). 
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 Creation is therefore mutable because Christ is, not because God is. Christ 
empties himself, thus making Christ mutable, not God. This means that the creation of 
the universe, which is a conceptual space that is mutable, happens within Christ’s 
person not God’s nature. Christ’s incarnation is not an efficient creation but a formal 
one; Christ’s emptying of himself creates the ontological condition of mutability. 
Christ’s human body is mutable and this creates the condition from which evolution 
can happen and the splendour of creation can flourish. 
 Thus the doctrine of tzimtzum can be seen as a nuancing of the Christian 
doctrine of kenosis.51 Indeed kenosis and tzimtzum can be seen as essentially the 
same doctrine, describing the same event in different ways. In the incarnation Christ 
does not ‘give up’ or ‘sacrifice’ his divinity; his emptying is not a complete 
surrendering of his divinity. The process of kenosis, the process of self-emptying, 
therefore, has the effect of a ‘retraction’ and this means that a ‘space’ is left. This 
space, of course, is not a physical space but an ontological one, as: 
 
the relation between God and space is not itself a spatial relation…the “come 
down from heaven” which is predicated of the Son is not to be construed in any 
sense a journey through space…“from the heavens” must be interpreted in 
accordance with the statements that the Son is “God from God, light from light” 
(Torrance, 1978, pp.2-3) 
                                                        
51
 Interestingly, Brown sees the ‘Chalcedonian’ and the ‘Kenotic’ as two distinct 
models of incarnation rather than two complementary components of the same model 
(Brown, 1985, pp.245ff), and that a model is only Chalcedonian if ‘the two natures 
were simultaneously present in the one person’ (Brown, 1985, p.228), i.e. kenosis 
means that Christ was God, then wasn’t God, then was God again (Brown, 1985, 
p.103). However, it is not entirely clear that such a distinction is needed. The 
incarnation is not trying to put two things into the same space. Prat confirms that 
‘fundamentally, the kenosis owes its first origin to the difficulty of conceiving two 
complete natures united in the one person’ (Prat, 1945, p.320), in other words, kenosis 
is not a separate model, but a way of dealing with Chalcedon. 
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The immutability of God is contracted and this leaves behind mutability. If the 
ontological space within Christ’s person was immutable, and this is retracted, then 
what is ‘left behind’ is no longer immutable, it is mutable (cf. Haught, 2000, p.40). 
 Most importantly, this interpretation of the incarnation as tzimtzum means that 
the ‘space’ that is left after Christ’s personal emptying can be Christ’s historical body 
– ‘nothing can subsist outside [Christ’s] flesh’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1977, p.33). That 
‘space’ is what Christ assumes in his incarnation, but that ‘space’ is the historical 
body of Christ. The tzimtzum is the assumption. The ‘form’ of creation is Christ’s 
historical body. The ontological ‘space’ that is ‘left behind’ when the second person 
of the Trinity ‘retracts’ his divinity is Jesus-shaped.52 
 There is therefore no contradiction between understanding the concrete 
historical body of Christ – the same body that walked around first century Galilee – to 
be the ontological grounding of the whole cosmos, or with being co-terminal with the 
whole cosmos, because the act of creation is ‘reduced’ to formal or ontological 
causality, and such an event is proleptic, stretching backwards and forwards through 
time. 
 
 The incarnation, therefore, is not Christ taking on another nature but the 
contracting of his divinity, and, by definition, his becoming created (i.e. that which is 
                                                        
52
 ‘Paul seems clearly to affirm a pre-existence for Christ, and apparently it is always 
the concrete, historical God-man of whom he is thinking, never the word independent 
of his humanity’ (Mooney, 1966, p.170). When it is remembered that for the Gospel 
of John the pre-existent Christ is operative in creation, then it must be Christ in his 
humanity who is operative in creation. Kropf also points to this element, writing that 
‘Yet [Prat] admitted the temptation to understand “all things have been created by 
him” and “all things have been created in him” (Col. 1.15-16) as applying to the word 
made man, a tendency warranted by Origen and Hippolytus in line with the prologue 
of St. John’s Gospel’ (Kropf, 1980, pp.144-5).  
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not divine is created). The emphasis, therefore, is on Christ ‘giving up’ his divinity 
rather than his ‘taking on’ another nature. Christ’s assumption is not the ‘addition’ of 
something more, but the subtraction of something that is already ‘there’. Thus, Brown 
can write that kenosis – the ‘tzimtzum-ic’ incarnation – ‘reduces’ the ‘divine reality’ 
to a ‘human nature, initially no more than a foetus’ (Brown, 1985, p.231).53 The use 
of the verb ‘reduces’ confirms that the incarnation must now be viewed from the 
opposite direction; creation results from a subtraction in the person of Christ, not an 
addition to the divine reality. Yet Christ does not sacrifice his ‘whole’ divinity (as if 
the divine nature can be compartmentalized), it is a contraction of his divinity. The 
ontological ‘space’ that defines creation, which is Christ’s historical body, is still 
‘surrounded’ by his divinity – Christ is still a God-man (cf. Torrance, 1978, p.82). In 
other words, there is still a contact, a ‘sheer joining’ of divinity and creature in the 
person of Christ, but this joining is not achieved by the addition of something new but 
by the retraction of something already present. 
 
d. Tzimtzum as Formal Deism 
                                                        
53
 This could be seen to support the Virgin birth. The incarnation is not an event that 
is contingent on anything else; in fact, the incarnation is primary. However, ‘the 
“firstborn” could mean the priority in time or rank, though most commentators prefer 
the latter, since the temporal priority is hardly what the author is trying to emphasize 
here’ (Deane-Drummond, 2009, p.105). Yet ‘the virgin birth story is not there to give 
information about gynecology any more than the story of the Fall is there to give 
information about primitive anthropology. It’s primary intention, as we have seen 
(though the New Testament writers were compelled to no such conscious antithesis), 
is not to assert discontinuity in the biological series (thus setting it directly against the 
genealogies that accompany it), but to make a positive statement at the level of spirit 
– to affirm the entire genesis of Jesus Christ as the act and initiative of God’ 
(Robinson, 1973, p.120). To claim that Christ was born of a Virgin, therefore, is not 
to assert the literal truth of that statement, but to affirm that Christ is the first born of 
all creation, and thus creation share in him ontologically; Christ does not share in our 
humanity, we share in his. 
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 The incarnation is still the assumption of humanity by the second person of the 
Trinity, but now this assumption must be viewed from the other angle, it must be re-
emphasized as the kenotic self-emptying of Christ. However, this does not mean that 
creation is physically Christ’s historical body; this is not pantheism. Indeed, the 
doctrine of tzimtzum, by definition, completely rejects pantheism. The whole point of 
tzimtzum is that God creates something that isn’t God; creation expands outside of 
God (Jonas, 1996, p.142). The ‘absence’ of God (i.e. eternity) means that time and 
space result, and with them comes mutability – if eternity (immutability) and 
time/space (mutability) are opposites, then the ‘removal’ of one necessarily means 
that the other is present. Likewise, if ‘nothing’ and ‘something’ are opposites, then the 
absence of one necessitates the other – ‘nothing’ is not the absence of ‘something’, 
‘something’ is the absence of ‘nothing’. If there is not ‘nothing’ (i.e. God), then there 
must be ‘something’ (i.e. creation). Creation is God becoming something he is not: 
‘something’ rather than ‘nothing’. 
 Once mutability is present creation expands and proliferates, not because it 
wants to or because this was the intention behind the incarnation,54 but because now 
there is the possibility of change. Once there is the possibility of change it is almost 
inevitable, given enough time, that the manifold splendour of creation will result, as 
the last chapter on neo-Darwinism argued. 
 This means that Christ only needs to define creation as being mutable (i.e. not 
eternal) and, out of nothing, creation spontaneously comes into being (thus denying 
the eternity of matter). Strictly speaking there is not an act of ‘efficient’ creation, 
                                                        
54
 The intention of the incarnation is still creation, but creation understood as 
ontological causality not efficient causality. God is not concerned with creating the 
‘stuff’ of creation, of ‘building the earth’; creation is not a tension between finished 
and unfinished. Instead creation is defining the form of that creation. 
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there is only an eternal definition of what creation is. Stoeger confirms such an 
interpretation, writing that: 
 
creation is not a temporal event, but a relationship – a relationship of ultimate 
dependence. Thus “cause” as applied to God should be conceived not as a 
physical force or an interaction, as it is in physics, but rather in terms of a 
relationship…it follows from this that creation is not about a temporal 
beginning of physical reality – although we cannot completely rule that out 
[although this thesis does on the basis of neo-Darwinism] – but about an 
ontological origin (Stoeger, 2010, p.181) 
 
Jonas, too, claimed that God 
 
had to contract himself so that, vacated by him, empty space could expand 
outside of him: the “nothing” in which and from which God could then create 
the world (Jonas, 1996, p.142) 
 
 However, now it is claimed that God does not create anything else in, or out 
of, this ‘nothing’, creation spontaneously springs forth of its own accord (Jonas, 1996, 
pp.168-9). Once God, in the person of Christ, removes eternity and immutability, 
nothing else needs to be done. God does not need to be the first mover, the universe 
does not need an efficient cause; absolutely no divine influence or direction is now 
needed (cf. Vogel, 1996, p.26). ‘The recent discovery of the Higgs Boson particle’, 
confirms Delio, ‘led some scientists to suggest that we no longer need to invoke God 
as prime mover’ (Delio, 2013, pp.58-9). 
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 Stephen Hawking also makes it clear that divine influence is no longer 
required, writing that: 
 
gravity shapes space and time…[and] because there is a law like gravity, the 
universe can and will create itself from nothing…spontaneous creation is the 
reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, why we 
exist. It is not necessary to invoke God to light the blue touch paper and set the 
universe going (Hawking, 2010, p.180) 
 
Christ can still be called ‘the evolver’ as Teilhard termed him, but not because he 
actively and ‘efficiently’ guides evolution. Christ is the evolver because he is 
responsible for the conditions upon which evolution is based. 
 
e. Incarnation as Divine Milieu 
 The incarnation, the eternal self-emptying of God in Christ, causes creation. 
This space, therefore, is the divine milieu. Teilhard wrote that ‘this cosmic body, to be 
found in all things, and always in the process of individualisation (spiritualisation) is 
eminently the mystical milieu’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1968a, p.175). Now, however, 
this cosmic body is ‘outside’ all things and is not in a process of ‘completion’, which 
has no meaning for a neo-Darwinist. 
 Thus, it is the form of creation that now represents the divine milieu. Christ is 
still that which holds the world together; he is still the principle of unity, which is 
what the divine milieu is. Christ is still the principle that keeps the world in being, but 
now that principle is no longer a teleological category. The kenosis of Christ creates 
the divine milieu, that ‘universal milieu in which and through which all things live 
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and have their being’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1977, p.33), so that, even more so than for 
Teilhard, ‘the light of the divine milieu “radiates from a historic centre”’ (Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1968, p.177) – indeed, ‘the [whole] cosmos is the divine milieu’ (Farria, 
2011, p.vi). 
 For Teilhard, the doctrine of the divine milieu was upheld and supported by a 
particular understanding of participation. Now that it has been established that, 
building on what Teilhard claimed, the doctrine of Tzimtzum can not only help to 
clarify what is meant by the incarnation causing the divine milieu, but also being able 
to make such a doctrine compatible with neo-Darwinism, the doctrine of participation 
must be considered. 
 
A Re-exploration of ‘Classical’ Participation 
 For Teilhard, the concept of participation played an important part in how he 
understood the progressive Christological function. Participation was a dynamic 
category of evolution. The more evolved one was, the more spiritual, and thus the 
closer to God, hence greater participation. However, neo-Darwinism has effectively 
denied this dynamic nature; not, of course, that species do not change, but that this 
change is not as dynamic as Bergson or Teilhard thought. Likewise, the notion of a 
future-looking idea of participation must be rejected. The divine milieu, 
fundamentally linked to Teilhard’s notion of participation, is not a future, evolved 
category, but an ontologically ‘static’ one, linked with the incarnation as a once-for-
all event of creation. To put it simply, creation and deification are understood as 
participation in the divine milieu, which was established by the incarnation, but now 
the teleology that was central to Teilhard’s Christology is removed. As it was 
affirmed at the end of the last chapter, this actually argues in favour of a return to a 
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more ‘static’ ontology, and this, in turn, leads to a return to a more traditional notion 
of participation, as understood by the Patristic Fathers (cf. Finch, 2006a, p.93; 
Kärkkäinen, 2004, p.20, Wood, 1998, p.7ff). 
 
a. The “Traditional” Notion of Participation 
 The idea of participation for the early Fathers is almost a synonym for 
deification (cf. Keating, 2007, p.97, Mannermaa, 2005, p.2; NRSV, 1995, 2 Pet 1.4), 
and, as has already been claimed, if participation is deification, then participation 
must also be creation, as creation and deification are now, quite literally due to the 
rejection of teleology, the same event. Both Gregory Palamas (1983, p.95), and 
Thomas Aquinas (Williams, 1999, p.66) can attest to this use of participation as a 
notion of creation. Creation and deification are the same event, and thus if 
participation in the divine nature is what it means to be deified, then this must also be 
what it means to be created, as Keating explicitly maintains, ‘we do not have an 
existence of our own apart from our participation in God’ (Keating, 2007, p.99). If 
Christ’s incarnation causes deification (Louth, 2007, p.36), then it also causes 
creation, and both are manifested as participation (Rahner, 1966, p.177, Lossky, 1975, 
p.118, Peura, 1998a, p.92, Tanner, 2011, p.71, Williams, 1999, p.66, Gregory 
Palamas, 1983, p.95). 
 Drawing on the necessity of God and the contingency of creation that 
characterizes participation, Keating continues that ‘participation necessarily requires a 
relation between two things that are unequal and that remain unequal and distinct in 
the act of the one participating in the other’ (Keating, 2007, pp.98-9). Participation in 
God means that there is always a relationship between the two that sets up a hierarchy 
of God and creation. Creatures are entirely dependent on God for their being, and 
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thus, not because of any failure of creation but by sheer logical necessity. ‘Greater’ 
participation is infinitely possible; it is always possible to be able to participate in 
God ‘more’. Thus Keating can affirm that 
 
the concept of participation, building on the language of participation in the 
New Testament, enables us to grasp how we are genuinely related to God and 
can partake of his life, without jeopardizing the infinite distance that 
distinguishes the uncreated Trinity from all creatures (Keating, 2007, p.103) 
 
 Although there is a ‘similarity’ between creation and God, necessitated by the 
fact that creation participates in his being, there is always a distinction (Keating, 
2007, p.99). However, that distinction is always infinitely greater than our ‘likeness’ 
to God as being made in his image (cf. Williams, 1999, p.54). In this direction, 
Keating uses the word ‘derive’ to describe the relationship between creation and God; 
creation derives its Being from God. He writes that ‘we share in [God’s] being in that 
he gives us our created being by bringing us into existence. He has it essentially; we 
have it derivatively and by participation’ (Keating, 2007, p.97). 
 
b. Participation and the Relationship Between Nature and Grace 
 Such an understanding of participation as both creation and deification can 
only work if a particular understanding of the relationship between nature and grace is 
held in the background. If creation and deification are both participation in divinity 
then there cannot be a separation of nature and the supernatural. In this way, this 
notion of participation still conforms to a Teilhardian theological paradigm but 
without the teleological evolutionary element. For Teilhard, nature and grace were 
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two parts of the same thing, however, he saw this as a process that is played out in 
time. Neo-Darwinism disagrees with this notion of completion in time through 
evolution and thus a new exposition of this relationship needs to be attempted. The 
doctrine of participation outlined here, following, as it does, the rejection of teleology 
from Christology, and the conflation of that process into the one, single event of the 
incarnation, is that attempt. This doctrine of participation still represents a Teilhardian 
Christology. The themes of Christ as creator, creation as the body of Christ, 
participation in the divine milieu, are all present here, yet the teleological direction 
that was so important for Teilhard has been removed. 
 
c. Participation as Christological Doctrine 
 By affirming participation as the way that God creates, as God’s sole act of 
causality, there are some allusions to the concept of the divine milieu as it was 
outlined in the chapter on Teilhard’s Christology. Teilhard wrote of the divine milieu 
that: 
 
nothing, Lord Jesus, can subsist outside of your flesh; so that even those who 
have been cast out from your love are still, unhappily for them, the beneficiaries 
of your presence upholding them in existence. All of us, inescapably, exist in 
you, the universal milieu in which and through which all things live and have 
their being (Teilhard de Chardin, 1977, p.33) 
 
 God’s act of creation is to create the divine milieu, but this is not a process. It 
does not have a teleological future completion, but is one act in Christ. This act, as it 
has already been explored, is the incarnation; the divine milieu is the ontological 
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‘space’ that is left after the divine nature is ‘retracted’ in the person of Christ – the 
divine milieu is the historical body of Christ in which all creation participates. The 
divine milieu is no longer a tension between finished and unfinished but is an 
eternally defined state of being (cf. Peter, 2012, p.87; Rahner, 1966, p.183). 
 Therefore, it is not God that creation participates in but Christ; it is not the 
divine nature that is participated in but the person of Christ. Such a reinterpretation is 
found in Teilhard. For Teilhard, participation is participation in the body of Christ, 
which is the only thing that is created. Christ’s body (his third nature) is creation, and 
thus to be created means to participate in this body. The same can be said for this 
reinterpretation of participation. It is Teilhardian in that it makes precisely the same 
demands of Christology, namely, that it is Christ who creates, and that creation is 
participation in his body. The only difference is that here a greater focus is put on the 
incarnation as an event, and the need to explicitly affirm that creation is something the 
person of Christ does, and therefore participation is a participation in the person of 
Christ, not in the divine nature (creation does not ‘inhabit’ the divine nature, it 
‘cohabits’ Christ’s person with the divine nature, the two meeting in the person of 
Christ), precisely because neo-Darwinism rejects the teleological dimension of 
Teilhard’s own exposition. 
 
d. Participation as Imitation 
 The concept of imitation can also further embellish the doctrine of 
participation outlined above. The manifestation of participation in the individual takes 
the form of an imitation; creation imitates Christ because creation participates in 
Christ. Keating framed the notion of creation’s participation in God with ideas such as 
hierarchy, and unequal relationships between the participating and the participated, 
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and it is precisely this language that is used to describe the relationship between the 
imitating and the imitated. The infinite degree of separation of creation from God that 
characterizes what it means to participate in God, through Christ, is exactly the same 
relationship that exists between Christ and those called to imitate him. In both 
imitation and participation there is a tension between necessity and contingency or 
derivation; God has Being necessarily and creation derives its being from God. 
 Castelli, in Imitating Paul, notes that one of the fundamental elements of the 
doctrine of imitation of Christ is the establishment of a hierarchy between a model 
and a copy. She writes that: 
 
mimesis is constituted through a hierarchy in which the model is imbued with 
perfection and wholeness, and the copy represents an attempt to reclaim that 
perfection…[thus] Christ is to Paul as Paul is to the Corinthians; Paul asks for 
an act of imitatio Pauli which mirrors his own imitatio Christi (Castelli, 1991, 
p.86, p.112; cf. Tinsley, 1960, p.100) 
 
There is a setting up of the leader as an example and the congregation as imitators. 
The community/congregation are called to follow the leader/Paul’s own imitation of 
Christ. Imitation, therefore, ‘presupposed a hierarchical structure: 
community/Paul/Christ/God’ (Castelli, 1991, p.112; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987, 
p.221). Quite importantly, the congregation is not called to imitate God directly; they 
are called to imitate the community leaders who in turn imitate Paul, who in turn 
imitates Christ. As Paul himself exclaims, ‘be imitators of me, as I am of Christ’ 
(NRSV, 1995, 1 Cor. 11.1). 
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 Yet the imitation of the model by the copy can never be perfect. Imitation is 
always a relationship of unequals, as Castelli continues 
 
there exists in the notion of imitation this tension between drive to sameness 
and the inability to achieve it, an inability which creates a hierarchy…the model 
is imbued with perfection and wholeness, the copy represents an attempt to 
reclaim that perfection…mimesis becomes a derivative function, in that it 
attempts to reproduce an unattainable origin (Castelli, 1991, p.75, p.86) 
 
 The use of language such as ‘hierarchy’ and ‘derivation’ clearly puts this idea 
of imitation in the same category as participation, and therefore it is suggested that 
they can be used to describe the same phenomenon. The relationship between Christ 
and creation outlined in the doctrine of participation is the same relationship outlined 
in the doctrine of imitation. Participation in Christ and imitation of Christ are, for all 
intents and purposes, synonyms. 
 
 Castelli also highlights the role that unity plays in the relationship of imitation. 
She writes that 
 
unity within the community constructs the community as “us who are being 
saved”; unity and sameness produce salvation, while difference (“those who are 
perishing”, i.e. those who are not being saved, those who are different “us”) is 
damned to folly (Castelli, 1991, p.99) 
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In other words, precisely because all are imitating the same perfect model, Christ, 
there is inevitably going to be a unity that exists between them, regardless of the 
degree to which imitation is happening. If every copy is imitating the same model 
then there is necessarily going to be some degree of unity. Imitation, therefore, creates 
unity, and if it is Christ who causes the imitation of creation then it is Christ who is 
the cause of the unity that exists in creation. However, this unity is not a future 
convergence, but an underlying, ontological grounding of creation. Imitation is as 
much a doctrine of creation as it is deification, not because the two represent two ends 
of the same process, but because they are two ways of looking at the same event. 
 However, there is also a unity, not with the rest of creation, but with God as 
well. Imitation does not just imply a unity between copies but a unity between the 
copies and the model. Montagnes, when discussing the doctrine of the analogy of 
being, notes that one way in which there can be said to be unity is ‘in the fact that 
creatures imitate God to the extent that they can’ (Montagnes, 2004, p.36). There is 
never a complete unity, because that would imply a degree of sameness that would 
destroy the tension between imitating and imitated; if creation became identical to 
Christ, they would no longer be imitating or participating in him, but would be him.55 
 
 Thus, to participate in Christ is to imitate Christ. Creation depends on Christ 
for its existence and, because it participates in his life, creation can be said to imitate 
Christ. Deification is ‘achieved’ through imitation of Christ, but to be created is to 
                                                        
55
 This means that personal identity is also affirmed in the doctrine of imitation. 
Castelli continues that ‘imitation is then the celebration of identity, in the sense that 
sameness implies the quality of identicalness…[imitation] is the struggle to write the 
identity of the copy onto the model’ (Castelli, 1991, p.22). The individual’s personal 
identity is defined by their imitation of Christ. Whilst there is not the scope to explore 
this function of imitation further, it adds an interesting dimension to the question of a 
new neo-Darwinian ontology. 
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imitate Christ. Both creation and deification are the same ‘thing’, an interpretation 
made possible, it has already been suggested, because of the particular understanding 
of nature and grace that underpins this whole Christology. 
 
e. Participation: A Neo-Darwinian Interpretation 
 However, perhaps even more importantly, the relationship that has been 
characterized by participation and imitation can also be understood as made necessary 
by the conclusions reached by neo-Darwinism. The ontology of ‘half-fixity’ that was 
argued to be the conclusion of the neo-Darwinian synthesis can be seen to fit this 
paradigm of hierarchy and unequal relationship. Both the Christological 
understanding of imitation and participation and the neo-Darwinian understanding of 
evolution work within a framework of model and copy, with the success of such a 
copying to be necessarily imperfect. Between the model and the copy, between Christ 
and creation there is an infinite gap whereby the copy attempts to imitate the model, 
the copy attempts to replicate the model, but can never do so perfectly. 
 Darwin himself pointed to the importance of imitation in the evolutionary 
process (Darwin, 2004, p.93, p.154), however, Dawkins explicitly uses the language 
of imitation to describe the role of genes in evolution. Dawkins writes that ‘the 
gene…[which is] the replicating entity that prevails on this planet…[is] a unity of 
imitation’ (Dawkins, 2006, p.192). Here the gene is explicitly being labeled as 
something that imitates. The ‘process’ of evolution, therefore, could be labeled as one 
of imitation. Dawkins reinforces this interpretation, writing that ‘if individuals live in 
a social climate in which imitation is common, this corresponds to a cellular climate 
rich in enzymes for copying DNA’ (Dawkins, 1999, p.110). 
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 Even Dawkins’ celebrated idea of the ‘selfish’ gene can contribute something 
to this understanding. The idea behind the selfish gene is not that the gene is only 
interested in itself – in the sense of ‘it’s me versus the world’ (leading some to argue 
that Dawkins must be wrong because the presence of altruism ‘disproves’ genetic 
selfishness) – but that the gene ‘wants’ to replicate itself as faithfully as possible. The 
gene is not selfish in an anthropomorphic sense of disregard for others, but selfish in 
the sense that replication fidelity is the most important aspect. The paradigm of 
imitation underpins this idea. 
 
 Of course Dawkins’ own atheist beliefs prohibit the imitation of Christ to be 
the context in which he claims there is a ‘social climate in which imitation is 
common’, but that does not mean that a comparison cannot be drawn. What happens 
in evolution can rightly be compared with what happens in Christology; just as 
creatures imitate Christ through a hierarchy, so genes imitate one another. 
 The diversity in the world is explained solely by the imperfect imitation by 
genes and chromosomes of their immediate ancestors. However, this diversity is not 
the intention of the ‘process’ of replication, quite the opposite in fact, as the last 
chapter on neo-Darwinism suggested. The diversity present in the universe is simply a 
by-product of the fact that the imitation of one by the other is never perfect. 
 Whilst there is no space to expound it fully, there is perhaps the possibility of 
a comparison of this idea of a neo-Darwinian understanding of Christological 
imitation and Dawkins’ idea of the ‘meme’. The idea of a ‘meme’ itself is not without 
its critics. It has been suggested, for example, that the Darwinian paradigm should be 
kept as a biological explanation and not be introduced into sociology (McGrath, 2005, 
p.119ff). It may also be criticized that, whilst genes replicate ‘longitudinally’, memes 
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(and ‘Christological’ imitation) can replicate ‘horizontally’ as well (Dawkins, 2003, 
p.142). However, the point is not that memes and genes are exactly identical, but that 
they both work in the same way, in other words the same ontological category can be 
applied to both. Dawkins makes this same point when he claims that the whole point 
of his work was to argue for ‘universal Darwinism’ of which the special example of 
DNA replication was one manifestation; the meme could be another (Dawkins, 2003, 
p.149). For Dawkins, the universe is characterized by a particular ontology that 
governs the way that genes replicate, and this can also be applied to cultural 
replication. 
 This thesis is making the same point. It claims that the ontology of imitation 
that comes into being because of the Tzimtzumic incarnation is sufficient to explain 
everything that was claimed about neo-Darwinism in the previous chapter; Christ, by 
his incarnation, creates an ontological space (co-extensive with his historical body) 
that is characterized by mutability (as opposed to dynamic change, and synonymous 
with the Christological idea of imitation) and which allows for the spontaneous self-
creation of the universe from nothing and the subsequent evolution. Imitation by the 
individual of their ancestors, with all the possibility of error in imitation, works in 
precisely the same way as genes replication of each other. 
 There is, therefore, a definite connection, even an identity, between the 
theological understanding of participation and imitation and the neo-Darwinian 
understanding of genetics; there is an identity between how individuals imitate God 
and how genes replicate (cf. Dawkins, 2003, p.147). This leads to the conclusion that 
the neo-Darwinian understanding of genetic replication is precisely how one might 
expect evolution to happen from this theological position. Neo-Darwinian evolution is 
simply the implementation of participation and imitation of Christ in a biological 
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context. Likewise, the same tension can also be applied to physical systems (cf. Jonas, 
Mivart), in terms of instability producing change in ‘systems’ that are trying to remain 
stable. There is still this tension between model and copy and the inability of the one 
to ‘reproduce’ the former. In other words, the spontaneous springing of matter from 
nothing that is the beginning of the universe is due to the fact that the ontological 
space that was created by the incarnation is characterized by one of imitation (and the 
mutability that makes imitation imperfect). 
 This means that Teilhard’s affirmation that Christ is the evolver can still be 
true. For Teilhard this was as efficient cause, whereas now it must be as formal cause. 
However, this does not mean that evolution was the intention of the incarnation; God, 
in Christ, does not set up the conditions of the world to create for him – neo-
Darwinism denies such an interpretation. However spontaneous creation, the result of 
instability in quantum fields was a possibility when Christ became what he is not, thus 
creating the ontological possibility of mutability. Teilhard’s Christ is still the Christ 
that is being appealed to, but with some nuancing of the context in which he appears. 
 
f. Participation and Imitation: A Subjective Approach 
 This leads to a specific neo-Darwinian understanding of imitation and 
participation, which in turn argues for a subjective understanding of the relationship 
of creation to Christ. The important point for neo-Darwinism was an imperfect 
replication process and the fact that it was only a replication of the immediate 
ancestor, thus allowing for continual change and the denial of an objective element to 
evolution. The same criteria are present in imitation. 
 This means that if any judgment value is present in evolution, it is also present 
in imitation. More specifically, if the judgment of worth in evolution is entirely 
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subjective, then the judgment of worth in imitation of Christ is likewise entirely 
subjective. Just as the imitation of the gene is imitation of its direct ancestor, so 
imitation of the individual is imitation of their ancestors, rather than an objective 
principle. However, before this subjective relationship to Christ is fully worked 
through, something first needs to be said regarding the role of Christ as creation. For 
Teilhard this was in the shape of postulating a third nature, but this forward-looking, 
teleological dimension has now been removed and something new must be said 
regarding the constitution of the person of Christ; if neo-Darwinism provokes a new 
anthropology, and a new theology, then this necessarily implies that the constitution 
of the God-man will also look different. This does not mean that the Chalcedonian 
definition must be rejected, but the context in which it is found must be reinterpreted. 
 
Christ’s Cosmic Function as Third Nature 
 Teilhard accounted for the tension between the historical body of Christ and 
creation as the body of Christ by postulating a third nature, separate from his 
historical nature, which he assumes at the end of evolution. However, now, such a 
postulation is unnecessary. Creation is no longer a process with a future completion 
and the event of creation is no longer a drawn out affair. This means that the historical 
body of the incarnation performs the function that Teilhard needed a third nature for 
(when a reinterpretation of the constitution of the hypostatic union in Christ is below 
is combined with the idea of the incarnation as tzimtzum above). When it is affirmed 
that the role of Christ is only in ‘formal’ causality, and not ‘efficient’ causality, then 
the two realities can exist in the same physical body. The ‘space’ that is created in the 
incarnation (which causes mutability and thus providing the basis for evolution) is not 
a physical space, the contraction of God in the incarnation is not a physical 
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contraction – because God is not physical – therefore the historical body of Christ can 
be the ‘ontological space’ of creation without any contradiction. (This also means that 
the problems with Teilhard’s Christology in terms of the neglect of the historical can 
also be corrected.) 
 Teilhard needed to posit a third nature of Christ because the second nature of 
Christ did not come at the end of evolution. The human Jesus does not represent the 
fullness of convergent evolution; Christ needs a body that is coextensive with the 
cosmos to do so. However, now that the possibility of ‘completion’ has been removed 
(i.e. the rejection of teleology), and, complementarily, there is no such thing as 
humanity as distinct from the rest of the cosmos, there is no need to postulate a ‘third’ 
nature.  
 For Teilhard, the historical Christ has a different ‘body’ from the cosmic 
Christ. The ‘mystical’ body of the cosmic Christ is the universe, which is 
differentiated from his historical body, as they perform different functions. The 
historical body almost takes on a teaching role, its function is to show humanity the 
way to bring about the end of evolution and to assist in that ‘bringing’ (hence his 
doctrine of original sin). However, his mystical body is that end of evolution, the only 
thing that is being created. However, now that ‘efficient’ causality has been removed, 
and there is no end to fasten, there is no need for this future nature. 
 Creation does exist in Christ, it is in Christ that creation moves and has it’s 
being (NRSV, 1995, Acts 17.28), but creation does not need to ‘inhabit’ Christ (cf. 
Torrance, 1978, pp.38-9), instead it participates in his form. Christ defines what it 
means to be created, i.e. formal causality (cf. Mostert, 2011, p.127). There is thus no 
inconsistency between the assumption of creation by Christ as an event ‘later’ than 
the first moment of time, because the kenotic/tzimtzumic incarnation is a proleptic 
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event. The incarnation is an eternal event; therefore its temporal manifestation does 
not need to be at the beginning of time because there is no identity between the Son’s 
contraction of his divinity and the first moment of time. As de Lubac makes clear, 
‘Christ existing before all things cannot be separated from Christ born of the woman, 
who died and rose again’ (de Lubac, 1947, p.174; cf. NRSV, 1995, Jn. 8.58). 
 This means that the incarnation is not coterminal with the Big Bang but, as 
already stated, the incarnation creates the ontological conditions that mean 
spontaneous self-creation by the universe is possible. The Big Bang is the beginning 
of time, the first moment of time, but the incarnation is the bridge between time and 
eternity. The fact that this bridge is temporally manifested at the ‘middle-point’ in 
time does not contradict the fact that it causes time itself; it is not an efficient cause of 
time but the formal cause. 
  
The Constitution of the God-Man 
 This provokes a reworking of the constitution of the person of Christ. If neo-
Darwinism provokes a reinterpretation, respectively, of humanity and God, then it is 
logical to claim that this leads to a reinterpretation of the hypostatic union of Christ. 
However, that new anthropology is not towards a more dynamic conception of 
humanity (as Lane contends (1990, p.131)) but is instead a relegation of humanity 
from their previous privileged position among the animal world. There is no longer 
any basis to claim that humanity deserve any special treatment from God. The 
accumulative, quantitative difference between humanity and the rest of creation 
further provided ammunition for this relegation. There is absolutely no way of 
distinguishing where humanity begins and the rest of creation ends; therefore, there is 
nothing that can objectively be termed ‘human’ nature. If this is so, then there can be 
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no ‘human’ nature for Christ to assume. If the act of creation is only achieved through 
assumption, then this provokes a new understanding of what it means for Christ to 
assume ‘human’ nature. 
 Likewise, if there is no ‘traditional’ understanding of original sin, no original 
historical event, there is nothing that makes humanity uniquely in need of the 
incarnation. The ‘fact’ of evolution, as it was acknowledged in the introduction, and 
as it was by Teilhard, suggests that humanity is not inherently sinful and has no 
unique need of Christ’s grace. The ‘mechanism’ of neo-Darwinism further clarifies 
that God no longer uniquely favours humanity – he treats all creatures identically – as 
there isn’t anything concrete that can be considered humanity anyway. 
 
 Teilhard did not consider the wider implications of this evolutionary 
constitution because he did not recognize the relegation of humanity. Christ was only 
relevant to the rest of creation in as much as he was the fulfilment of the process of 
which they constituted an earlier part (Dobson, 1984, p.208). Mooney evidences that 
for Teilhard 
 
the humanity of Christ embraces not only the human race but also the cosmos in 
so far as this is united to man, that is to say, in so far as evolution produces 
man, and in so far as man freely fosters that personal unity in the noosphere 
which is the key to evolutionary progress (Mooney, 1966, p.146 (italics mine)) 
 
Evolution, for Teilhard, was a means to another end, and therefore, since other 
creatures represent a lower and more primitive part of that process, they are only 
indirectly addressed in the incarnation. Teilhard does not need, therefore, to ‘spread’ 
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the ‘range’ of the incarnation either ‘backwards’ or ‘outwards’ (to put the point rather 
crudely), to include all of the past and present life in the relevance of the incarnation. 
 To put the point differently, if ‘that which is not assumed is not created’, to 
paraphrase Gregory of Nazianzus, then Teilhard’s Christ does not need to assume 
other ‘natures’ because they are represented by humanity who, by being a later, more 
united and converged manifestation of evolution, transcends them. However, if 
humanity no longer represents a ‘better’ nature, and indeed there is no such thing as 
‘human’ nature anymore anyway, what exactly is it that Christ assumes in the 
incarnation? Lyons asks the same question in his book on Teilhard’s Christology, 
writing 
 
this language [of cosmic Christ] says that what God does for men he also does 
for the whole of creation; and it asks the question, if to be involved with 
humanity God becomes man, what does he become to be involved with the 
whole of creation? (Lyons, 1982, p.4) 
 
 
a. Christ’s Assumption of Creation 
 Christ is creation; creation participates in Christ, but ontologically, not 
physically. This relegation of ‘efficient’ causality means that creation does not need to 
physically ‘inhabit’ Christ, hence the rejection of the third nature. The cosmic nature, 
which is the ontological ‘inhabitation’ of Christ’s person, can be coterminous with his 
historical body without any contradiction. This means that Christ must now be 
relevant, not just to humanity, but to all creation, and not just indirectly either, since 
there is nothing to suggest that humanity is representative of the rest of creation. If 
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creation happens because of an assumption of nature, then all of creation, every 
manifestation of evolution, must now be assumed by Christ in order for them to have 
Being. 
 
 Whilst for practical purposes the classification of life into variations and 
species is essential, philosophically it is not only an arbitrary process but also, in 
many respects, an impossible one. There is now no such thing as human nature proper 
since it not only emerged from, but is also therefore impossible to demarcate from, 
the rest of creation. What it means to be human is only one manifestation of what it 
means to be created. All life, and in many respects all matter as well, becomes 
connected and linked in a genealogical and familial way, and there is no clear way, as 
Darwin made clear (2009, p.378), of properly distinguishing where those ‘divides’ 
should be. 
 To put the point crudely, if humanity is saved through Christ’s assumption of 
human nature then so must its direct ancestors, so must the Neanderthals, and so must 
their ancestors, and so on until all of creation becomes implicated. If humanity, for 
example, shares 50% of its DNA with bananas (cf. Morris, 2010, p.159), and creation 
and deification extend ‘automatically’ because of Christ’s assumption of human 
nature, then at least 50% of all bananas are deified. Yet what about the slight DNA 
differences between humans? Are only humans who are exactly genetically identical 
to Christ deified? Since these questions do not make sense, it seems better to claim 
that all creation is now implicated in Christ’s incarnation, rather than limiting it to 
only genetically identical individuals. Precisely because evolution is the result of 
small accumulative changes, no ontological separation can be made and thus all of 
creation enjoys being at the centre of God’s work. Christ comes for the benefit of all 
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creation, not just humanity – ‘all living things are brothers and sisters because they 
have the same genetic code’ (Boff, 1997, p.211). 
 The implications of this theological approach to the traditional Chalcedonian 
constitution of Christ are great. Christ, according to the Nicaeo-Constantinopolitan 
Creed, was truly God and truly man, he was two natures in one person, he had one 
divine nature and one human nature. However, neo-Darwinism concludes that, due to 
the inherent biological unity of creation, there cannot be anything so concrete as a 
particular nature. Life is just a ‘smeary continuum’ of different manifestations of 
evolution. Instead of claiming that Christ assumed a human nature, it must be claimed 
that Christ assumed a created nature; Christ was not a human, he was a creature.56 
 All nature is now included in the work of God, nothing is excluded. All 
creatures must find their ontological grounding in Christ, not just humanity. To put 
the point differently (with reference to Gregory of Nazianzus’ infamous formula), if 
Christ assumed male humanity, then only male humanity are deified through him, and 
therefore male humanity is the only thing that was created. If Christ assumed 
humanity, the fact of his maleness being irrelevant, then humanity is deified him 
through him, and therefore humanity is the only thing that was created. If God 
assumed creation, the fact of his humanity being irrelevant, then creation is deified 
through him, and therefore the creation of everything finds its ontological ground.57 
                                                        
56
 The use of the word ‘creature’, ‘created’, ‘creation’ etc, shall be used, not as an 
opposite of ‘uncreated’, but in the sense of using a neutral term that can apply to the 
whole of creation, to include every creature (which in turn means ‘something 
created’, and thus includes literally everything that exists from humanity to 
elementary particles); ‘when all is said and done, quantum fields are simply creatures’ 
(Polkinghorne, 2006, p.72). 
57
 In Galatians Paul writes that ‘there is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer 
slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ 
Jesus’ (NRSV, 1995, Gal 3.28). Prat writes on this verse that ‘for Christians, 
identified individually with Christ in the unity of his mystical body, the natural 
inequalities of race, condition, sex, no longer count for anything. A slave is as good as 
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 This is precisely what one would expect from a neo-Darwinian Christology. 
Humanity is accidental; there is nothing to suggest that evolution worked towards the 
appearance of humanity, nor that the appearance of humanity was inevitable. If this is 
the case, then the same must be said of Christ’s assumption of it; Christ’s being 
human is only accidental, there is no reason for Christ to appear as a human. The 
incarnation is necessary as the means of creating, but if humanity is accidental, then 
Christ’s humanity must also be accidental. Christ, it must be maintained, could have 
just as easily appeared as a tree, a mushroom, a cicada fly, or indeed an extra-
terrestrial and the creation of the universe would be just as effective. The important 
point is that Christ became created, not that he became man. This doesn’t deny the 
fact that Christ did appear as a ‘human’ in first century Palestine, nor that this was the 
moment of revelation of God to creation, but it wasn’t necessary for it to happen this 
way. 
 
b. The Constitution of Christ as Tzimtzum 
 This understanding of the constitution of the God-creature complements the 
idea of Christ’s incarnation as tzimtzum. The quotation of Russell used above in 
support of the understanding that it is through Christ’s assuming human nature, not 
his ‘efficacious, vicarious death’, that he defies and creates can now be nuanced to 
include all creatures. It must now be ‘the unity of [creation]…means that the whole of 
[creation] is deified…when the [creature] which the logos assumed is deified him’ (cf. 
Russell, 2004, p.172). All of creation is now unified, and it is this created nature, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
a free man’ (Prat, 1945, p.276). It is possible to add no creature, no manifestation of 
life and matter at all, is separate from Christ. Christ is relevant to all, and in that way 
he assumed all life. 
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smeary continuum of created nature, that Christ assumes and creates through 
grounding it ontologically in his historical body. 
 Likewise, de Lubac’s quotation, used above in support of the same 
interpretation, can be similarly nuanced. De Lubac notes that it is important to 
maintain that Christ, in assuming human nature, did not just become another human 
person; his humanity was different in the sense that he assumed human nature itself 
(de Lubac, 1947, pp.37-8). However, there is no longer a human nature that can be 
separated and held apart from created nature; Christ no longer assumes a human body 
but a created body. This created body must be identified with the ontological ‘space’ 
that remains after Christ ‘retracts’ his divine nature. The created nature of his 
historical body is the nature that Christ ‘assumes’ in emptying his divine nature; this 
created nature is what results when God ‘subtracts’. Again, this neo-Darwinian 
interpretation of the incarnation performs the same function that Teilhard needed a 
third nature for: the unity of creation in Christ. 
 
c. Constitution of Christ as Biological Unity 
 All creatures are united in Christ, and all creatures find their ontological 
grounding in Christ. This means that there is an ontological unity in creation that 
mirrors their biological unity. De Lubac writes that ‘the unity of the mystical body of 
Christ, a supernatural unity, supposes a previous natural unity, the unity of the human 
race’ (de Lubac, 1947, p.25). However, if that ‘previous natural unity’ is now 
extended to include all creatures, then this must mean that the ‘supernatural’ unity in 
the mystical body of Christ is likewise extended. This unity is found in the historical 
body of Jesus of Nazareth. 
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 However, if deification and creation are now the same event, not two ends of 
the same process, then Christ’s assumption of creation is no longer limited to 
deification but also includes creation. Again, there is a distinct understanding of the 
relationship between nature and grace here that is distinctive of Teilhardian 
Christology and comes to represent the mainstay of Roman Catholic theology after 
the Second Vatican Council. The natural unity of creation and the supernatural unity 
of creation are the same thing. To put it another way, the Christological unity, which 
was affirmed above as the result of imitation, is the same as the biological unity that 
neo-Darwinism claims. All creation is now made in the image of God, not just 
humanity. The genealogical and familial unity that exists in nature means that all of 
creation is made in the image of God, which again is the historical body of Christ; 
‘[Christ] is the Logos, the image according to which not only man but all creation is 
fashioned’ (Maloney, 1968, p.7). 
 Again, such a conflation of creation and deification, such is the outcome of a 
Teilhardian doctrine of nature and grace yet without the teleological, forward-looking 
dimension, concludes that there is no need to postulate a third nature of Christ. The 
‘second’, creaturely, historical nature of Christ fulfils the role that Teilhard wanted it 
to. There is no need to postulate another, cosmic Christ, because the historical nature 
of Christ, by removing ‘efficient’ causality and a future completion, is cosmic in 
dimension and function. 
 
Participation and Imitation: A Subjective Approach 
 With a new interpretation of the constitution of Christ, and his role in being 
the ground of creation, the subjective nature of imitation of Christ can be returned to. 
If all creatures are imitating Christ by virtue of finding their ontological grounding in 
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him, and that this imitation is an imitation, not of Christ directly, but of their ancestor, 
then just as neo-Darwinism becomes subjective, so does ontological imitation. 
 Castelli supported the idea of imitation by maintaining that there is a hierarchy 
that exists in terms of who imitates whom. Humanity does not imitate Christ directly 
but through the imitation of community leaders, theologians, biblical translators etc. 
and therefore is always susceptible to mistakes. Since the copy is always imperfect, 
this means that ‘errors’ are always going to be possible, not because theologians and 
biblical translators are consciously attempting to change (although this might 
sometimes be the case), but because they can only ever present a subjective account 
of the revelation of God in Christ; no theologian can work out of context (Wiles, 
1986, p.10). What it means for humanity to imitate Christ in twenty first century 
Western society is entirely different from what it means for a first century Palestinian 
to imitate Christ. Yet, it could be argued that the difference between the two 
‘imitations’ is nothing but a ‘smeary continuum’ of different imitations, caused by 
replication ‘errors’ of theologians’ interpretations or biblical translations etc (cf. 
Cupitt, 1972, p.144). 
 This means that there is likewise a relationship with participation. All creation 
participates in Christ but that participation is not an ‘indwelling’, it is not an 
‘inhabiting’. Thus all the manifold and diverse creation participates in Christ through 
their ancestors, just as they imitate Christ through imitation of their ancestors. The 
hierarchy that it is argued is demanded by the use of participation and imitation is not 
a hierarchy in nature, there is an equality in nature that does not allow the postulation 
of higher and lower; the hierarchy is between Christ and creation. This means that 
there are various ways in which imitation and participation is manifested, but there is 
no judgment value; it is entirely subjective. 
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 However, as outlined in relation to the constitution of Christ, Christ is not just 
relevant to humanity but to all creatures equally; his appearance as a human does not 
betray a uniqueness on the part of humanity. This means that one does not need to be 
a human to imitate Christ; in the same way that Christ’s maleness is not important, so 
neither is his humanity. A tree, for example (cf. Delio, 2013, p.99, quoting Thomas 
Merton), imitates Christ by being a tree. Therefore, in the same way, it can be said 
that a hydrogen atom imitates Christ by being a hydrogen atom. 
 To suggest that inanimate matter and/or ‘irrational’ life’s imitation of Christ is 
forced since they do not have a brain and therefore are not able to freely choose to do 
anything, as Rolston argues that ‘trees do nothing voluntarily’ (Rolston, 2001, p.62), 
is merely an anthropocentric assumption that such a distinction correlates to better or 
worse. There is nothing superior about consciousness, therefore, there is nothing 
superior about humanity’s ability to freely choose an action (cf. Kenney, 1970, p.65), 
assuming of course that humanity are completely free, something that modern 
behaviourists have denied (Pannenburg, 1985, p.29). Precisely because consciousness 
is an evolved category it only represents one subjective manifestation of the 
ontological principle of imitation of Christ. Conscious and unconscious imitation 
merely represent two subjective ‘attempts’ to imitate Christ and do not form a 
progression.58 
 Genes, it has been argued, act in precisely the same way. Genes imitate their 
ancestors, just as humans do, therefore they can be included in this subjective 
exposition of imitation. What a gene does is imitate Christ, the way it does this just 
                                                        
58
 This also applies to the magnetic fields that hold atoms together. Teilhard claimed 
that it was the love of God that held atoms together (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, 
p.146), however, now it must be claimed that this ‘attraction’ is an imitation of the 
love of God by those elementary particles responsible for such forces. 
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happens to accidentally provide the basis upon which evolution occurs. The 
replication, and possible errors that occur in replication, are only the manifestation on 
the level of genes of the ontological principle that imitation of Christ is the basis of 
creation. 
 There is no ontological separation between anything in existence; all find their 
ontological grounding in the divine milieu that was brought into existence through 
Christ’s incarnation. Such an ontology, it has been argued, can be described as one of 
imitation or ‘half-fixity’, therefore, the subjective approach that was claimed to be 
characteristic of neo-Darwinism can also be applied to the Christological doctrine that 
all creatures must imitate Christ – itself made necessary because of neo-Darwinist 
interpretation of the constitution of Christ’s person. 
 
Omega Point as Parousia: A Reinterpretation of Vision 
 As well as this subjective interpretation of imitation of Christ – i.e. what 
constitutes imitation for one is different from what constitutes imitation for another – 
the distinction between creation and deification is likewise subjective. Such a position 
is, of course, dependent upon Teilhard’s particular understanding of the relationship 
between nature and grace, but it must be argued that Teilhard did not go far enough. 
He postulated a connection between nature and grace because the natural process of 
evolution has a supernatural term. However, now that there is no term, there is 
nothing, per se, to separate creation and deification, as Lossky argues, ‘the notion of 
creation in Dionysius is so close to that of deification that it is hard to distinguish 
between the first state of creatures and their union with God, their final end’ (Lossky, 
1957, p.97). Creation and deification are precisely the same event, not two ends of the 
same process, thus Williams can write that ‘the entire story of salvation from creation, 
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through the fall and our redemption, to consummation, is condensed into this one 
moment [the Transfiguration of Christ], and thus a single moment of history stands as 
a comprehensive statement of Christian theology, like a creed, a symbol of faith’ 
(Williams, 1999, p.116). However, the transfiguration, like the cross and resurrection 
of Christ, are only important in that they point towards the incarnation, that this 
human was truly divine. The transfiguration is only important in that it confirms the 
incarnation took place. 
 If creation and deification are the same event – participation in the divine 
nature, or, now, participation in the Christic person – then the only distinction 
between the two is subjective. The ontological basis of creation is participation in 
Christ and, likewise, deification is participation in Christ. For Teilhard, there was a 
definite progress in terms of what it meant to participate in Christ, but now this 
progress has been removed so that it becomes nonsensical to talk about progression in 
participation in Christ. The difference becomes only one of interpretation, or, better, it 
is the person who has ‘vision’ who realizes that they are already deified in Christ; the 
two can be seen as a Gestalt picture, they are simply two ways of looking at the same 
picture (cf. Hefner, 1993, p.271). If imitation of Christ is subjective then the imitation 
of Christ that represents deification is likewise subjective. 
 The comparisons with Gregory of Nyssa’s doctrine of epekstasis are clear. If 
there is an infinite distance between creation and God through Christ, then there is 
always infinite possibility for greater imitation and participation in Christ. This 
infinite possibility of progress therefore means that there is no real progress at all; just 
like evolution, the only possible criteria for judging progress is entirely subjective and 
relative (cf. Dobzhansky, 1982, p.23; Huxley, 1942, p.119). There is nothing to 
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prevent the conclusion that a tree imitates and participates in God to a greater extent 
than humanity because such a judgment is only relative. 
 
 The example of the Transfiguration can serve to illustrate the point. Mooney 
writes of the Transfiguration that ‘[Christ’s] divinity was not fully manifested in his 
humanity except on Mt. Tabor in the transfiguration. There was no change in Christ, 
yet a radical change took place in the belief of Peter, James, and John’ (Maloney, 
1968, p.246). Lossky also writes that ‘the transfiguration is not a phenomenon 
circumscribed in time and space; no change took place in Christ at that moment, even 
in his human nature, but a change was produced in the consciousness of the apostles’ 
(Lossky, 1975, p.61). The point is that the Apostles ‘saw’ Christ differently; there was 
no objective change. The same can be said of all creatures. Creation does not 
objectively change, it does not progress towards a future perfection when all will be 
deified; those who have ‘eyes that can see’ are able to notice that creation imitates 
Christ and participate in his divine person. 
 Henri de Lubac can also contribute to this position. He writes that ‘for each 
one salvation consists in a personal ratification of his original “belonging” to Christ, 
so that he be not cast out, cut off from the whole’ (de Lubac, 1947, p.39). In other 
words, the individual already belongs to Christ, it is the reason for their Being, and 
deification consists in the individual recognizing such a belonging and ordering their 
life accordingly. For the human, this recognizing is conscious, but for other, non-
human life or matter, it must be a non-conscious ‘recognizing’. What this might mean 
is difficult to say, but, as Thomas Nagel illustrates (cf. Nagel, 1979, p.165ff), it is 
important not to anthropomorphize this ratification. 
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a. Two Biblical Parables 
 Two biblical passages help to illustrate such a position: the parable of the 
labourers and the parable of the widow’s mite. The first demonstrates the equal value 
of creation to God and the fact that, to God, any response [read: imitation] to his self-
revelation in Christ is just as good. Likewise, the second parable confirms the 
subjective nature of the imitation of Christ, that what is deemed imitation for one is 
not necessarily that of another. 
 
b. The Parable of the Labourers 
 The parable of the labourers, recorded only in the Gospel of Matthew, relates 
the parable of a landowner who hires workers throughout the day, yet at the end of the 
day, regardless of how long the labourers have worked, he pays them all the same 
wage; 
 
when those hired about five o’clock came, each of them received the usual daily 
wage. Now when the first came, they thought they would receive more; but 
each of them also received the usual daily wage. And when they received it, 
they grumbled against the landowner, saying, “these last worked only one hour, 
and you have made them equal to us who have bourne the burden of the day and 
the scorching heat” (NRSV, 1995, Mt 20.9-12) 
 
In evolution (the day), some, such as humanity, seem to be afforded a closer 
relationship with God (working all day), due to an anthropocentric understanding of 
imitation and the apparent openness to the call to respond to God that the evolution of 
consciousness affords them. Yet, objectively, it affords them no greater wage (the 
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relevance of Christ in the single, eternal outpouring of grace) than the rest of creation. 
God treats all creation the same. Both the unity of nature and the eternal action of God 
show that he pays all of his creation the same wage – it is anthropomorphic to suggest 
otherwise. God calls us all to work in the vineyard (respond to the call to imitation of 
Christ), and some respond to that invitation ‘better’ than others, but, ultimately, God 
pays all of creation equally, and the response (imitation) to that wage (grace) is only 
ever a subjective response. 
 
c. The Parable of the Widow’s Mite 
 The parable of the widow’s mite also provides a comparable example. 
Humanity in this example is the rich people. Other, non-human life (or even 
‘inanimate’ matter) is the widow. Just because humanity has the ‘riches’ of 
consciousness and freedom to give more to God does not mean that God does not 
revere it better than the contribution of the rest of creation – humanity ‘[contribute] 
out of their abundance’ whereas non-human life, the rest of creation, ‘out of [their] 
poverty has but in all [they] had to live on’ (NRSV, 1995, Lk. 21.1-4). If imitation is 
interpreted as being the ‘gifts put into the treasury’, then what constitutes a ‘good gift’ 
is completely subjective and relative; what is considered imitation for one person may 
not be the same for another. Humanity’s complex moral and ethical principles are 
nothing but a ‘codification’ of the imitation of God (cf. Delio, 2013, p.73). Imitation 
and participation in Christ is only ever a relative category, it has no objective value. 
 
 The outpouring of grace (wages) by God is singular and broad, whereas it is 
the creaturely reception of it that is graded (gifts put into the treasury), not the 
gratuitousness of God; it is not a case of ‘how much’ grace one receives (grace is not 
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‘quantifiable’ so that creatures can receive it differently), but how open to that grace 
that influences the life of the individual. This leads Williams to affirm that 
 
sanctifying grace cannot differ in degree [i.e. the single bestowal of grace in the 
incarnation] because its nature is to effect the union with God, but grace may 
differ in degree from the perspective of the subject, who may receive more or 
less of it and be more or less enlightened than another subject…[yet it is] not 
whether sanctification is God’s work or ours but whether our sanctification can 
be accomplished against our will or without or wills (Williams, 1999, p.86, 
p.130) 
 
 Thus, evolution, through the molding of life, ‘creates’ creatures that can, 
subjectively, imitate Christ differently. However, it would be too anthropocentric to 
suggest that this represents a better imitation of God, only a different imitation of 
God. God appreciates the small and insignificant gift of the elementary particles in 
just the same way that he does the grand riches of humanity. 
 
Conclusion 
 Teilhard’s Christology may look significantly different at this point, but it is 
still a Teilhardian Christology. Christ is responsible for creation, but now that the 
tension between finished and unfinished has been removed this leads to a relegation 
of efficient causality and an affirmation of formal causality. This means that 
participation in Christ is likewise not a progressive category. All participate in Christ 
not in correlation with how close to the end of evolution they are but equally. Christ is 
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equally relevant to all creation because evolution is no longer a ‘linear’ process of 
progression. 
 This affirmation of the equal relevance of all creation, in conjunction with the 
fact that creation is the event of the incarnation, now means that the constitution of 
Christ must be reinterpreted. There is nothing that can concretely be termed human 
nature, therefore there is nothing concretely that Christ assumed in the incarnation. In 
the same way that humanity are an accidental, irrelevant manifestation of evolution, 
so Christ’s humanity is irrelevant for his relationship with creation. 
 This reinterpretation of the hypostatic union also means that the event of the 
incarnation can now be reinterpreted as well. Christ assumed all creatures in his 
incarnation, but not ‘physically’ or ‘efficiently’ as Teilhard claimed his ‘third nature’ 
to be, but ‘formally’. This means that, in conjunction with the doctrine of Tzimtzum, 
the incarnation is not the addition of another nature, but the contraction of his divine 
nature. The ontological ‘space’ that is left is therefore no longer God and as a result is 
now mutable, characterized by the tension of imitation that provides the formal 
explanation for evolution. In this space spontaneous creation happens. This 
ontological ‘space’, now no longer needing to be a ‘physical’ body, can be identified 
with Christ’s historical body, denying the need for a ‘third’, cosmic nature; Christ’s 
historical body is cosmic. 
 This means that all creation is included in the incarnation and all find their 
ontological grounding in Christ. All creation imitates Christ because it participates in 
his person. Likewise, if creation and deification are the same event, what constitutes 
deification is no longer an objective principle applied to few, but an affirmation that 
the ‘original’ ontological ground and basis of life is supernatural in character. One 
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cannot participate in Christ more, since that implies that grace is quantifiable, and that 
there is a finite distance between God and creation. 
 Christ, therefore, is still the creator, he is still the principle of unity in which 
all creation participates, and he is still that which, at least formally, causes evolution 
(if somewhat indirectly, and accidentally). However, now, that principle is a single 
event not a process. The incarnation becomes, quite literally, ‘co-extensive with the 
duration of the universe’ (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965, p.64), but again, not as a 
process, but as a single event. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Further Problems and the Contextualization in Wider Roman Catholic Theology 
 
 
 The essential conclusions of this thesis were drawn at the end of the last 
chapter. This interpretation of Teilhard’s Christology, however, is not without 
problems. In claiming to represent a neo-Darwinian Christology, using Teilhard de 
Chardin as a model, it has raised more questions that lie outside the scope of this 
thesis to consider. Therefore, it is important to point out the direction in which further 
research is needed, and the particular questions that need addressing. 
 However, in raising these questions and problems, it will be shown that such 
issues can also be found in the work of Karl Rahner. This does not mean that Rahner 
will be used as evidence for what has been claimed, but rather that he works with the 
same themes that both Teilhard and this thesis have. After all, Rahner reached his 
own conclusions for different reasons and using different methods than have been 
used here. Indeed, it must be remembered that Rahner was implicitly criticised in the 
introduction for adhering to an evolutionary paradigm that this thesis has explicitly 
argued against. Rahner’s own evolutionary theology can be understood to follow from 
Teilhard’s in that he views in humanity an emergent manifestation of life that is 
qualitatively separated from the rest of creation. In his Foundations of the Christian 
Faith (1978), he writes that ‘man is thus the self-transcendence of living matter’ 
(Rahner, 1978, p.187) and that ‘the history of the cosmos is always and basically a 
history of the human spirit’ (Rahner, 1978, p.191), both of which express clear 
agreement with Teilhard’s general theory. At one point, Rahner even affirms a 
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positive correlation between being and consciousness that could be seen as similar to 
Teilhard’s (Rahner, 1978, p.303). Albeit that Rahner uses Aquinas for support, and 
Teilhard did not deal with Thomism favourably, this could provide further evidence 
of the similarity of the use of evolution within a theological paradigm. Moreover, 
Rahner’s treatment of the incarnation is also similar to that of Teilhard. When Rahner 
considers the incarnation explicitly from an evolutionary perspective, he notes that the 
Christ-event happens when it does, because it is at that moment that creation is able to 
respond to such an event (Rahner, 1978, p.181). This again is a theme that is 
paramount for Teilhard. 
 However, by making this claim he is fundamentally at odds with the neo-
Darwinian synthesis and thus must be criticised and corrected in precisely the same 
way that Teilhard de Chardin has been. When Rahner writes that ‘the notion that man 
is accidental and really unintended product of the history of nature, a caprice of 
nature, contradicts not only metaphysics and Christian faith but basically it also 
contradicts natural science itself ‘(Rahner, 1978, p.188) he is unfortunately incorrect 
in his claim. It is he who contradicts natural science (as outlined in this thesis) by 
claiming that man is not accidental and unintended, and, as this thesis has maintained, 
it is metaphysics and Christianity that must reinterpret their claims. 
 That being said, this does not detract from the fact that some of the solutions 
presented here can be found supported by Rahner. It must be emphasized again that 
Rahner is not being pointed to in support for what is being claimed in this thesis, but 
to show that the themes and questions raised are not isolated problems but represent 
central concerns in twentieth century Roman Catholic theology. This is thus used as a 
sort of ‘rubber stamp’ to claim that if the Christology presented here seems strained, 
or even alien, then the same must be said of Karl Rahner, one of the most influential 
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Roman Catholic theologians of the twentieth century (this is without acknowledging 
that other influential Catholic theologians, such as Henri de Lubac and Joseph 
Ratzinger, have, at various points, also been used to support the same Christology). 
 This being the case, two distinct elements of Rahner’s theology will be 
pointed to in order to demonstrate that the Christology presented in this thesis is 
distinctively Catholic: Rahner’s theology of the anonymous Christians and his 
relegation of the particularity of the Christ-event. Both of these themes, in one way or 
another, can be shown to anticipate what has been claimed here in terms of the 
broadening of the relevance of the incarnation and the subjective nature of its 
acceptance. Tying the two themes together, and thus of supreme importance for 
Rahner, as indeed it was for Teilhard de Chardin, and likewise this thesis, is a 
particular relationship between nature and grace. 
 
Anonymous Christians 
 One of the salient elements of Rahner’s theology is that the human being, by 
its very nature, knows God. It is for this reason that Rahner can write that ‘man 
always and inevitably has to do with God in his intellectual and spiritual existence, 
whether he reflects upon it or not, and whether he freely accepts it or not’ (Rahner, 
1978, p.69), meaning that an orientation towards God is the very ontological make-up 
of humanity. Precisely because humanity depends on God for its very existence 
(Rahner, 1978, pp.77-8), so it cannot ever be in a position, whether accepted or not, 
whether acknowledged or not, in which its life is not directed towards God. In fact, at 
one point Rahner even points to the language of ‘natural desire’ for God in order to 
explain this relationship between humanity and God (Rahner, 1978, p.298). Humanity 
desires a relationship with God as a part of its very nature, even if the individual 
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person does not know the name of this God or is aware of his self-revelation in Christ, 
or does not explicitly acknowledge such a desire. 
 If Christ is the culmination of God’s outpouring of grace, or even the single 
outpouring of grace in the world (Deane-Drummond, 2009, p.42), then this means 
that the person of Jesus Christ is supremely relevant and effective for all humans. This 
leads to Rahner’s doctrine of the ‘anonymous Christian’, that, 
 
anyone who, although far from any revelation explicitly formulated in words, 
accepts his existence in patient silence (or, better, in faith, hope and love), 
accepts it as the mystery which lies hidden in the mystery of eternal love and 
which bears life in the womb of death, is saying “yes” to Christ even if he does 
not know it (Rahner, 1978, p.228) 
 
 Acceptance of Christ for Rahner, therefore, is not judged on a conscious 
acceptance of the Gospel but on the acceptance of the eternal mystery that lies at the 
centre of all life, the eternal mystery that is the ground of one’s being in God; 
embracing one’s life is response to the Christ event. Put simply, the human who lives 
his life true to being a human, in terms of embracing the absolute freedom with which 
he is constituted, that person is a Christian, with or without the explicit self-revelation 
in Christ. That acceptance Rahner also sees in the love of the neighbour. Pointing to 
the passage in Matthew in which Jesus relates the love of neighbour to the love of 
God (NRSV, 1995, Mt 25.40), Rahner claims that the man who loves his neighbour 
also loves God, even if he is unaware of such a fact (Rahner, 1978, pp.295-6). In other 
words, for Rahner, love of the neighbour is an unmistakable expression of the natural 
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desire for God, and affirmation of the individual’s grounding in God, and a response 
to that affirmation (Rahner, 1978, pp.309-11). 
 Elsewhere in the same work he writes that ‘this global understanding of 
existence [is] already “Christian” because of antecedent grace’ (Rahner, 1978, p.295). 
In other words, life is Christian, not because of a conscious submission to God 
through Christ, but because grace, which is out poured in the incarnation, is the 
ground and basis of life. For Rahner, precisely because human existence is from the 
very moment of its inception directed towards God, who is the ontological foundation 
of creation, the human responds to the Christ event positively simply by living a life 
that is true to itself, without having to have had the opportunity to explicitly respond 
to the Christ-event in an ecclesial environment. For Rahner, response to Christ is not 
explicitly an ecclesial action. In fact, he claims that Christology, as an apologetic 
exercise, only has any value because those to whom it is directed have already made 
an unconscious ‘yes’ to the subject of that Christology (Rahner, 1978, p.294). 
 
a. “Anonymous Christians” as Ontological Position 
 Whilst the question of ‘anonymous Christians’ inevitably presents itself in 
relation to the post-life experience of those who, through no fault of their own, had no 
opportunity in life to hear the Gospel (i.e. do the unbaptized go to heaven?), any 
vision of the doctrine of anonymous Christians as solely to do with this question is to 
miss the scope of what is being claimed. The doctrine is not solely a response to an 
ecclesial (or evangelical) problem, but is actually an ontological one, and has far 
greater implication than for those who were not born, through no fault of their own, in 
the Western world (understood loosely, as Christianity is often defined as a ‘Western 
religion’ despite its universal following). The doctrine is more concerned with the 
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ontological condition of humanity, and the relationship with God on the level of 
being. The human cannot exist without the grace of God (hence the relationship of 
nature and grace). As a result of this, no human can truly be said to be without the 
presence of God in their lives. Thus, submission to this presence can be seen as 
response to the Christ event, even if they are unaware of either that presence or its 
revelation in Christ. 
 
b. “Anonymous Christians” in A Neo-Darwinian Context 
 Such a position can be claimed to be representative of this thesis, yet on a 
narrower plane because there is no reference to the neo-Darwinian synthesis. The 
freedom with which humanity can respond to the self-revelation in Christ (a neo-
Darwinian would argue) is an accidental occurrence and does not provide them with 
any objective advantage. This means that, just as for Rahner all of humanity can enter 
into relationship with God, whether consciously or not, so now it must be claimed that 
the whole of creation can enjoy such a privilege – humanity are no longer uniquely 
favoured by God. The freedom to respond is no longer a necessary requirement. Just 
as, for neo-Darwinism, consciousness does not represent an objective ascent of life, 
but simply one solution out of many for survival, so for theology ‘emergent freedom’ 
does not represent a pre-requisite for relationship with God, only one possible 
manifestation of relationship with God. God treats all creation precisely the same, and 
humanity does not enjoy a uniqueness in being able to freely respond to the Christ-
event (if, indeed, humanity is ‘free’ to begin with (cf. Pannenberg, 1985, p.29)). There 
is nothing to separate humanity objectively, fundamentally or ontologically from the 
rest of the animal world (and possibly even matter in general), and so there is likewise 
nothing about humanity which gives them a unique ability to respond to the Christ-
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event, only that their conscious, apparently free, response is different, neither better 
nor worse, than other responses. 
 Rahner’s doctrine of anonymous Christians, therefore, can be seen to 
anticipate what has been claimed here. For Rahner it was specifically humanity who 
were called to respond, yet now, precisely because the neo-Darwinian synthesis has 
destroyed any claim that humanity transcend the rest of creation, and thus enjoy an 
ontological equality, that privilege must be extended. The hydrogen atom is as much 
an anonymous Christian as is the human who has died without hearing the gospel. 
Once response to the Christ event is removed from a narrow, conscious acceptance of 
the revelation in the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth to a broader ratification of 
the person’s own being, then it is not a great step to broaden such a response further 
to include all of creation and not just intelligent life once the neo-Darwinian synthesis 
is taken seriously. 
 
 This does not mean, as it has already been claimed, that in Rahner there is 
support for the conclusion of this thesis, but it shows that the problem of the 
relationship of those outside of an ecclesial environment with God is not a problem 
that is exclusive to this thesis. In fact, not only is this problem not exclusive, it is one 
of the central problems of late twentieth century Roman Catholic theology. As the 
world becomes smaller, and the Catholic Church comes into closer contact with those 
who are not members, so the problem of how to engage with those outside its 
confines becomes more pressing. However, because this thesis approaches the 
problem from a neo-Darwinian perspective, the question is asked from a different 
angle and, as a result, a new dimension is focused upon, namely, the relationship of 
the non-human world to the Church. Rahner’s engagement with the problem 
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anticipates what it expounded in this thesis, but, as has already been claimed, he does 
not go far enough precisely because he is not a neo-Darwinian. 
 
The Relegation of the Particularity of Christ 
 The affirmation that humanity is directed towards God as the ground of its 
being, meaning that the response to the incarnation is found in the freedom of the 
individual, necessarily leads onto, and provides the foundation for, another important 
element of Rahner’s theology, namely, the relegation of the particularity of Christ. In 
the chapter on Christology in his Foundations of the Christian Faith, Rahner claims 
that theology demands that an ‘absolute saviour’ is necessary (Rahner, 1978, pp.228-
9). He then argues that there are very few criteria that need to be satisfied in order to 
be labelled ‘saviour’. This means that the particular details of Jesus’ life are relatively 
unimportant in order for him to be considered the ‘absolute saviour’ (Rahner, 1978, 
pp.245-6). 
 
a. The Problem of The Particulariness of Christ as Historical Problem 
 If all that is required of humanity is to ‘exercise this obedience [to God] by 
accepting his own existence without reservation’ (Rahner, 1978, p.306), then the 
particular historical details of Christ’s life are irrelevant: they do not impinge upon the 
individual accepting their own existence. This means that the incarnation could have 
happened in secret, without the preaching of the Word by Christ through first century 
Palestine, and nothing fundamentally different would be affirmed (indeed, the 
doctrine of ‘anonymous Christians’ affirms exactly that the incarnation has happened 
in secret!). If the individual can have a personal relationship with Christ without 
actually being aware of the object of that relationship (Rahner, 1978, p.305ff.) then 
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the ‘particularliness’ of Christ is inconsequential; all that is required is that the 
incarnation happened, at a real, concrete, historical time, at some point in the history 
of creation, at some location, the finer details making no important difference. 
 
 Of course this does not mean that Rahner denies, or even doubts, that the first 
century Palestinian rabbi Jesus of Nazareth was the incarnation of the second person 
of the Trinity. Far from it. However he affirms that Christ did not need to be Jesus; 
the particular details of Jesus’ life are not essential for his being the Christ. The 
incarnation did not need to happen in first century Palestine, but this does not mean 
that it did not. 
 Neither does this deny that the incarnation did not need to happen at all. 
Relegating the historical particularity of the Christ event does not mean that it can be 
completely ‘demythologized’ away as being merely conceptual. The incarnation 
needed to happen. The argument is that the details, and indeed knowledge of these 
details, are not important. The second person of the Trinity needed to become 
incarnate in order for the universe to come into being; he did not need to be a first 
century human for this to happen, but he was. 
 Importantly, this does not mean that the historical Jesus is unimportant. One of 
the potential problems with the relegation of the particular details of Christ’s human 
life is that Christology becomes docetic by default. To claim that it is not important 
for Christ to be Jesus is not the same thing as claiming that Jesus is unimportant 
(Jorge Maria Bergoglio did not need to become Pope, but, now that he is, his life 
becomes necessary to understanding his papacy). It is in this direction that O’Collins 
claimed that ‘Christology requires both some historical credible information and some 
philosophical structure’ (O’Collins, 1995, p.10). In the same way it can be said that 
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humanity is not a necessity, simply an accident of evolution; yet this does not mean 
that constructing a theological anthropology is not important. Christ did not need to 
be Jesus but he was. This makes the historical Jesus very important for theology but 
not necessary. 
 
b. The Problem of the Particulariness of Christ in the Context of Neo-Darwinism 
 Again, as with the anonymous Christians, there is in Rahner an anticipation of 
the conclusion of this thesis, namely, the accidental nature of Christ’s humanity and 
its revelation of the Godhead. One of the biggest problems with this thesis, it may be 
claimed, necessitated by a sober acceptance of the neo-Darwinian appraisal of the role 
of consciousness and the accidental genesis of humanity, is that the self-revelation of 
God in Christ, whilst remaining a necessity as the ground of existence, does not need 
to be manifested as a human, nor, further, does it need to be recognized by creatures. 
Just as the arrival of humanity in the universe is entirely accidental, and represents no 
qualitatively different or emergent property, so the self-revelation of God in human 
form is itself entirely accidental. The incarnation simply had to happen, as the coming 
together of divinity and creation. What particular individual manifestation of creation 
it occurred in is mostly irrelevant. 
 If it can be claimed, and upheld, that the conscious understanding of the self-
revelation of God in Christ, and the free response to it, are not essential elements of 
the individual’s relationship with God, then it follows that the explicit self-revelation 
of God in Christ is not essential either. The fact that Christ ‘became’ created, i.e. the 
incarnation, is, of course, essential. But the manifestation of it as a human and the 
conscious communication of God in him are not. Christ could have died as an infant, 
or born isolated from society, or, as this thesis has maintained, he could have been a 
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tree or a pebble or any other accidental manifestation of creation. It would have made 
no difference to the expectation on creation. Response to the Christ event, as Rahner 
makes clear (Rahner, 1978, p.228), does not require the conscious comprehension of 
it. 
 Therefore, just as Rahner was criticised above for not going far enough in 
broadening the relevance of Christ to all creation so his understanding of the 
particulariness of Christ does not go far enough either. Rahner still maintained that 
the absolute saviour had to be human (Rahner, 1978, pp.245-6). Rahner was no neo-
Darwinian. However, one of the main points of this thesis has been that humanity is 
accidental, and therefore Christ’s humanity must also be accidental. This means that 
the ‘absolute saviour’ did not have to be human in order to do what he did. This 
follows from the Patristic notion that it is not what Christ did but who he was, i.e. the 
divine person, the creator. 
 
 Again, it must be stressed that Rahner is not called upon as support for this 
thesis. Rahner arrived at his ‘reductionist’ Christology, at least as it is presented in 
Foundations of the Christian Faith, for historical critical reasons, whereas this thesis 
arrived at its ‘reductionist’ Christology for neo-Darwinist reasons. However what 
Rahner does show, as does Teilhard to a certain extent, whose own doctrine of the 
third nature of Christ could be interpreted as being a relegation of the importance of 
the historical Christ, is that the themes and questions raised in this thesis, and the 
conclusions reached, are not isolated problems but real problems for contemporary 
Catholic theology. All this thesis has done is attempt to discuss them within the 
framework of a neo-Darwinian paradigm. Or, to put the same point differently, the 
problems and issues raised attempting to formulate a neo-Darwinian Christology are 
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the same issues that other twentieth century Roman Catholic theologians deemed 
important for different reasons. 
 
The Christocentric Nature of Theology 
 One of the implications of the relegation of the particulariness of Christ is that 
his relevance becomes widened as he becomes less and less ‘tied’ to the first century 
Palestinian rabbi who was his historical appearance. However this widening of the 
relevance of the incarnation also has the implication of narrowing the role of the 
Spirit. 
 In Foundations of the Christian Faith, Rahner writes that ‘Christ is present 
and operative in non-Christian believers and hence in non-Christian religions in and 
through his Spirit’ (Rahner, 1978, p.316), and that the Spirit ‘can and must be 
called…the Spirit of Christ’ (Rahner, 1978, p.316). Rahner also affirms that there is a 
connection between the presence of grace and the presence of the Spirit (Rahner, 
1978, p.316). This means that the Holy Spirit is only ever considered within a 
Christological context; the Spirit only ever continues the work that was started by 
Christ, such that he can be called the Spirit of Christ. 
 This betrays an understanding of the Holy Trinity that is quintessentially 
Western; the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. In this way, Rahner’s 
Christocentricism is not a criticism that is limited to his theology, it is representative 
of the wider criticism of Western theology in general (Boff, 1997, p.166). Teilhard, 
too, was criticised for being Christocentric (cf. Grey, 2006, p.118). For both Rahner 
and Teilhard, the widening of the scope of the incarnation has impinged upon the 
work of the Spirit, so that the Spirit can only rightly be seen as doing the work of the 
Son. 
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a. Neo-Darwinism as Christocentric 
 Once again, therefore, Rahner has anticipated what has been concluded in this 
thesis. This thesis has likewise widened the scope of the incarnation to such an extent 
that there, at first glance, does not appear to be any room for the Spirit. The work of 
God is creation: this work is carried out specifically in the incarnation. If the Spirit is 
to be included, it could only ever be as an ‘addition’ to the incarnation, since that now 
becomes the main focus of the work of God. 
 There are further issues here. If God must become created in order to 
influence the world, then the Spirit must also be incarnate. This clearly impinges upon 
the uniqueness of the incarnation of the Son. 
 Further, the Holy Spirit is often used as a way of accounting for the continued 
presence and action of God in the universe (cf. Ramsey, 1973, p.1ff). However, if it is 
correct that neo-Darwinism argues for an ‘incarnational deism’ (the activity of God in 
the universe is singularly in the incarnation) then there is no need for a continued 
activity. This further weakens the role of the Spirit. 
 
 Likewise, a Christocentric account of creation also seems to ignore the role of 
the Holy Spirit in the incarnation itself. The Holy Spirit is seen, most notable in the 
Gospel of Luke (NRSV, 1995, Lk. 1.35), as being responsible for the conception of 
the Son in Mary. Even if the incarnation is emphasised to the detriment of other 
models of divine activity, there is still the problem of the relation of the Holy Spirit to 
the incarnation itself, especially in the light of the claim that God needs to become 
created in order to influence creation. 
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 It is not clear how this problem can be solved, and it is not necessary to 
attempt it here. However, it is important to note that the Christocentric nature of any 
theology does not mean that this theology is a failure. It only serves to strengthen its 
contextualisation within Roman Catholic theology. 
 
The Relationship between Nature and Grace 
 The reason that Rahner can maintain such a position as ‘anonymous 
Christianity’, and thus postulate an incarnation that does not demand our conscious 
knowledge of it as being essential, is precisely because of the relationship he 
postulates between nature and grace. 
 Rahner can claim what he does because he acknowledges that there is no such 
thing as ‘pure nature’ and that the human cannot exist without grace (Rahner, 1966, 
p.183; cf. Peter, 2012, p.89). This grace, as Deane-Drummond notes (2009, p.42), is 
singly bestowed in the incarnation. This means that the human, with or without their 
own knowledge of it, is already in a state of facing God and being drawn towards him 
as the natural condition of their lives. Whilst this position is dependent on the 
incarnation as its basis – as this thesis maintains as well – it is primarily an 
understanding of the relationship between nature and grace that underpins the whole 
position (Rahner, 1978, p.181). 
 The same can be said of Teilhard and his evolutionary theology. Whilst there 
are of course other elements that are essential to how Teilhard understands evolution 
to function in a theological perspective, it is ultimately a relationship between nature 
and grace that underpins his relationship between matter and spirit, and thus the 
overall function of evolution. 
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a. Nature and Grace in A Neo-Darwinian Context 
 This thesis has concluded that Teilhard is correct in his understanding of 
nature and grace. Christ can have the relationship he does with creation precisely 
because he is the bestower of grace (i.e. the only way that God can interact with this 
creation). The incarnation is the only, single, bestowal of grace (Deane-Drummond, 
2009, p.42), therefore the incarnation is responsible for nature i.e. creation. 
 In the same way that Rahner claims that the human is already naturally 
inclined towards God, and Teilhard claims basically the same thing whilst invoking 
evolution as the means of such an inclination, so this thesis takes over the same basic 
principle: the whole of creation, from the very first elementary particles to humanity, 
find ultimate significance and relevance in Christ. Yet this ultimate significance and 
relevance is subjective. It is only ‘he who has eyes that can see’ who can perceive that 
the individual already participates in the divine person and is deified. This dictates a 
reinterpretation of ‘vision’. Yet again, it is a doctrine of vision that is widened to 
include all of life. Deification is not just subjective for humanity but for all creatures. 
 
b. The Relevance of Vatican II 
 What is important about making such an observation is that it puts all three 
theologies (alongside others, such as Henri de Lubac, who was also used in support of 
the Christology espoused in this thesis), to some degree at least, within the bounds of 
acceptable theology after the Second Vatican Council. As was noted already 
regarding Teilhard’s evolutionary theory, he anticipated many of the themes of 
Vatican II and influenced many of its leading contributors (despite his reputation in 
Rome). Of course, it would be irresponsible to claim that a relationship between 
nature and grace is the sole outcome of the council (and in many respects it was the 
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influence behind Vatican II, rather than its conclusion), likewise that adherence to its 
precepts can be judged solely on the one issue. However, the point is to show that the 
issues raised in trying to construct a neo-Darwinian Christology, and the problems 
that it inevitably creates, are not only far from alien, but are actually anticipated in 
mainstream Catholic theology. 
 Once again this is not to claim thorough orthodoxy but to show that the 
problems wrestled with here do not separate it from contemporary Catholic theology 
but actually form part of that ongoing conversation. To put the point simply, if a neo-
Darwinian theology suggests Christocentricity, a relegation of the particularity of 
Christ, and an affirmation of the possibility of grace outside of the institution of the 
Church (as opposed to Church as an abstract concept comparable to the communion 
of saints), made possible because of a particular understanding of the relationship 
between nature and grace, then this is not an alien conclusion. In fact, it is exactly 
what should be expected from a modern Roman Catholic theology. 
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